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When I started my PhD project, I was pretty sure I knew what my dissertation 
was going to be about. Looking back, five years later, I must conclude that I 
didn’t have a clue at the time. I still don’t quite understand how it happened, 
but the topic of my dissertation changed completely over the years. Inspired 
by my work in psychiatry, I started out with an idea about the nature of men-
tal illness. I ended up writing a dissertation about the nature of commonsense 
psychology. From psychopathology to common sense: a rather surprising and 
admittedly radical shift of focus. 
Now that I have started working with psychiatric patients again, I am 
slowly but surely starting to see the connection. The other day, I interviewed 
a patient who was plagued by compulsive doubt. Everything he was aware of 
thinking or doing had to face a tribunal of critical thought. This process of un-
relenting self-reflection absorbed his mind, to the point that he felt mentally 
paralyzed, afraid to do or think anything at all. 
As in so many cases in psychiatry, the story of this patient reveals a core 
feature of mental health, a feature which tends to remain unnoticed due to the 
very fact that it enables healthy mental activity. In this case, it has to do with 
our capacity to think, plan and perform our actions spontaneously, without a 
moment of reflection disturbing the flow of mind.  What this patient had lost, 
I concluded after the interview, was the certainty of everyday practical life, the 
viii certainty of common sense that makes up the necessary background against 
which productive thought and action becomes possible. Due to some basic 
affective disturbance, I figured, this person had turned into an overreflective 
self-interpreter who could no longer rely on his common sense, which put 
every spontaneous impulse of mental activity to a halt and left him practically 
incapacitated. 
At the same time, I realized that this patient’s incapacity to rely on com-
mon sense had had a profound influence on my use of common sense during 
the interview. In order to make this person in front of me feel comfortable 
enough to allow me to explore the world from his perspective, and to get an 
idea of what the world was like for him, I had actively constrained the ways I 
normally rely on common sense for the period of the interview. I had inhibit-
ed some of my spontaneous ways of thinking and interacting in order to make 
room for his discrepant personal perspective. At the level of social interaction 
too, the interview with this patient brought out the absence of something we 
normally take for granted: that in socially engaging with one another in every-
day life, we unreflectively rely on our common sense, our common ways of 
experiencing, thinking and acting. 
Reconstructing the development of my ideas during the last five years, it 
seems I shifted focus from the nature of psychiatric illness to the nature of the 
health care professional’s interaction with people suffering from psychiatric ill-
ness, only to become fascinated by something which is significantly impaired 
in such interactions. This dissertation is about our reliance on common sense 
in everyday social engagements with one another. It argues against the con-
sensus view on social cognition in philosophy and psychology, which, as it 
turns out, models our ordinary interactions with one another on the kind of 
situation faced by psychiatrists when interviewing their patients. On this view, 
the difference between the two is of a mere quantitative nature, the clinician 
simply having to account for more discrepant mental states than the ordinary 
interpreter in order to make sense of the personal perspective of the individual 
she is facing. The more I interact with patients, the more I am convinced that 
this view is deeply mistaken. Looking back, this dissertation can be seen as an 
attempt to account for this difference in a qualitative way. It tries to explain 
our reliance on common sense in social interaction in terms of the ascription 
of a kind of mental state that is different in nature from the kind we attribute 
when attempting to understand the discrepant views of other people, as in the 
case of interpreting psychiatric patients. Commonsense psychology, I argue, is 
based on the ascription of public mental states, states that relate the individu-
als we interact with to the world of common understanding. 
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Introduction 
1.1 The Reflective Fallacy
We are all familiar with projectionist fallacies. Consider anthropomorphism, 
the projection of human characteristics onto members of other species. Or 
take ‘the curse of knowledge’, the widely studied phenomenon of projecting 
one’s own knowledge onto the more naïve person. Typically, such projection-
ist inclinations are countered by reflection. Adopting a critical stance toward 
the act of attribution often reveals the differences between oneself and the 
animal or other person, resulting in attenuation or withdrawal of the attribu-
tions made.
In this book I want to introduce a kind of projectionist fallacy that is dif-
ferent in this respect. Rather than being countered by taking a step back and 
reflecting on the matter, it precisely arises out of such reflection. In particular, 
it springs from philosophical reflection. This is what I call the ‘reflective fallacy’. 
The reflective fallacy is the fallacy of projecting certain philosophical analy-
ses of thought and action onto our commonsense conception of ourselves as 
thinking agents. It may be a quite general phenomenon in philosophy. Here, 
however, the focus lies on a specific instance: that of regarding a particularly 
reflective form of action understanding in terms beliefs and desires as an ad-
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equate account of our spontaneous understanding of each other’s actions in 
terms of goals and reasons. 
It has become customary among philosophers and psychologists to use 
the term ‘folk psychology’ (or ‘commonsense psychology’) to refer to the rich 
set of concepts we employ in our everyday lives to make sense of each other’s 
thoughts, feelings, utterances and actions. Within this conceptual framework, 
a central place is reserved for the concept of intentional action. It is the con-
cept we deploy when making sense of each other’s behavior in terms of goals 
and reasons for action. It applies to Bill, who explains that he couldn’t come 
to the party yesterday because he had to finish his report in order to ensure his 
candidacy for the position that has just become vacant at work. Or to Betty, 
who, considering her father’s sudden illness, decided to cancel her trip so that 
she could help him around the house. Making sense of others in terms of the 
goals and reasons that motivate them to make certain decisions and perform 
certain actions is a core activity of human social cognition. It reveals the hu-
man mind as a rational mind, a mind capable of reasoning about what to do 
and why, i.e. as a discursive mind. 
Established wisdom in many corners of philosophy has it that our com-
monsense understanding of rational, discursive minds evolves around the 
concepts of belief and desire. On this picture, folk psychology is essentially 
a form of belief-desire psychology. The idea seems simple enough. To adopt 
a goal, one must have a desire to achieve something. And to perform a goal-
directed action in response, one must have certain beliefs about the means 
to achieve it. Interpreting someone as acting intentionally must therefore 
involve deployment of the concepts of belief and desire. Thus, Bill must have 
had a desire to be eligible for the new job at work and must have believed that 
finishing his report in time would make him eligible. This, in turn, must have 
evoked his desire to finish his report yesterday evening, which, guided by his 
belief that he would not be able to do so if he went to the party, resulted in his 
decision to stay home working on his report.  
But there is more. Belief-desire psychology works irrespectively of the fea-
sibility, truth or appropriateness of the beliefs and desires ascribed. Little Peter 
wanted to fly to the moon so he made himself a couple of wings from old 
newspapers. Cathy decided to buy a lottery ticket because she was convinced 
she was going to win the jackpot this time. Of course little Peter wouldn’t fly 
to the moon in a million years, and the chances of Cathy winning the lottery 
were just about as slim. Belief-desire psychology enables us to make sense of 
all forms of intentional action with the use of one single explanatory strategy, 
whether the actions under consideration are realistic, acceptable, appropriate, 
In
tr
od
uc
tio
n
3 
or not. And it makes sense to everyone. Just take a moment and reflect on the 
last thing you did before picking up this book. No doubt you can find an ex-
planation that fits the scheme of belief-desire psychology. It’s really amazing. 
It works every time.
As coherent and commonsensical as this story may sound, I think it pre-
sents us with a deeply distorted picture of our ordinary understanding of one 
another as discursively engaged human beings who perform goal-directed ac-
tions for reasons. It exemplifies a relatively detached, typically philosophical 
way of thinking about mind and action, which is not representative for our 
commonsense conception of discursive agency. Belief-desire psychology, so 
I will argue, is not the conceptual core of folk psychology; it only appears 
to be from a particularly reflective stance. If true, this claim is not only of 
philosophical significance. Following the philosophical orthodoxy, many psy-
chologists and other cognitive (neuro-)scientists these days take belief-desire 
psychology as their starting point for further empirical inquiry, as the central 
explanandum of folk psychology their theories are designed to explain. If I am 
correct, however, they have been targeting the wrong phenomenon, mistaking 
what typically serves as a philosophical reconstruction of social cognition for 
the actual psychology of human discursive engagement.  
The problem with this so-called ‘Belief-Desire Model’ of folk psychology 
is that it portrays our sensitivity to the discursive minds of others in an exclu-
sively representationalist and individualist, subjectivist way. Beliefs and desires 
are representational states. As Davidson (1983/2001c, p. 138) once observed: 
“Much of the point of the concept of belief is the potential gap it introduces 
between what is held to be true and what is true.” Mastery of the concept of 
belief requires that we be able to ascribe false beliefs, informational states that 
misrepresent the world. Likewise, mastery of the concept of desire is evidenced 
by the capacity to ascribe unrealistic, unacceptable or conflicting desires, mo-
tivational states that misrepresent the world as we ourselves want or expect 
it to be. Ascription of belief and desire as such must go accompanied by an 
acknowledgement of the possibility that the ascribed beliefs and desires are 
or turn out to be false, unfulfilled or inappropriate. Modeling our common-
sense understanding of intentional action exclusively on these concepts, the 
Belief-Desire Model thus gives a thoroughly individualist picture of the folk 
psychological conception of mind. It depicts our understanding of the relation 
between another agent and the world as being mediated by her (mis)represen-
tations of, her subjective and possibly inaccurate or inappropriate views on the 
world. On the Belief-Desire Model, we perceive the discursive minds of others 
as essentially private minds. Accordingly, interpreting someone in terms of her 
Introduction
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beliefs and desires reveals the way she (mis)takes the world to be, and not 
necessarily anyone else.
This picture flies in the face of common sense, or so I will argue. The main 
aim of this book is to show why this is so and to put an alternative picture in 
its place. I will call it the ‘Relational Model’ of folk psychology. Against the 
representationalist aspect of current orthodoxy, I will argue that interpretation 
of others in terms of their goals and reasons is first and foremost a kind of rela-
tional sense-making. Our default mode of discursive understanding of another 
person consists in quite literally seeing a connection between that person and 
her goals and reasons, as if by drawing an arrow from the person to certain sali-
ent and significant (past, present or future) events or situations. In such cases, 
interpreting someone starts with looking out into the world in search of her 
goals and reasons and it ends with finding them there. At no time during this 
interpretative act do we conceive of the other person as a world-representer. 
Against the individualist or subjectivist aspect, I hold that interpreting 
others in terms of their goals and reasons takes place against the background 
of the common world. We tend to treat each other’s intentional attitudes as 
intersubjective phenomena. This should not be understood as claiming that we 
interpret another person’s intentional attitudes through, or as, sharing those 
attitudes ourselves, nor as saying that his or her intentional attitudes constitu-
tively depend on our own presence or social engagement. Both may be true in 
some cases. We sometimes do instantiate the same intentional attitudes when 
attending or acting jointly, and, more controversially, an interpretee’s inten-
tional attitude towards an interpreter may be partly constituted (rather than 
merely caused) by the interpreter’s presence and engagement. The claim here 
is rather this: that in our daily social affairs, we generally assume a person’s 
intentional attitudes to consist in a relation between the individual person and 
the common world. This turns the minds of others into essentially public enti-
ties, entities whose acts of thinking and intending imply the existence of a 
community to which they belong. On this alternative picture of folk psycho-
logy, our basic understanding of the thoughts and actions of others is confined 
to how they ought to think and act under the circumstances, in accordance 
with established socio-cultural norms of reasoning and proper conduct. The 
private, representationalist conception of mind has no role to play in our 
spontaneous folk psychological practices. 
I do not aspire to be a radical eliminativist about representationalist belief-
desire psychology, however. Ascribing private beliefs and desires does belong to 
our folk psychological repertoire. But it is not our primary way of discursively 
engaging with others, not even when it comes to attributing goals and reasons 
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for action. Belief-desire psychology, I claim, is an essentially complementary 
interpretation strategy. It is not the conceptual core of folk psychology, nor 
the driving psychological force behind our discursive engagements with one 
another. Rather, it is an interpretative tool designed for reflection on and man-
agement of such discursive engagements when our default, relational modus 
of understanding runs aground. 
Herein also lies the source of the reflective fallacy. As I pointed out above, 
it is amazing that belief-desire psychology always works. Parsing goals and 
reasons in terms of beliefs and desires is a move that is always available for a 
competent participant of discursive practice. Any story about folk psychology 
should be able to account for this remarkable fact. The line of reasoning that 
leads to the reflective fallacy starts with an acknowledgement of this fact, but 
it then derails by trying to explain it in terms of the conceptual structure of folk 
psychology or the psychological requirements for wielding it. The alternative is 
to account for this fact in terms of the social function of belief-desire psycho-
logy in human social life.
1.2 Preview
The distinction between the private and the public dimension of the common-
sense mind has generally been neglected in the debate on folk psychology. 
Getting it into full view requires that we dig deeper into the conceptual frame-
work in which much of the debate has been taking place. The private-public 
distinction does not parallel the oppositions that have held the debate in its 
grip over the last 30 years. It runs orthogonal to the question whether deploy-
ment of folk psychology is primarily a matter of theorizing about one another 
by means of a ‘theory of mind’, as the ‘Theory Theory’ of folk psychology has 
it, or rather consists in a simulative procedure during which we try to under-
stand the world from the other person’s point of view, as on the ‘Simulation 
Theory’ (e.g. Davies and Stone 1995a, 1995b, Carruthers and Smith 1996). Nor 
does it match the distinction between an ‘internal’ conception of mind on the 
one hand and an ‘enacted’ conception on the other. On the first, social cogni-
tion is best explained as a process of getting access to the mental states behind 
the expressions we see and the utterances we hear, entities that lie underneath 
the surface of social interaction, to be inferred from the outside by means of 
a theory or to be experienced from the inside by means of simulation (e.g. 
Herschbach 2008b, Spaulding 2010, Jacob 2011). On the second, other minds 
are encountered as essentially embodied entities as they take shape in the in-
Introduction
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teraction itself, entities directly perceived in the behavior displayed, whose 
boundaries are drawn only by the activities they engage in (e.g. Gallagher 
2011, Zahavi 2011, Hutto 2011c). As we shall see in the following chapters, all 
these different and sometimes mutually incompatible accounts can and should 
acknowledge the folk psychological distinction between the private and the 
public sphere of mind. 
Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of the Belief-Desire Model of action 
explanation as it has been developed in action theory and shows how this ac-
count has been widely adopted in the debate on folk psychology. It also gives 
a first impression of the Relational Model and introduces relational mindreading 
as a technical notion for the relational understanding of other people’s goals 
and reasons for action in everyday discursive practice. Relational mindread-
ing is a form of social understanding through which we perceive others as 
being intentionally directed toward the world in propositionally articulated, 
truth-evaluable ways, without, however, conceiving of them as representing the 
world in those ways. Relational mindreading thus consists in the ascription of 
non-representational, relational propositional attitudes. 
To many a philosopher’s ear, talking about a mental state with propo-
sitional content just is talking about a representational state. Accordingly, 
conceiving of someone as saying or thinking that such-and-such entails ap-
preciation of the fact that he or she represents the world as such-and-such in 
doing so, or at least presupposes this fact. From this perspective, the idea of a 
non-representationalist folk conception of the propositional attitudes is sim-
ply incoherent. I take this orthodoxy seriously and will therefore consider it 
a genuine challenge for the Relational Model to reveal the notion of a non-
representational propositional attitude as conceptually coherent, i.e. to estab-
lish the validity of the conceptual distinction between (the attribution of) such 
relational propositional states and their representational counterparts.  
This first challenge for the Relational Model sets the agenda for chapters 
3 and 4. Chapter 3 provides an elaborate discussion of Sellars’s well-known 
‘Myth of Jones’ in his ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (1956/1997). 
Sellars myth has often been considered the intellectual inspiration for repre-
sentationalist Theory Theories of folk psychology.  But it actually turns out 
to be the perfect philosophical tool for introducing a mere relational concep-
tion of mindreading. Chapter 4 goes beyond Sellars’s particular conceptual 
framework and shows how we can make the distinction between the repre-
sentational/private and the relational/public dimension of mind irrespective 
of specific commitments regarding the nature of mental states and mental 
state attribution. We can cash out the distinction between relational and re-
In
tr
od
uc
tio
n
7 
presentational mindreading on all dominant theories in the literature: Theory 
Theories, Simulation Theories, internalist and enactivist accounts alike 
Having met the challenge of conceptual validity, the next question is 
whether we should expect the distinction between (the ascription of) relation-
al and representational propositional attitudes to make an actual difference 
in human social affairs. Besides being conceptually valid, is the distinction 
also empirically robust? This constitutes the second challenge for the Relational 
Model and it will be addressed in chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the cognitive feasibility and the practical importance 
of relational mindreading. First, relational mindreading will be incorporated 
into current explanatory theories that explicitly target the subpersonal im-
plementation basis of our folk psychological competence. Second, powerful 
considerations will be presented as to why relational mindreading should be 
considered the psychological linchpin of human discursive practice. Relational 
mindreading plays a vital role in the quick and reliable attribution of propo-
sitional attitudes in quotidian, holistically structured contexts of interpreta-
tion, it easily accounts for the attribution of knowledge implied by ordinary 
explanations of action, and it guides children’s first attempts at discursively in-
teracting with others. In all these respects, the Relational Model gives a much 
more plausible picture of the psychology of common sense-making than the 
Belief-Desire Model. 
In chapter 6, attention shifts towards the important complementary func-
tions of representational mindreading. As indicated in the previous section, 
representational belief-desire psychology enables us to make sense of others 
even when their attitudes fail to align with our common assessment of the 
world. This makes it rather superfluous at the ground level of human discursive 
engagement, and rather impractical when used for predictive and explanatory 
purposes from a strictly third-person point of view. The private conception of 
mind is of great value, however, for the management of our discursive engage-
ments in difficult or problematic social situations, and it proves necessary for 
critical evaluation of the norms that shape those interactions. 
The distinction between relational and representational mindreading, be-
tween the attribution of public and private mental states, cuts across our folk 
psychological practices. Why has it generally been ignored in philosophical 
practice? Chapter 7 returns to the reflective fallacy. Having established both 
the conceptual validity and the empirical robustness of relational mindread-
ing, it can now be fully appreciated why the in principle availability of belief-
desire explanations of intentional action should not be explained in terms of 
conceptual entailment or psychological requirement. The account presented 
Introduction
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in chapter 6 moreover suggests that it be understood as a particular manifesta-
tion of the evaluative function of belief-desire psychology in human social 
practice. The in principle availability of belief-desire explanations of inten-
tional action can be explained in terms of the social dynamics of philosophical 
practice itself. In
tr
od
uc
tio
n
2_ 
Goal-Reason Psychology
2.1 Introduction
One of the primary jobs of philosophy is to provide an accurate characteriza-
tion of the phenomena we want to explain. In the debate on folk psychology, 
however, most philosophers seem to have been more interested in providing 
explanations than in directing their conceptual scrutiny to the explanandum 
their theories were targeting. In a rush to enter into the debate, many started 
from the allegedly commonsensical assumption that folk psychology is belief-
desire psychology. But this is itself a substantial theoretical claim, presenting 
us with a model of folk psychology that is certainly debatable as such. 
In this chapter I start from what I consider to be a more neutral charac-
terization of folk psychology, i.e. that, amongst other things, it conceptualizes 
behavior in terms of goals and reasons for action. The question then becomes 
whether such goal-reason psychology is best understood as belief-desire psy-
chology. The preliminary conclusion at the end of this chapter will be that it 
is not. Commonsense goal-reason psychology is first and foremost goal-reason 
psychology, and wielding it consists in drawing connections between agents, 
their goals and their reasons.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will discuss the Belief-
10
Desire Model of action explanation in action theory. Then, in the third section, 
I will show how this account has been adopted almost unanimously as an ac-
count of the psychology of folk psychology, i.e. of the attribution of goals and 
reasons in everyday social practice. The fourth section explores the relation 
between goal-reason attribution and belief-desire attribution and concludes 
with the suggestion that the former does not require the latter. This carries over 
to section 5, where it is proposed that the relation between goal-reason psy-
chology and belief-desire psychology should not be explained psychologically 
(in terms of presupposition) or logically (in terms of entailment), but rather 
socially (in terms of the rationale of belief-desire ascriptions in social practice). 
This will give us a first insight into the nature of the reflective fallacy intro-
duced in the previous chapter. Section 5 thereby also gives a first impression of 
the Relational Model of folk psychology as an alternative to the Belief-Desire 
Model. Section 6 coins the term ‘relational mindreading’ as a non-projectionist 
philosophical characterization of commonsense goal-reason attribution and 
places it in the context of the mindreading literature. This then sets the stage 
for the chapters to follow. 
2.2 The Belief-Desire Model of Action Explanation
In order to make sense of an intentional action of another person, it is often 
important that we understand the purpose or goal of the action. It may also be 
important that we understand the reasons for which the action is performed. 
Thus, if John is walking down the street, it may be relevant that we find out 
that e.g., he is walking towards the supermarket in order to buy some milk. 
And it may be equally relevant that we know that he intends to do so because 
he has run out of milk, or because he won’t be able to go to the supermarket 
tomorrow, or because he’s having some friends over for lunch (his reason for 
having this goal). We can also think of situations in which it is important that 
we find out about the reason for his walking towards the supermarket (rather 
than e.g. taking his car) or his walking on this particular street (rather than tak-
ing the usual route). Perhaps his car is at the garage, so that walking is the best 
means of transportation given the circumstances (John’s reason for walking in 
order to achieve his goal). Or maybe construction work is blocking his usual 
route, so that taking this route is the shortest way to the supermarket at the 
moment (his reason for walking on this particular street in order to achieve 
his goal).
In the example above, John’s goal is given by a description of the intended 
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result of his action: an event (in order to buy some milk at the supermarket). His 
reasons are presented as states of affairs (because he has run out of milk) or facts 
(that walking is the best means of transportation given the circumstances). Goals 
and reasons thusly characterized are the things we often mention by using 
‘in order to’, ‘because’ or ‘for the reason that’ clauses when giving answers 
to questions why regarding our actions. In what follows I shall use the terms 
‘goal’ and ‘reason’ accordingly. Thus, goals are the things we intend to bring 
about by acting: events, or states of affairs. Reasons are the things that we con-
sider to obtain (have obtained, will obtain) and to favor adopting certain goals 
and performing certain actions as a means to achieve them: what we perceive 
to be states of affairs, events or facts that solicit a response.1  
Taking our commonsense explanations of action at face value, it seems 
we often engage in what we might term ‘goal-reason psychology’: we interpret 
each other’s actions in terms of the goals we intend to achieve in the light 
reasons that make these goals and their means worth accomplishing. Even if 
we do not know the specific goal of another person’s action, there often seems 
to be an implicit assumption to the effect that the action has some goal or 
other. And knowing the goal of an action often seems to carry the assumption 
that the goal is adopted and the particular action performed for certain rea-
sons. Thus, seeing John walking down the street, we’d probably assume that 
he is going somewhere to do something for some reason, and that his walking 
down this street is somehow conducive to his reaching his goal. It is assump-
tions of this kind that motivate us to ask him, on certain occasions, where he is 
going, what he is going to do there and why, etc. From an interpretative point 
of view, in short, many intentional actions imply goals and reasons for which 
they are performed.
One of the central themes in contemporary philosophy of action is to ob-
tain a precise understanding of these implications. According to what has be-
come the standard account, goal-reason explanations of action evolve around 
the concepts of belief and desire. Proper understanding of some behavioral 
event as a genuine instance of intentional action, i.e. an action directed at 
1 For similar use of the notion of a reason for action see e.g. Dancy (2000), Bittner (2001), 
Stoutland (2007), Alvarez (2010). There is a longstanding tradition in the philosophy of action 
according to which an agent’s ‘motivating’ reasons for action are psychological states of the agent: 
belief-desire (pro attitude) pairs that represent the things to be achieved and the things taken into 
consideration or responded to by performing the action (cf. Davidson 1963/2001a, Smith 1987, 
1994). For now, this can be regarded as a mere terminological difference. The issue that concerns us 
here is whether the attribution of goals and reasons, in my sense of the term, implies the attribution 
of such belief-desire (pro attitude) pairs (see below). See the appendix to this chapter for further 
discussion.
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achieving certain goals in the light of certain reasons, demands that we regard 
it as being informed by appropriately structured beliefs and desires: beliefs 
representing the agent’s reasons and desires representing the agent’s goals. 
Davidson once claimed that “In order to understand how a reason of any 
kind rationalizes an action it is necessary […] that we see, at least in essential 
outline, how to construct a primary reason.” (1963/2001a p. 4)2 Davidson in-
troduces the technical notion of a primary reason – not to be confused with 
the notion of a reason for action introduced above – as consisting of a pro 
attitude of the agent towards actions of a certain kind and a belief of the agent 
that his action is of that kind.3 Thus, in the example above, John’s primary 
reason could consist of his desire to perform a certain type of action, namely 
getting some milk, and his belief that his walking down the street satisfies this 
description of this action type, that is: that his walking down the street is a 
way of getting some milk. 
Davidson’s claim reads that in order to understand an action as an inten-
tional action performed for a reason, it is necessary that we take there to be 
some pro attitude/belief pair or other that rationalizes the action. In many 
cases, finding out the specific pro attitude/belief pair is highly relevant, and 
explicit ‘construction’ of such primary reason may be required. But even if we 
do not know the specific pro attitude-belief pair that informed the agent’s ac-
tion, conceiving of her performance as an intentional action demands that we 
assume, ‘at least in essential outline’, some such pair to appropriately describe 
the event. Thus, in order to understand John’s walking down the street as an 
intentional action, it is necessary, according to Davidson, that we see it as be-
ing informed by some pro attitude-belief pair or other.
More recently, Michael Smith (1987; 1994; 1998/2004) has defended what 
he terms the ‘Humean’ account of action explanation. A Humean explanation 
of an intentional action proceeds by citing a suitably structured belief-desire 
pair, consisting of a desire toward some end and a belief regarding the means.4 
In John’s case above: his desire to go to the supermarket and his belief that 
walking down the street is a means to achieve that end, or his desire to buy 
some milk and his belief that going to the supermarket is a means to achieve 
2 The quote reads ‘and sufficient’ between the brackets. This sufficiency claim is not relevant 
for our present purposes, nor is it plausible, as Davidson himself later recognized (e.g. 1978/2001a). 
3 “R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d only if 
R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a belief of the 
agent that A, under the description d, has that property.” (Davidson, 1963/2001a, p. 5)
4 Cf. Smith (1987, p. 36): “R at t constitutes a motivating reason of agent A to φ iff there is 
some ψ such that R at t consists of a desire of A to ψ and a belief that were he to φ he would ψ.” 
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that end, etc. 
Smith’s Humean account makes two claims. The first is “that it is al-
ways possible to construct a Humean, belief/desire explanation of action.” 
(1998/2004, p. 155) The second claim is that “once we see the central place 
occupied by Humean belief/desire explanations, we see that all the other ex-
planations we give simply supplement this basic Humean story.” (p. 156) The 
first claim is rather non-committal; it merely states that folk psychologically 
competent interpreters have the capacity to parse an agent’s goals and reasons 
in terms of her beliefs and desires when the social situation demands it. 
It is the second claim that makes the Humean account more substantive. 
For it says that Humean belief-desire explanations form the explanatory core of 
all explanations of intentional action we provide in daily social life, including 
explanations in terms of the agent’s goals and reasons, in the perfectly ordinary 
sense identified above. Thus, when we explain an action by describing a state 
of affairs, e.g. John’s going to the supermarket because he’s run out of milk, 
we do not, Smith argues, “compete with the basic Humean story in terms of 
desire and belief, but rather presuppose and add to it.” (p. 157, emphasis added) 
He later changes this into the more careful claim that “commonsense expla-
nations [of action] presuppose the availability of a standard, Humean, belief/
desire explanation.” (p. 176, emphasis added) Thus we seem to arrive at the 
same core claim that Davidson made, be it in terms of desires rather than the 
general class of pro attitudes.5 In order to understand how a reason of any kind 
explains an action it is necessary that we see (we have to presuppose), at least 
in essential outline (the availability of), how to construct a primary reason (a 
Humean belief-desire explanation). This is what I shall term the ‘Belief-Desire 
Model’ or ‘BD-Model’ of action explanation. 
This section started with the assumption that making sense of an inten-
tional action often demands that we engage in ‘goal-reason psychology’: that 
we interpret the action as having a goal and being performed for reasons. The 
BD-Model takes this assumption one step further by stating that understand-
ing an agent as having goals and acting for reasons in turn demands that we 
see him as instantiating appropriately interlocking beliefs and desires, or at 
least rests on appreciation of the fact that explanation in terms of such beliefs 
5 A desire is just one kind of pro attitude, as Davidson used the latter term: “under [pro atti-
tudes toward actions of a certain kind] are to be included desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and 
a great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and 
public and private goals and values…” (1963/2001a, p.4)  The distinction between desires and pro 
attitudes is not very important for our purposes. In what follows, I will use the term ‘desire’ to refer 
to a broader class of pro attitudes, viz. those pro attitudes that have representational, propositional 
content (see section 2.4).  
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and desires is available in principle. On this picture, our commonsense under-
standing of an agent’s action on the one hand, and his goals and reasons on 
the other, is brought together in virtue of their sharing a common presupposi-
tion: that the action is informed by the agent’s beliefs and desires.
2.3 Folk Psychology as Belief-Desire Psychology
The BD-Model of action explanation in the philosophy of action has had a 
profound influence on philosophical treatment of folk psychology. In the 
most neutral sense of the term, folk psychology comprises the large body 
of commonsense explications, explanations, predictions, etc. we, ‘the folk’, 
generate in the service of making sense of each other in everyday social life. 
Philosophical interest in folk psychology ranges from more metaphysical con-
cerns to more epistemological ones. 
On the metaphysical side, the focus lies on the status of folk psychology 
in relation to (mature) cognitive neuroscience. On David Lewis’s (1972) influ-
ential analysis, folk psychology is to be regarded as an implicit functionalist 
theory that specifies how mental states are causally related to sensory stimuli, 
motor output and other mental states. Mental state terms, as ‘the folk’ under-
stands them, are implicitly defined by this commonsense functionalist theory. 
On this analysis, our folk psychological concepts are theoretical concepts 
indicating functional entities that occupy causal roles in the production of 
thought and action. Lewis’s conceptual analysis of folk psychology as a term-
introducing theory gave rise to heated discussions about the relation between 
this presumed folk psychological theory on the one hand and our scientific 
theories on the other, that is: those scientific theories that aim at explaining 
the production of thought and action. Some proposed a mesh between the 
two and argued for a vindication of folk psychology by cognitive science (e.g. 
Fodor 1987, Dretske 1988), others envisaged a clash that would result in the 
scientific elimination of folk psychology (e.g. Churchland 1981, Stich 1983), 
while still others suggested a slightly more relaxed interpretation of Lewis’s 
analysis and proposed a rather independent and peaceful co-existence of folk 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience (e.g. Dennett 1987, Jackson and Pettit 
1988).  A minority took a different approach altogether by taking issue with 
the heart of Lewis’s proposal. They challenged his construal of folk psychology 
as a theory and thereby tried to disarm the heated debate about the fate and 
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future of folk psychology  (e.g. Wilkes 1991, Baker 1995).6  
Without exception and regardless of their differences, all these accounts 
are explicitly framed in terms of the attitudes of belief and desire. At first sight, 
this may seem a rather innocent consequence of their preferred choice of sub-
ject: the ontology of these propositional attitudes. Are the folk concepts of 
belief and desire functionalist concepts, do they purport to say anything about 
what’s going on inside our heads, and if so, how does that fare with what our 
best scientific theories have to say about that? These are surely important is-
sues in the philosophy of mind that justify specific interest in our belief and 
desire concepts. But closer inspection reveals that this focus was also moti-
vated by an assumption about the structure of folk psychology, viz. that it is, at 
its core, a belief-desire psychology. Thus, Baker explicitly states that “Although 
commonsense psychology encompasses much more than propositional atti-
tudes […] belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology.” 
(1999, p. 3) In similar fashion, Fodor tells us that “the theory from which we 
get [our] extraordinary predictive power is just good old commonsense belief/
desire psychology” (1987, p.3), Churchland targets propositional attitudes 
such as belief and desire as “the principal elements of common-sense psychol-
ogy” (1981, p. 67), and Dennett holds that in exercising our folk psychological 
capacities, “we approach each other as intentional systems, that is: entities 
whose behavior can be predicted by the method of attributing beliefs, desires 
and rational acumen.” (1987, p. 49)7 Underlying their interest in the ontology 
of the propositional attitudes, then, we find a commitment relating to the 
psychology of folk psychology, viz. that the ascription of beliefs and desires to 
one another is the central engine of our practice of explicating, explaining and 
predicting each other’s thoughts and actions in daily social life. 
The psychology of folk psychology is the target of the (descriptive) epis-
temological debate on folk psychology (cf. Goldman 1993; 2000). Here the 
central question concerns our adult capacity to generate and understand 
folk psychological, explications, explanations, predictions, etc. What pre-
cisely does it consist in? Traditionally, the debate was defined by two main 
6 Some writings of Dennett seem to point in this direction as well. See especially his distinc-
tion between folk psychology as ‘craft’ and as ‘ideology’ (Dennett 1991).
7 Dennett is rather explicit about the actual interpretation activity in folk psychological prac-
tice: “First you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then 
you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. 
Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you 
predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical 
reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in many – but not all – instances yield a 
decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do.” (1987, p. 17)
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positions.8 According to the first, our explicit attempts to make sense of other 
people are effectuated by implicit deployment of a ‘theory of mind’ (Premack 
and Woodruff 1978). This general position, termed the ‘Theory Theory’ (TT) 
(Morton 1980), is the epistemological counterpart of the Lewisian analysis of 
folk psychology.9 Theory theorists argue that our understanding of other peo-
ple’s actions requires making use, in some way or other, of a theory that speci-
fies the functional roles of beliefs, desires and other psychological states. We 
use this folk psychological theory to make inferences to the best explanation 
as to what an agent’s mental states are and how they give rise to behavior. It 
is not a theory that we have conscious access to or that we can state explicitly 
on demand. Rather the theory is said to be tacit or implicit, meaning that it 
is stored in our brains, subconsciously guiding the information processes that 
lead up to our explicit judgments about the actions and mental states of oth-
ers. (cf. Davies 1994, Stone and Davies 2001, Ravenscroft 2003) 
This theoretical approach to the epistemology of folk psychology was the 
default position in philosophy until the mid 1980’s, when Jane Heal (1986) 
and Robert Gordon (1986), later followed by Goldman (1989), proposed a 
‘Simulation Theory’ (ST) of folk psychology. On this proposal our capacity for 
explaining and predicting other people’s thoughts and actions is not medi-
ated by a theory that specifies the functional roles of mental states, but rather 
proceeds by using our own (practical) reasoning skills and emotional responses 
as a model of the minds of others. Thus, instead of theorizing about other 
people’s reasoning, we simply ‘replicate’ (Heal) that reasoning ourselves, thus 
arriving at their conclusions by letting our own reasoning skills determine 
which are the proper and relevant inferences to make. Explaining or predict-
ing another person’s action, we identify with them (Gordon) or place ourselves 
in their shoes (Goldman) and let our own practical reasoning skills and other 
response mechanisms work on the pretend context of action in order to find 
out why the agent performed the action or what her next move is going to be. 
8 Goldman (1989, 2006) distinguishes a third position he terms ‘rationality theory’, which 
he attributes to Davidson and Dennett. Rationality theory has never played an important role in 
the epistemological debate on folk psychology, mainly because its two leading proponents did 
not directly participate in it. In fact, their concerns were mainly with the metaphysical aspects of 
folk psychology. Like Lewis, they put forward an account of folk psychological concepts in order 
to make progress on the metaphysics of mind.  The leading idea is that the use of folk psycho-
logical concepts is governed by norms of rationality that make folk psychology indispensible but 
in principle unfit for description, or even approximation, of sub-personal processes (Dennett) or 
nomological regularities of physics (Davidson). Yet, they also appear to be making claims about 
the actual folk psychological activity of interpreting other people, Dennett in particular (see n. 7). 
9 In fact, one could argue that it is the epistemological implication of the Lewisian analysis. 
For an interesting discussion on this score, see Jackson, Mason and Stich (2009). 
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Exploiting our folk psychological capacity for making sense of other people 
does not primarily consist in the deployment of tacit knowledge of a func-
tionalist theory of mind. Our most important interpretation skills are ‘process 
driven’ rather than ‘knowledge driven’ (Goldman 1989).
Recently, a third general approach has been introduced in the debate. 
This approach stresses the interpretationist insight (e.g. Davidson 1970/2001a, 
Dennett 1987) that folk psychological practice is a normative practice. Folk psy-
chological practice is not only a matter of explanation and prediction, but also, 
and most importantly, of justification, regulation and education (cf. Morton 
2003, McGeer 2007, Gallagher and Hutto 2007, Hutto 2008a, Zawidzki 2008, 
Andrews 2009). According to Hutto (2008a), for example, folk psychological 
practice is an essentially narrative practice. He attacks what seems to be a im-
plicit assumption behind many of the accounts discussed so far, viz. that the 
core business of folk psychology is the prediction and explanation of action 
from a spectatorial, third-person standpoint. According to Hutto, we learn to 
participate in folk psychological practice in participatory, second-person con-
texts and these contexts remain the primary raison d’être of adult’s deployment 
of their folk psychological skills. The idea behind this is that these skills are 
brought to bear only in the sorts of cases in which we are surprised or perplexed 
about the actions of other people; normally, our culturally based expectations 
obviate the need to explicate their ways. In instances of surprise or perplexity, 
second-person interaction serves to normalize a seemingly abnormal course 
of action by placing it in the context of a larger personal narrative. (Hutto 
2008a, p. 32-40). The story the agent tells is suited to her particular situation, 
it does not necessarily generalize to other people or situations. It functions 
to normalize her actions in the face of her apparent failure to meet cultural 
norms or the interpreter’s expectations. It is their particularity, normativity 
and primary second-person use that renders folk psychological explications 
rather non-theoretical, and better characterized as instances of story telling.
This panoply of philosophical approaches to the psychology of folk psy-
chology is impressive, and some of them contain important insights that will 
be developed in later chapters of this book. For now, however, we should re-
turn where we left off in our discussion of the metaphysical debate on folk 
psychology. There it was noticed that concerns regarding the status of folk 
psychology were accompanied by a claim about its structure: that it is, at its 
core, a belief-desire psychology. This claim, in turn, seemed to be inspired 
by an assumption regarding the psychological requirements for generating 
and understanding folk psychological explanations and predictions: that it 
demands the ascription of beliefs and desires. The same line of thought has 
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also been driving the epistemological debate on folk psychology. Thus Davies 
and Stone (1995, p. 2), for example, state that the conceptual repertoire that 
constitutes folk psychology “includes, predominantly, the concepts of belief, 
desire and their kin […] the propositional attitudes,” and Hutto (2008a, p. 
3) targets folk psychology ‘stricto sensu’ with explicit focus on belief-desire 
psychology, agreeing with Baker’s claim quoted above that “belief-desire rea-
soning forms the core of commonsense psychology.” (Ch. 1, n. 5) 
These assumptions regarding the core structure of folk psychology are 
taken further by others, transformed into the stronger claim that belief-desire 
ascription is a psychological requirement for generating explanations and pre-
dictions of the actions of others. Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 4), for example, 
say that “the central concepts implicated in mindreading’ are ‘belief, desire 
and intention.” These claims are taken as a starting point for more elaborate 
hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms underlying our folk psycho-
logical capacities. On Goldman’s version of ST (2006, pp. 44-45, 185-188), ac-
tion explanation and prediction requires the classification of pretend beliefs, 
desires and decisions as such. And Fodor (1992, p. 283) speculates that normal 
socio-cognitive development “eventuates in the child’s internalization of a 
tacit “metacognitive” intentional psychology: specifically, in the internaliza-
tion of some version of the folk psychological theory that an agent’s behavior 
is normally caused by his beliefs and desires.”10 
Fodor’s theory is a version of the ‘modular’ theory that has played an 
important role within developmental psychology. On this story, children have 
a (partly) innate ‘theory of mind mechanism’ that deploys the concepts of 
belief, desire and some other propositional attitudes and predisposes the nor-
mally developing child to pay selective attention to mental states of others, 
thereby enabling them to attribute such states in the course of action explana-
tion and prediction (e.g. Baron Cohen 1995, Leslie 1994, Scholl and Leslie 
1999). Other psychologists have put forward an radically empirist account 
that portrayed children as ‘little scientists’, advancing, testing and rejecting 
increasingly accurate theories about the behavior of others in relation to their 
environment. In their first few years of life, children come to reject relatively 
simple desire-based and belief-based theories in light of overwhelming coun-
tervailing evidence, eventually arriving at a full-blown belief-desire theory that 
form the basis of their social functioning throughout the rest of their lives. 
10 Consider also the numerous ‘boxologies’ of third-person mindreading in Stich and Nichols 
(1992, 1995, 1997) and Nichols and Stich (2003, chapter 3), or Currie and Sterelny (2000, pp. 145-
146), who maintain that “our basic grip on the social world depends on our being able to see our 
fellows as motivated by beliefs and desires we sometimes share with them and sometimes do not.” 
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(e.g. Gopnik 1996, Gopnik and Wellman 1992, Gopnik and Wellman 1994, 
Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). Although these two general approaches differ in 
their account of the developmental trajectory, they too share the same core 
assumption regarding the end-stage of this trajectory: that our adult folk psy-
chological capacity to interpret other people’s actions is essentially a matter of 
attributing beliefs and desires.11 
In general, then, there has been a strong tendency, both in the more 
philosophical discussions between theory theorists, simulation theorists and 
more recent contenders, and in the more psychological discussions between 
nativists and empirists, to characterize our adult folk psychological capacity 
for generating and understanding action explanations as centering around 
the capacity for belief-desire attribution. Accordingly, explanations in terms 
of goals and reasons as characterized above – things to be achieved in the light 
of things that make them accomplishable and worth accomplishing – have to 
be regarded as essentially elliptical expressions of proper belief-desire explana-
tions. Interpreting another person’s action in terms of his goal and reason aims 
at laying bare the beliefs and desires that inform the action. Theory theorists 
claim that this process is guided by lawlike psychological generalizations, chief 
amongst which is the ‘central action principle’: “if A wants P and believes that 
doing q will bring about p, then ceteris paribus, A will q.” (Borg 2007, p.6)12 
Whereas simulation theorists oppose to the idea that the interpreter needs to 
have (tacit) knowledge of such action principles (but see Ravenscroft 2003), 
most of them seem to agree that the simulation procedure needs to at least 
mirror these principles: no action explanation or prediction without offline 
processing, classification and attribution of (pretend-) beliefs and desires. And 
although Hutto (2008a) sharply distances himself from a cognitivist rendering 
of the interpretation processes involved, he does regard “the way beliefs and 
11 Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997, p. 126), for example, claim that our mature theory of mind, 
“(...) has many complexities but also a few basic causal tenets (...). These tenets are perhaps best 
summarized by the “practical syllogism”: if a psychological agent wants event y and believes that 
action x will cause event y, he will do x.” On the nativist side, consider Scholl and Leslie (1999, p. 
132): “A theory of mind refers to the capacity to interpret, predict, and explain the behaviour of 
others in terms of their underlying mental states. It is an ability that all normal humans enjoy, and 
seems to manifest itself in early childhood. This capacity is inherently ‘metarepresentational’, in 
that it requires one not only to employ propositional attitudes, but to employ them about propo-
sitional attitudes, for example having beliefs about (others’) beliefs.” Cf. “in everyday life we make 
sense of each other’s behaviour by appeal to a belief-desire psychology” (Frith and Happé 1999, p. 
2); “a prediction of behavior requires additional ascription of desire, the integration of belief and 
desire, and the inferring of a resulting action.” (Leslie, German and Polizzi 2005, p. 50)
12 Cf. Botterill (1996, p. 115): “If belief-desire psychology has a central principle, it must link 
belief, desire and behavior. It could be formulated like this: [action principle] An agent will act 
in such a way as to satisfy, or at least to increase the likelihood of satisfaction, of his/her current 
strongest desire in light of her beliefs.” See also the quote of Gopnik and Meltzoff in n. 11. 
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desires conspire to motivate actions’ as comprising ‘what we might think of as 
the “core principles” of intentional psychology,” structuring the folk psycho-
logical narratives we tell each other (p. 29). 
Within the debate on folk psychology, commonsense goal-reason psycho-
logy has been characterized as a belief-desire psychology through-and-through. 
On the assumption that the attribution of goals and reasons hinges on the 
capacity to attribute beliefs and desires, it is our proficiency in belief-desire 
psychology that has been targeted as the real explanandum.13 
2.4 Relating People to Their Goals and Reasons
Let us retrace our steps to where we began: with the rather innocent assump-
tion that when we make sense of other people’s actions we often assume there 
to be goals and reasons for which these actions are performed.
A practical reason is something that favors an action and may render it 
the appropriate or right thing to do. Thus his having run out of milk may 
be a reason for John to buy some milk. And the fact that he can buy milk 
at the supermarket may be a reason for him to go to the supermarket in or-
der to buy some milk. Reason giving explanations therefore have a so-called 
‘word-to-world’ direction of fit (e.g. Searle 1983). A reason explanation given 
in response to a question why should adequately describe some feature of the 
world that made the action appropriate or right: the explanation should con-
tain a description that ‘fits’ a favorable condition in the world. A goal, on the 
other hand, is something that determines the success conditions of an action. 
If John is walking towards the supermarket in order to buy some milk, then the 
success of his walking towards the supermarket can be measured by the extent 
to which it will enable him to buy some milk there. A goal has a ‘world-to-
word’ direction of fit: an explanation in terms of one’s goal given in response 
to a question why determines how the world is to be changed as a result of 
successfully carrying out the action.  
In order to understand John’s action in terms of his goal and his reasons, 
we need to see John inter alia as responding to his having run out of milk by 
intending to go to the supermarket to buy some milk. Understanding John as 
responding to a reason by intending to carry out and complete an action is a 
13 There are a few notable exceptions, e.g. Gordon (1987, 2000, 2001), Perner (e.g. 1991), 
Perner and Roessler (2010) and Ratcliffe (2006, 2007, 2009). See chapter 4 for discussion of these 
accounts. 
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typical example of ‘intentionalistic’ interpretation: it requires that we perceive 
John as being intentionally directed at his reason and his goal. John’s goal is 
something we may regard as an event bound to happen or likely to occur in 
the near future: his buying some milk at the supermarket. On the assumption 
that John has actually run out of milk, we may conceive of John’s reason is 
the state of affairs of his having run out of milk. Interpreting John’s action as 
an intentional action requires that we see him as responding intentionally to 
some state of affairs by intending to bring about some event. It thus involves 
drawing two kinds of ‘intentional connection’ between the state of affairs con-
stituting his reason, the event constituting his occurrent behavior and the 
event constituting his goal: an intentional connection with a ‘mind-to-world’ 
direction of fit between his action and his reason, and an intentional con-
nection with a ‘world-to-mind’ direction of fit between his behavior and his 
goal. The important issue is whether drawing these intentional connections 
amounts to belief-desire ascription. 
There are three features of belief-desire ascription that are relevant for our 
present purposes: it results in the attribution of (i) representational mental 
states with (ii) propositional content that (iii) have a particular direction of 
fit. Starting with (iii), beliefs are said to have a mind-to-world direction of fit, 
desires a world-to-mind direction of fit (e.g. Searle 1983). A true belief answers 
to the way the world is, it fits with the world. A false belief should be discarded 
and changed to fit with the world, and not vice versa. By contrast, a desire 
can be realized, and if so, the world fits with the desire. An unrealized desire 
should not be discarded simply because it is not realized. Rather, a desire may 
provide ample reason to change the world to fit with it, but not vice versa. This 
seems to fit nicely with the conclusion reached above about an agent’s reasons 
and goals. Beliefs have the same direction of fit as the intentional attitude of 
taking into consideration or responding to a reason and desires have the same 
direction of fit as intending to achieve a goal. 
Turning to (ii), beliefs and desires are often referred to as propositional 
attitudes. This means that in ascribing beliefs and desires, the contents of the 
attributed mental states should be propositionally articulated, i.e. have the 
appropriate structure to be truth evaluable and to stand in inferential relations 
to the contents of other mental states of the agent and the meaning of her 
linguistic utterances.14 Interpreting an agent’s action in terms of her goals and 
14 There is some discussion whether desires always have propositional contents. Some hold 
that desires may be directed at intentional objects rather than situations or states of affairs (e.g. ‘I 
desire that piece of chocolate’ rather than ‘I desire that I have that piece of chocolate’). But this 
treatment seems strained in the case of belief. Beliefs are true or false in virtue of their propositional 
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reasons also requires sensitivity to the propositional structure of her intention-
al attitudes. It requires that we are able to place the action within the scheme 
of practical reasoning and within the discursive practice of giving and asking 
for reasons. Even if the action did not result from conscious practical delibera-
tion (which, arguably, is often the case), making sense of the action as a second 
or third person interpreter may involve some practical reasoning about the 
agent’s goals and reasons. And knowing how to engage in reason discourse, 
ask the appropriate why-questions and understand the agent’s responses as 
justifying because-answers, demands that we understand her reasons and her 
goals in truth-evaluable, propositionally articulated fashion.  
Taken together, features (ii) and (iii) of belief-desire ascription mirror two 
important requirements of the attribution of reasons and goals. From this, I 
expect, many would want to conclude that identifying an agent’s reasons and 
goals consists in determining, inter alia, the contents of some of her beliefs 
and desires.  
But this is too quick. Arriving finally at feature (i) of belief-desire ascrip-
tion, it should be realized that parsing the agent’s mind into beliefs about his 
reasons and desires about his goals results in an articulation of the way the 
world is (was, will be, should become) according to the agent in particular. 
Genuine ascription of beliefs, whether true or false, or desires, whether realis-
tic or unrealistic (appropriate or inappropriate, etc.), demands that we keep a 
distinction between the ascribee’s subjective view on the world and the world 
itself, as it reveals itself to us. Ascribing to the agent a belief about his reason, 
we differentiate between what the agent believes to be the worldly conditions 
that favor his action, and what the worldly conditions really are. When we 
ascribe a true belief in the course of explaining an action, we lock his view 
onto the real structure of the world, as we take it to be. Likewise, in attribut-
ing a desire for and a corresponding intention towards a certain outcome, we 
distinguish between the agent’s representation of how the world is supposed 
to be changed as a result of his action, and the way we expect the world to be 
changed by that action. By ascribing a realistic desire, we project the contents 
of the agent’s desire onto our own expectations regarding the future course of 
events. 
What we need is an argument to the effect that maintaining a distinction 
content; objects cannot be true or false. And in the case of desire, it is the ascription of the proposi-
tional attitude of desiring that is suited making sense of the goals people adopt in response to rea-
sons and the practical reasoning that may be involved in such sense-making. It is in virtue of their 
propositional form that the contents of desires can enter into the appropriate logical relations with 
other propositional states that make up instances of practical reasoning. Cf. Hutto (2008a, p. 2)
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between the agent’s representations of the world and how the world presents 
itself to us is required for interpreting his action in terms of his goals and 
reasons. But it is far from obvious that there is such a requirement for goal and 
reason attribution simpliciter. In the case of John walking down the street, for 
example, we’d do perfectly fine, it seems, by simply drawing relations between 
a state of affairs (his having run out of milk), a present event (his walking 
down the street), and a future event (his buying some milk at the supermar-
ket), given a fact (that he can buy some milk by going to the supermarket). 
Here, the term ‘relation’ should be understood in the strict sense of imply-
ing the past, present or future existence or reality of both (all) relata. Of course, 
this implication should be understood from our point of view as interpreters 
of John’s action. We would be relating John to what we take to be the states 
of affairs John is responding to and what we expect will be brought about by 
John’s action. We could be mistaken about the things we interpret John as re-
sponding to or make the wrong ‘predictions’ about the future course of events 
that will follow as a result of John’s action.15 What matters is the interpretative 
distinction between understanding others directly in terms of the world (past, 
present or future) as it presents itself to us and understanding them indirectly in 
terms of their representations of the world (past, present or future) as it presents 
itself to us. 
As argued above, the relations drawn between John’s and the world 
around him would have to be intentional relations, of responding to his having 
run out of milk, of being aware that he can do so by buying some milk at the 
supermarket, of intending to buy some milk at the supermarket, etc. Crucially, 
however, these intentional states would not be attributed as representational 
15 The term ‘prediction’ may be somewhat misleading, because our expectations about the 
future in relation to John’s action need not be based on any further evidence than the verbal ex-
pression of his intention to buy some milk at the supermarket when we ask him what he is up to. 
Our expectations regarding the effectiveness of other people’s actions are perhaps best understood 
in analogy to first-person avowals of intention, as in ‘I shall buy some milk in the supermarket’. 
Anscombe (1957) suggested that such avowals are predictions in the sense that they provide de-
scriptions of something to occur or obtain in the future, but not in the sense that they are based 
on some kind of (introspective or behavioral) evidence (see Hamilton (2008) for a treatment of 
avowals of intention along these lines). Accordingly, second- or third-person understanding of 
avowals of intention would take the form of attributing practical commitments to make it happen 
that something occurs or obtains (cf. Brandom 1994, ch. 4). On this account, expectations about 
the future based on the attribution of practical commitments (assuming that the agent has the 
reliable responsive disposition to act accordingly) are not the same in kind as predictions about the 
future based on ordinary empirical evidence (e.g. predicting that the vase will fall on the ground 
and break when pushed off the table). Yet such expectations about other agents’ intentional be-
havior may generate the same degree and feeling of certainty as predictions about non-agential or 
non-intentional occurrences. In this sense, interpreting agents’ behavior in terms of their goals can 
be characterized as implying the occurrence or presence of some future event or state of affairs to 
be brought about by their actions.
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states. Understanding John as walking toward the supermarket in order to buy 
some milk because he’s run out of milk, we would be making sense of his ac-
tion in terms of relational mental states: psychological states attributed to John 
that relate him to his goal and his reasons.16 
2.5 The Fallacy: A First Assessment
Let us now return to the two claims Smith makes in defense of the BD-Model 
of action explanation. The first says “that it is always possible to construct a 
Humean, belief/desire explanation of action.” (1998/2004, p. 155) Accordingly, 
whenever an action is explained in terms of a goal at which it is directed and 
a reason for which it is performed, there is an explanation of that action in 
terms of, inter alia, a Humean belief-desire pair. Call this conditional C. The 
question is how we should explain the truth of C. 
Smith chooses to explain it by arguing that the Humean explanation (or 
at least its availability) is presupposed by the explanation in terms of goals and 
reasons. This is his second claim. Accordingly, “once we see the central place 
occupied by Humean belief/desire explanations, we see that all the other ex-
planations we give simply supplement this basic Humean story.” (ibid., p. 156) 
Thus, when someone explains John’s going to the supermarket by saying that 
he does so in order to buy some milk because he’s having some friends over 
for lunch, he not only presupposes the existence of John, his friends and the 
supermarket, but also John’s desiring to buy some milk, his believing that he’s 
having some friends over for lunch, that he can buy milk by going to the 
supermarket, etc. (or at least the presence of some such representational states 
of John). 
As we have seen, the BD-Model has been adopted within the debate on 
folk psychology as the claim that in attributing a goal and a reason to another 
person, we must be (tacitly) ascribing Humean belief-desire pairs. Thus, the 
truth of C is explained in terms of psychological requirement: the attribution of 
goals and reasons requires the ascription of beliefs and desires. Adherents of 
the BD-Model often seem to be making an even stronger claim: that it is sim-
ply a matter of a priori conceptual truth that goal-reason explanations imply 
belief-desire explanations. The idea would be that the conceptual structure of 
16 In what follows, I shall be using the term ‘state’ in a metaphysically rather noncommit-
tal way. In particular, I do not want to imply that mental states are ‘states’ in a sense opposed to 
episodes. 
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our folk psychology is such that having goals and reasons for action entails 
instantiating desires representing these goals and beliefs representing these 
reasons.17 According to this line of thought, the truth of C should thus be 
explained in terms of conceptual entailment. 
But there is another option for explaining the truth of C. Rather than try-
ing to explain it psychologically by saying that the antecedent presupposes the 
consequent or that the former explanatory strategy requires tacit deployment 
of the latter, or logically by claiming that the antecedent entails the conse-
quent, we could explain it in terms of the social dynamics of the explanatory 
practice itself.  
There is a rule in boxing that allows the coach of a fighter to throw in 
the towel at any time during the fight. Attorneys in American television series 
have the prerogative to shout ‘Objection your honor!’ during interrogation of 
a witness by the other party. The coach’s and attorney’s entitlement to make 
use of these procedures co-constitute the practices they are involved in, a box-
ing fight and a legal trial, respectively. And there are clear rationales for their 
entitlement to make use of these procedures. It is for the safety of his pupil 
that the coach is always allowed to throw in the towel. And, in general, it is for 
the sake of a fair trial that attorneys may object to the method of interrogation 
of a witness. Thus, there is a way of making sense of the fact that ‘making a 
certain move’ is always possible in a certain practice, by appeal to the rules and 
rationales of the practice itself. 
Analogously, we could argue 1) that folk psychological interpreters can 
always make a move in the ‘game of giving and asking for reasons’ (cf. Sellars 
1954/2007; Brandom 1994) from explanations in terms of the agent’s goals 
and reasons to Humean belief-desire explanations and 2) that this fact is ex-
plained in terms of rationales revealing why this ‘procedure’ has become part 
of our social practice. 
Consider a surgeon who, after having tried to reach an organ ventrally 
according to standard protocol, decides to take the dorsal route with a differ-
ent surgical instrument, or a soccer coach who substitutes a defender for an 
attacker at the end of the match. Such changes in technique or strategy to 
solve a problem or win a game are common phenomena. But the surgeon’s use 
of the first technique does not presuppose (let alone entail) the second tech-
17 To a certain degree, this seems to be inspired by the thought that motivating reasons are 
belief-desire pairs, rather than what is represented by certain beliefs (see appendix). This thought 
can only cause confusion in the present context. What matters is whether according to the folk 
psychological conception of intentional action, acting on reasons in my sense of the term, i.e. 
events, facts or states of affairs that solicit a response, entails having beliefs about those reasons. 
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nique, not even it’s availability. Of course, the second technique is available 
– it belongs to her surgical repertoire and the instrument required for it lies on 
the table – but the surgeon need not appreciate this fact while she is using the 
first technique, not even tacitly. The availability of the second technique may 
simply first presents itself when the ventral route starts posing problems. The 
same goes for the soccer coach. The offensive strategy is always available, but 
it may come to mind only when the situation demands it, e.g. when the other 
team has scored a goal. 
Analogously, we could regard the shift from an explanation in terms of the 
agent’s goals and reasons to a Humean belief-desire explanation as a change in 
interpretation technique or explanatory tactics. It is a move that, as the game 
of giving and asking for reasons is set up, is always available for competent 
participants, but which skilled interpreters are prone to make only at certain 
crucial moments, viz. those moments in which social interaction starts be-
coming problematic in some way or other. In normal situations, however, the 
belief-desire strategy need not play any psychological role. 
There is, of course, an important disanalogy between shifting surgical 
techniques or soccer strategies on the one hand, and changing to a Humean 
mode of interpretation on the other. The switch from making sense of some-
one in terms of her goals and reasons to interpretation in terms of her beliefs 
and desires is unique in its kind. It is a representational shift, a switch from 
attributing goals and reasons to attributing representations of goals (desires) and 
reasons (beliefs), from relating an agent to the world to relating to the agent’s 
view on the world. 
This brings us to the rationale of the switch to belief-desire psychology 
in ordinary discursive practice. The most important feature of belief-desire 
explanations is that they work irrespectively of the truth of the beliefs and 
the appropriateness or feasibility of the desires and resulting intentions of the 
agent. It is this neutrality regarding truth, appropriateness and feasibility that 
gives representational belief-desire psychology its primary raison d’être. When 
social interaction becomes problematic due to displays of apparently counter-
normative or irrational behavior, it is often of crucial importance that we ef-
fectively manage our discursive engagements with one another and maintain 
the social balance that is required for successful coordination of our actions. 
As I shall explain in chapter 6, belief-desire psychology is a useful interpreta-
tive tool in such situations, precisely because it allows us to go beyond our 
common assessment of the world and to adopt a relatively disengaged atti-
tude towards one another. Belief-desire psychology is our most sophisticated 
technique for dealing with cognitive conflict and conative divergence between 
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members within our community; it allows us to make our default explanations 
more precise, better suited to the particularity of individual agents.
This section started with the question how to explain conditional C: 
whenever an action is explained in terms of a goal at which it is directed and 
a reason for which it is performed, there is an explanation of that action in 
terms of, inter alia, a Humean belief-desire pair. I have made a first, sketchy 
attempt of how to answer this question without invoking the presupposition 
or entailment of the latter by the former. According to this alternative, belied-
desire psychology is not the conceptual core of or the psychological engine 
behind our discursive engagements with one another, but rather a complement 
to that practice, a secondary interpretation technique specifically designed to 
deal with socially problematic situations. 
This brings us to the title of this section. As indicated in chapter 1, the 
reflective fallacy is the fallacy of projecting a typically philosophical, reflective 
understanding of intentional action in terms of belief and desire onto our 
commonsense understanding of each other’s intentional actions in terms of 
goals and reasons. Now if the present account is correct, belief-desire explana-
tions can serve the social purpose precisely of taking a few steps back in order 
to reflect on each other’s actions and evaluate them in a special way. Adopting 
this reflective mode of understanding for detached philosophical reflection is 
in line with its primary social function. 
If the philosophy of action is indeed concerned, as Smith thinks, with the 
“attempt to state a principle that allows us to unify diverse [commonsense] ex-
planations” (1998/2004, p. 155), then a Humean shift in interpretation is only 
to be expected: it simply reflects the rationale of belief-desire psychology in 
ordinary social practice that explains conditional C. Smith’s Humean account 
runs the risk of committing the reflective fallacy when it regards this unify-
ing ‘Humean principle’ as a logical principle underlying our commonsense 
concepts of having  a goal and acting for a reason, or a psychological principle 
guiding our interpretative abilities, rather than a social principle that describes 
the dynamics of our discursive practices.
It may be considered a datum that people sometimes err, that they some-
times have very peculiar desires and that their aspirations are sometimes far 
from realistic. The BD-Model incorporates explanations of such aberrant cases 
into the explanatory scheme of default, veridical, appropriate and realistic 
cases. It thereby presents us with a unifying story of action explanation, but 
only at the expense of making our explanations of normal, i.e. well-informed, 
appropriate and realistic, actions subject to the requirements for explaining 
abnormal ones. This is symptomatic of the reflective fallacy. In the attempt 
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to articulate a concept that is at home in unreflective social practice, the 
philosopher seeks to use it for himself from a particularly reflective stance, 
thereby inadvertently altering the focus of investigation. It is a non-starter to 
test the adequacy of our default, unreflective conception of intentional action 
by putting it to use in what, from a folk psychological point of view, is an 
exceptional, detached and reflective mode of understanding. 
2.6 Mindreading 
The claim of this book is that the psychological basis of human discursive 
practice is relational rather than representational. On the Relational Model 
of folk psychology, we tend to interpret other people by drawing relations 
between them and the things in the world that constitute their goals and rea-
sons. This is what I call ‘relational mindreading’. It is relational mindreading 
because it consists in the attribution of relational mental states rather than 
representational mental states; it is relational mindreading as opposed to mere 
behavior or body reading; and it is relational mindreading because it requires 
sensitivity to the inferentially articulated propositional contents of the mental 
states attributed. The form of social understanding that results from relational 
mindreading has generally been neglected in the debate on social cogni-
tion. The conception of an agent being 1) genuinely intentionally directed 
at the world, as opposed to being merely behaviorally disposed to react to 
it, in 2) a propositionally articulated fashion, as opposed to more primitive, 
non-conceptual modes of responsiveness, without, however, 3) subjectively 
representing the world as being a certain way – this conception seems to have 
been overlooked entirely. Yet, as I shall argue, it is the conception that lies at 
the basis of our appreciation of each other as rational, discursive beings, beings 
who think, talk and act in response to reasons.  
The reflective fallacy is at least partly to blame for this neglect. As theo-
rists, we are so used to talking in terms of beliefs and desires and to focusing on 
their representational character, that the intelligibility of a relational notion 
of propositional attitude has simply escaped notice. Theorizing about reason 
attribution and acknowledging its propositional character, participants auto-
matically switch to a representationalist belief-desire framework. But they do 
so without any argument, which gives the impression that there is an assump-
tion at play to the effect that the propositional nature of content implies its 
representational nature. As I shall argue, however, there is no reason why this 
should be true from a commonsense point of view.  
G
oa
l-R
ea
so
n 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
y
29 
Another factor that has played a role in the neglect of relational mindread-
ing is the ambiguity that has crept into our use of the term ‘representation’ in 
the debate. Sometimes it is used to indicate the subjective character of states 
like beliefs, that is: to highlight the fact that a belief captures the way the world 
is represented to the particular individual to whom it is ascribed. Attributing 
a belief to another person, an interpreter regards him as a subjective world-
representer, with a particular view on the world that may or may not jibe with 
the world itself. At other times, the notion of representation is used merely as 
a functional notion, to indicate the causal or explanatory relevance of some 
internal state in the bringing about of certain behavior. Conflation of these 
two ways of using the notion of representation makes it difficult to appreciate 
the idea of relational mindreading (see chapter 3 and 4).
Relational mindreading should first and foremost be distinguished from 
representational mindreading. Representational mindreading, as I use the 
term, is just good old belief-desire psychology. It does exist, but its social 
function is not what many philosophers and psychologists have assumed it 
to be, i.e., to ground the practice of giving and asking for reasons. Belief-desire 
psychology is not the silent engine behind our rational social practices, but 
rather an adjunct to, enabling us to manage and to reflect on those practices 
(see chapter 6).   
Relational mindreading should also be distinguished from what is some-
times referred to as ‘theory of behavior’ (cf. Povinelli and Vonk 2003, 2004; 
Perner and Ruffman 2005, Perner 2010). On this account, which has been 
offered as a possible explanation of the social behavior of primates and infants, 
the behavior of others is interpreted in terms of behavioral rules, rules stating 
behavioral dispositions in relation to environmental conditions without refer-
ence to mental states that mediate between stimulus and response. The states 
attributed by the relational mindreader are not mere behavioral dispositions. 
Nor do the features of the environment making up one end of the relation fig-
ure as just that, features of the environment; rather they feature as the contents 
of the states attributed, on the other side of the relation. These contents are 
moreover propositionally articulated, so that attributing a relational mental 
state allows the interpreter to draw inferences about the agent’s sayings and 
doings that exceed any strictly behaviorist analysis.  
Finally, relational mindreading should be distinguished from a variety of 
less sophisticated forms of triadic social responsiveness that do not exhibit 
sensitivity to the propositional structure of other people’s intentional di-
rectedness. Here we can think of the ontogenetic precursors of sophisticated 
mindreading, such as perceiving other people’s gaze as being object-directed 
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(Woodward 2003, Johnson, Ok and Luo 2007), assessing others’ visual access 
to objects (Luo and Baillargeon 2007, Luo and Beck 2010), following pointing 
gestures (Woodward 2005), anticipating other agents’ proximal goal-directed 
actions (Gergely and Csibra 2003), engaging in short cycles of object-directed 
joint attention (Tomasello et al. 2005), or responding to ostensive communicate 
signals and building generalizable referential expectations in communicative 
contexts (Csibra and Gergely 2007). It has been convincingly argued that these 
and numerous other relatively primitive forms of social responsiveness persist 
as the backbone of our adult socio-cognitive skills, supporting and targeting 
sophisticated mindreading when and where we engage in it (e.g. Gallagher 
2001, Gallese 2007, Ratcliffe 2007, Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, Hutto 2008a, 
Bermudez 2009, Apperly 2011, Zawidzki forthcoming). 
Many theorists these days distinguish between so-called ‘low-level’ and 
‘high-level’ forms of social cognition.18 The low-high dimension can be ap-
plied at least along two axes: 1) the nature of the process that underlies the 
socio-cognitive activity and 2) the nature of the target states tracked by that 
activity (cf. Zawidzki, forthcoming, ch. 1). Along the first axis, low-level in-
dicates relatively automatic, involuntary and/or subconscious processes, 
whereas high-level amounts to relatively effortful, voluntary and/or conscious 
interpretation. Along the second axis, low-level refers to relatively simple, 
observable states and high-level to relatively complex, unobservable states. 
Arguably, relational mindreading is often relatively effortful, voluntary and 
accessible to consciousness. (Remember that our primary target is the discursive 
practice of interpreting, explicating, explaining actions). But there is nothing 
in the concept of relational mindreading per se that demands that it is a phe-
nomenologically accessible, explicit form of reasoning about other people’s 
mental states. On the other hand, relational mindreading occupies a specific 
end of the spectrum on the second axis.   
The distinction between understanding someone’s behavior as an expres-
sion of ‘observable’ mental states on the one hand, and interpreting her be-
havior being informed by ‘unobservable’ mental states on the other, need not 
be understood in terms of the inner-outer contrast, observable states reach-
ing the bodily surface, unobservable states remaining ‘hidden’ in the head. 
Rather, the observable-unobservable dimension points to the degree in which 
18 As for as I know, it was Goldman (2006) who first used this terminology in this context. 
Goldman describes ‘low-level simulation’ as “comparatively simple, automatic and below the level 
of consciousness” (p. 113) and contrasts it with ‘high level simulation’, which targets mental states 
of a relatively complex nature, such as propositional attitudes, is at least partly under voluntary 
control and/or has some degree of access to consciousness (p. 147). 
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a mental state type tracks a particular type of behavior. The prime example of 
an observable mental state is a motor-intention, a ‘mental state’ being specifi-
cally directed at the performance of a particular kind of action. Primitive emo-
tions, such as disgust and fear, are also relatively observable states, matching 
specific kinds of facial expression and bodily posture. On the other side of 
the spectrum we find mental states with only tenuous connections to behav-
ior types. Here the prime example is a state with propositional content. The 
relation between propositional states and their behavioral manifestations is 
one-to-many and many-to-one. Think of John again, having run out of milk. 
His reason for walking down the street is that he has run out of milk. But 
interpreting his action as being informed by the state that he has run out of 
milk only makes sense if we see it in the wider, temporally extended context 
of John’s mind: his knowledge, intentions, plans, preferences, etc. Attributing 
to John solely the knowledge that he’s run out of milk, devoid of any mental 
context (which arguably, is nonsensical in the first place) does not suggest any 
particular kind of behavior, and so every kind is a possibility. The same goes 
for understanding the goal of John’s action. Sophisticated (longer term) goals 
are relatively unobservable compared to the immediate goals of simple motor 
intentions, such as grasping a cup or grabbing a doorknob.19 Buying some milk 
in the supermarket is not something that manifests itself in any particular type 
of walking behavior. A mental state is unobservable to the extent in which its 
interpretation in relation to behavior requires a ‘holistic’ mental context (cf. 
Davidson 1970/2001a).20  
Relational mindreading deals in relatively unobservable, relational states. 
Obviously these states cannot be regarded as ‘inner’ states: the agent (her head 
included) constitutes just one side of the relation. Relational mindreading al-
lows the interpreter to relate another person to the world by propositional 
means. It allows for the attribution of genuine doxastic states and intentions, 
as well as the commitments and entitlements that these states carry on their 
shoulders. Relational mindreading thus permits us to participate in the game 
of giving and asking for reasons. It exhibits mastery of the inferential connec-
tions between our thinkings, sayings and doings, the kind of expertise that 
is required for criticizing someone’s reasoning, holding him to his word or 
19 Our focus is on such more sophisticated goals, not on the goals of motor intentions.
20 This holistic constraint on propositional attitude ascription has been recognized by many 
participants in the debate on high-level mindreading. See e.g. Heal (1996), Morton (1996, 2003), 
Currie and Sterelny (2000), Nichols and Stich (2003), Goldman (2006), Bermudez (2003; 2009), 
Zawidzki (2008).  See chapter 5.3 for discussion. 
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asking him to explain his conduct. In its fullest form, relational mindread-
ing amounts to explicit reasoning about someone’s goals and reasons, which 
demands making inferences about unobservable, propositionally articulated 
mental states. 
Thus, relational mindreading is a sophisticated form of human social un-
derstanding that enables us to perceive each other’s relation to the world in 
non-representational, intentional, yet propositionally articulated ways. One 
of the reasons I have chosen the term ‘mindreading’ is that it is often used in 
the debate on folk psychology and social cognition as a theoretically neutral 
label for our capacity to attribute propositional attitudes (cf. Nichols and Stich 
2003, p. 2; Apperly 2011, p. 3). Let me stress again that my primary target is an 
important explanandum in the debate: the capacity of normal adult human be-
ings to interpret one another in terms of their goals and reasons. The technical 
notion of relational mindreading is meant to give a further characterization of 
this explanandum. My claim is that our capacity for propositional attitude as-
cription is relational rather than representational at base.  It is not my primary 
aim to give a detailed explanatory account of the cognitive underpinnings of 
this capacity. The neutrality of the technical term ‘mindreading’ therefore 
serves my purposes quite well. 
Some have criticized the use of the term, because the association with 
telepathy makes it appear as if our commonsense understanding of others is a 
rather mysterious, occult affair of ‘gaining access’ to their otherwise ‘hidden’ 
minds. As I use the term, however, it only serves to mark the contrast with 
other ways in which we are sensitive to the minds of others. Just as seeing the 
words on the page of a book is not the same as reading them, so perceiving 
other people’s minds in their facial expressions, postures and bodily move-
ments is not the same as interpreting them in inferentially articulated and 
truth-evaluable ways. There is nothing mysterious about reading the page of a 
book, and there need not be any hidden message to be uncovered between the 
lines. Likewise, reading other people’s minds often takes the mundane form of 
simply listening to what they have to say about something, about their own 
actions, for example. In such cases, the propositional attitudes ascribed are 
enacted in the words interpreted – not encrypted, ‘hidden’ from view.  
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2.7 Conclusion
Human social practice hinges on the capacity of its participants to interpret 
each other in terms of goals and reasons for action. Most philosophers and 
psychologists have followed the BD-Model of action explanation and hold 
that commonsense goal-reason psychology is in fact belief-desire psychology. 
This chapter provided the essential ingredients for an alternative conception: 
the Relational Model of folk psychology. First, it introduced relational mind-
reading as a philosophical characterization of the psychology of default goal-
reason attribution. On this account, representational mindreading, in terms 
of beliefs and desires, is an essentially secondary interpretation technique that 
enables us to manage and evaluate our discursive engagements with one an-
other when social interaction becomes problematic. It also characterized the 
armchair tendency to parse ordinary goal-reason attribution in terms of beliefs 
and desires as a typical instance of the reflective fallacy, the fallacy of project-
ing one’s sophisticated, reflective understanding of human social practice onto 
the psychology of unreflective participants of that practice. Finally, it gave a 
preview of how this armchair tendency might actually be explained by the 
present account, in terms of the specific social functions of belief-desire psy-
chology mentioned above. The following chapters will be mixing these basic 
ingredients together, adding some further constituents as we go along. Toward 
the end, this will reveal the Relational Model of folk psychology as a genuine, 
and I hope plausible, alternative to the BD-Model. 
The next chapter will focus exclusively on the locus classicus of function-
alism in the philosophy of mind: Sellars’s Myth of Jones. As we shall see, a 
functionalist treatment of folk psychology need not yield a representationalist 
picture of mind. It in fact invites a relational conception of folk psychological 
ascriptions. 
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Appendix: Motivating Reasons 
The reasons that occupy a central place in commonsense goal-reason psy-
chology are sometimes referred to as ‘motivating’ reasons. There are different 
philosophical accounts of what motivating reasons are, however, and of how 
they relate to other ‘kinds’ of reasons we give in folk psychological practice. 
This appendix provides a selective overview of these matters in relation to the 
present account. 
There seem to be three ways in which we use the term ‘reason’ in everyday 
reason talk. First, we may be interested in the reasons there are for someone in 
certain circumstances to perform an action of a certain kind. Talk of reasons 
in such explicitly evaluative context serves the purpose of finding out whether 
acting thusly is the appropriate, prudent or right thing to do. Sometimes phi-
losophers speak of ‘normative’ reasons in this context: reasons that make an 
action more or less favorable, right or wrong. Second, we may want to know 
the reasons for which someone acted. To see the difference with the first, nor-
mative use, notice that people may have good reasons for acting in a certain 
way, while not acting for those reasons, or contrary to those reasons. When 
we talk about reasons in this context, we are interested in the reasons that 
motivated the agent, even if the agent’s reasons were bad reasons for acting in 
the way she did. Hence the term ‘motivating’ reasons. Third, there is a wider 
class of ‘explanatory’ reasons that may be mentioned in giving an explana-
tion of why a certain event occurred or why a certain state of affairs obtains. 
Regarding the explanation of action, we can think of explanation in terms of 
character traits, habits, abilities, upbringing, situational factors, social roles, 
emotions, moods, etc. When explaining someone’s action in this way, we may 
not be specifically interested in the reasons that motivated him. Rather, we 
seem to put his reasons, whatever they are, in a wider, personal context.  
When discussing and criticizing the BD-Model of action explanation, it 
is crucial that we be clear about the kind of reason talk that we adopt. We 
might say that the BD-Model is concerned with intentional action insofar as 
it is explained in terms of motivating reasons. Thus the fact that we often cite 
an agent’s traits, history, abilities or emotions in the course of explaining his 
action, prima facie does not pose a threat to the BD-Model of action explana-
tion. For it need not claim that all explanations in terms of the wider class 
of explanatory reasons explain by invoking belief-desire pairs.21 Within the 
21 It seems that Smith goes beyond this characterization of the Humean account when he 
says that “once we see the central place occupied by Humean belief/desire explanations, we see 
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mindreading debate, this caveat has generally been ignored. Those inspired by 
the BD-Model have focused almost exclusively on belief-desire psychology at 
the expense of ‘thicker’ folk psychological explanations in terms of people’s 
traits, motives, moods, habits, etc. (cf. Goldie 2007, see also Ratcliffe 2007).  
That being said, it may be argued that explanation in terms of an agent’s 
traits, history, abilities, etc. often does occur with implicit reference to the 
agent’s motivating reasons. Consider Malle’s (2001, 2004) account of action 
explanation, for example. Malle distinguishes two basic alternative strategies 
for the explanation of intentional action. Instead of citing an agent’s reasons 
for action, interpreters may rather refer to ‘the causal history of reasons’, so 
as to describe background factors that triggered a reason for action (e.g. John 
cooked diner today because he was home early). The second alternative strat-
egy makes use of ‘enabling factors’ in the explanation of intentional actions, 
situational factors that have a positive (enabling) or negative (disabling) influ-
ence on the performance of an action (e.g. Peter stayed up all night working 
because he had a lot of coffee). On Malle’s account, explanation in terms of 
causal history (upbringing, character, social roles, moods, etc.) or enabling 
factors (abilities, emotions, physical fitness, etc.), make sense as explanations 
of intentional actions because they imply that the action was performed for 
a reason. If we know about someone’s character, for example, we know, in 
general, what kind of reasons she is motivated by (see also Schueler, 2003). 
Thus, even if we are not certain about the specific reasons that motivated her, 
information about her character (or upbringing, etc.) gives us a pretty good 
idea where to look for them. Giving explanations in terms of enabling factors 
seems especially appropriate when it is the manner in which, rather than the 
reason for which, the action is performed that requires explanation (e.g. Peter 
stayed up working because he had a deadline; he stayed up working all night 
because he had a lot of coffee). 
Explanations in terms of (moral) rules also fit this schema. Consider: he 
bought her a present because that’s the way they celebrate birthdays around 
here. Or: she helped the old lady cross the street because that was the right 
thing to do. These explanations mention normative reasons for the types of 
action under consideration (it being her birthday today, an old lady trying to 
cross the street). But it may very well be the case that such explanations make 
sense as explanations of the particular action tokens in virtue of implicit refer-
that all the other explanations we give simply supplement this basic Humean story.” (1998/2004, 
p. 156; emphasis added)  
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ence to the agent’s motivating reasons. The explanations we provide in folk 
psychological practice in terms of traits, roles, rules, habits, abilities, emotions, 
etc. may be ‘thicker’ precisely to the extent that they reveal a pattern in the 
agent’s motivating reasons. Rather than obviating reference to other people’s 
motivating reasons, this wider class of explanatory reasons may actually deepen 
our understanding of their motivating reasons. 
This brings us to the relation between motivating reasons and ‘normative’ 
reasons. The BD-Model of reason explanation tends to go accompanied by a 
‘Humean’ account of motivating reasons themselves. Accordingly, motivating 
reasons consist of belief-desire pairs (cf. Smith 1987, 1994). Naturally, if moti-
vating reasons just are BD-pairs, then attribution of such reasons must consist 
in the attribution of, inter alia, such pairs. 
On this Humean account, motivating reasons and normative reasons 
are of a different ontological kind. Normative reasons are things that favor 
an action, e.g. worldly states of affairs or facts, such as it raining outside or 
the fact that holding up an umbrella will normally keep one dry (as reasons 
for carrying an umbrella). Motivating reasons, by contrast, are psychological 
states of the agent: appropriately structured belief-desire pairs such as desiring 
to stay dry and believing that carrying an umbrella is a good means to stay 
dry. It is because motivating reasons are considered to consist of BD-pairs that 
Humeans such as Smith hold that a motivating reason explanation explains in 
virtue of reference to a belief-desire pair that informs the action (see e.g. Smith 
2003/2004) 
A minority of philosophers of action has put forward a ‘non-psychologis-
tic’ alternative for the Humean account (e.g. Dancy 2000, 2003; Bittner 2001; 
Schueler 2003; Stoutland 2007, Alvarez 2010). These philosophers claim that 
motivating reason explanations explain in virtue of citing that ‘in the light of 
which’ the agent acts. Suppose Jill runs out the door because the house is on 
fire. What it is, in the light of which she runs out the door, is the house being 
on fire, or the fact that the house is on fire.22 The explanation of Jill’s action 
succeeds by citing this fact – a fact about the worldly situation she responded 
to, not about her own psychological condition. Motivating reasons are thus 
22 Proponents of the non-psychologistic alternative disagree about the ontology of reasons. 
Bittner (2001) and Stoutland (2007) think that reasons are concrete states of affairs or events, 
while Alvarez (2010) holds that reasons are abstract entities, viz. true propositions or facts. Dancy 
(2000) hovers between the two. On the one hand he thinks that reasons are concrete things like 
her distress or yesterday’s bad weather (p. 115), and thus not abstract entities. But on the other 
hand he holds that people act for genuine reasons in error cases, committing him to the idea that 
reasons are things that can be the case (p. 145-151). But something that can be the case seems to 
be something abstract rather than concrete (see Alvarez 2010, p. 157). 
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conceived as the states of affairs that the agent’s considerations are about, not 
as the psychological states or events that enable the agent to be intentionally 
directed towards these states of affairs. 
On this alternative, motivating reasons are regarded as a subspecies of 
normative reasons. Accordingly, there is only one kind of reason for action (as 
opposed to several kinds of explanatory ‘reasons why’, such as traits, abilities, 
etc. – see above) that may be termed ‘normative’ or ‘motivating’ only relative 
to a context of interest. Thus, when deliberating what to do, an agent takes 
into account the ‘normative’ reasons she has for (not) performing a certain 
action. Making up her mind, she decides to perform the action for one or some 
of those reasons, and acts accordingly. Explaining her action then consists in 
picking out the ‘motivating’ reason she decided to act upon.
What is essential to this position is that reason explanations given from 
a second or third person point of view need to be such that they render the 
action rational from the point of view of the agent (see especially Dancy 2000, 
Schueler 2003 and Stoutland 2007).23 This is exactly what the phrase ‘reasons 
in the light of which’ is supposed to capture. What explains Jill’s running 
out the door is the fact that the house is on fire. It is this fact that makes Jill’s 
running out the door a rational thing for her to do; it is a fact that could have 
figured in her deliberation leading to the decision that running out the door 
is the best thing for her to do. By contrast, citing her belief as an explanation 
for her action does not make sense from her point of view: the fact that she 
believes that the house is on fire, by itself, is no reason for running out the door. 
Compare this to the situation in which Jill checks the stove again because her 
fearful doubt that it might still be on keeps her from sleeping, or of a psychi-
atric patient who makes an appointment with his psychiatrist because he’s 
hearing voices again.  In these cases, the actions seem rational by the agents’ 
lights in virtue of facts about their own psychological condition (the fact that 
23 Non-psychologistic accounts of reason explanation in action theory show some parallels 
with simulation theory in the debate on folk psychology, especially Gordon’s (1986) version of the 
simulation as performing an ‘egocentric shift’ (see chapter 4.2). Consider Stoutland’s (2007) claim 
that “To be agent-centered, rational explanations must be formulated in terms of the agent’s ac-
tions and the world as apprehended by her, but that is not at all the same as their being formulated 
in terms of her apprehension. What rational explanations require is not the agent’s point of view 
but the world and her action as it is taken to be from that point of view.” The Humean account, 
by contrast, suggests a Theory Theory account folk psychology. It does not deny we often give 
explanations in terms of normative reasons. But when we do, it says that these explanations are 
themselves to be explained with reference to, inter alia, the agent’s beliefs and desires. (cf. Smith 
2003/2004). The obvious candidate for such an explanation is a functionalist theory that specifies 
how beliefs, desires and other mental states are causally related to environment, behavior and each 
other.   
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her doubt keeps her from sleeping, or the fact that he is hearing voices again). 
But such cases are rather exceptional; most of the time people experience their 
actions as responses to things occurring around them, not in them. 
On the Humean account, motivating reasons are belief-desire pairs and 
so motivating reason explanations explain in virtue of citing the belief-desire 
pair that constitutes the agent’s motivating reason. On the non-psychologistic 
alternative, motivating reasons are a subspecies of normative reasons, namely 
those normative reasons in the light of which the agent acts, and so reason 
explanations explain by citing normative reasons. The question that needs to 
be asked at this point, however, is how we should understand the ‘in light of 
which’ clause from a second or third person point of view. 
As argued in chapter 2.4, in order to regard the ‘normative’ reason for run-
ning out the door, i.e. that the house is on fire, as the reason that motivated 
Jill’s action, it seems we need to see some kind of ‘intentional connection’ 
between Jill and her reason. We need to understand Jill as being aware of the 
fact that her house is on fire, and as getting into the state of being motivated 
to leave the house and run out the door. The clause ‘in the light of which’ is 
meant to capture the agent’s intentional directedness towards the situation at 
hand; without it, a factive reason explanation could not explain her action. 
The question is whether this ‘intentional connection’ must be of representa-
tional kind, whether attributing a reason ‘in the light of which’ to another 
person requires the ascription of beliefs and desires. Philosophers of action 
tend to stay silent on matters of mindreading. But at times proponents of 
non-psychologistic accounts seem to accept the BD-Model of action explana-
tion in the sense that belief-desire ascription forms a necessary enabling factor 
for reason explanation to succeed (Dancy 2000, p. 127; Alvarez 2010, p. 174). 
There are obvious parallels between the non-psychologistic alternative to 
reason explanation and the present account. The relational mindreader re-
lates the agent to her reason, which is typically not something psychological 
about the agent but rather something about the world outside the agent. On 
both accounts, ‘motivating’ reasons are things suited to figure in the delibera-
tion of an agent or the ‘co-deliberation’ of the interpreter. Apart from this, 
it is not exactly clear how far the parallel goes. If in fact proponents of the 
non-psychologistic account agree with the BD-Model insofar as it holds that 
belief-desire ascription is necessary for reason explanations to explain from 
a second- or third-person view, then this of course would mark a clear differ-
ence. In the remainder of this appendix, I will focus on the accounts provided 
by Dancy (2000) and Alvarez (2010).
Non-psychologistic accounts contrast with the Humean account insofar 
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as they hold that it is in virtue of the agent’s reason ‘in the light of which’ that 
a reason explanation explains, rather than in virtue of a Humean belief-desire 
pair of the agent. The ‘in the light of which’ clause (whether it be interpreted 
relationally or representationally) highlights a background condition for the 
explanation to go through; it is not part of the explanans itself.24 The Relational 
Model could hold a middle position on this score, for it could say that the real 
explanantia of default reason explanation are relational mental states, states 
relating the agent to her reason. It is not the agent’s reason that by itself con-
stitutes the explanans, but rather that reason in relation to the agent. It could 
thus agree with the Humean account insofar as the latter holds that there is a 
psychological element in the explanans. 
Alvarez (2010) thinks that we can only speak sensibly of motivating rea-
sons in veridical cases, i.e., in which the agent has a true belief about that 
which motivates her. In error cases, she speaks of ‘apparent reasons’. This, she 
argues, does justice to the fact that agents will normally retract their claim to 
having a reason when they find out that their action or intention was based on 
a false belief. This means that we can only give genuine reason explanations 
in veridical cases; in error cases we turn to Humean explanations that mention 
the agent’s apparent reason in the content clause of her beliefs (p. 177-181). 
Alvarez thereby rejects Bernard Williams’ principle that ‘The difference be-
tween false and true beliefs on the agent’s part cannot alter the form of the 
explanation which will be appropriate to his action.’ (1981, p. 102)
The Relational Model is sympathetic towards Alvarez proposal, in that 
it stresses the important difference between interpretation in veridical cases 
(by means of relational mindreading) and interpretation in error cases (by 
means of representational mindreading). It can, however, retain an element of 
Williams’ principle: that in both veridical and error cases there is a psychologi-
cal element featuring in the explanans. 
Dancy (2000) accepts Williams’ principle, but rejects the Humean account 
of reason explanation. For Dancy, reason explanation from a second- or third-
person perspective has an important and irreducibly first-person element.25 He 
24 Cf. Dancy (2000, p. 129) “That explanation specifies the features in the light of which the 
agent acted. It is required for this sort of explanation that those features be present to the agent’s 
consciousness – indeed that they be somehow conceived as favouring the action; so there must 
always be a way of making room for this fact, in some relation to the explanation that runs from 
features as reasons to actions as response. It is not required, however, that the nature of the agent’s 
consciousness itself either constitute, or even be part of, the explanans.” 
25 Dancy’s account shows interesting parallels with Gordon’s (e.g. 1986, 1995, 1996) ‘radical’ 
simulation theory. For Gordon, third-person interpretation is also essentially first-personal, in that 
it requires an ‘egocentric shift’ on the part of the interpreter, a ‘transformative identification’ with 
the agent to be interpreted. Dancy’s ‘appositional account’ of belief ascription also has a lot in 
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says that ‘The distinction between first and third person does not allow us to 
suppose that in the third-person case, there is a radical distinction between the 
psychologized and the non-psychologized forms of explanation, when there is 
no such radical difference in the first-person case.’ (p. 135) Since the Humean 
account does not make sense from the first-person perspective, it needs to be 
abandoned from the second- or third-person perspective as well. Yet at the 
same time, because there is no radical distinction between veridical and error 
cases from the first-person perspective, we shouldn’t allow for such a distinc-
tion from the second- or third-person perspective either. This commits Dancy 
to the claim that agents can act for genuine reasons even if their actions are 
based on false beliefs. Accordingly, reasons are things that may or may not be 
the case – things with the property of being suited to be the case – a metaphysi-
cal bullet that he is willing to bite (p. 145-151).  It also moves him toward a 
non-causal account of reason explanation. For things that are only capable of 
being the case, he argues, cannot feature as explanantia in causal explanations 
(p. 161). 
The first thing to notice is that the Relational Model can allow for a causal 
rendering of reason explanation: the attitude of the agent towards his reason – 
one of the relata of the relational mental state explaining the action – may be 
regarded as causally relevant in bringing about the action. And, of course, this 
causal rendering is also possible when the interpreter shifts to representational 
belief-desire psychology (see chapter 3 and 4). 
Secondly, the strong symmetry Dancy claims exists between first-person 
acting on reasons on the one hand, and third-person reason explanation of 
action on the other, paradoxically suggests a full-blown representational ren-
dering of third-person interpretation. For if the distinction between veridical 
and error cases is not allowed to enter into our account of third-person reason 
explanation, on the grounds of symmetry with the first-person perspective, 
then it seems we are committed to belief ascription or representational min-
dreading in both error and veridical cases.26 This is paradoxical because such 
common with Gordon’s ascent routine approach: “…the appositional account. This hears ‘He is 
doing it because he believes that p’ as ‘He is doing it because p, as he believes.’ The ‘as he believes’ 
functions paratactically here, attaching itself to the ‘p’. Again, it is not part of the specification of 
his reason, but is a comment on that reason, one that is required by the nature of the explanation 
that we are giving.” (Dancy, 2000, p. 128-129) See chapter 4.2 for further discussion of Gordon’s 
simulation theory. 
26 It is not clear from the text of his (2000) where exactly Dancy stands on this matter. Some 
remarks, however, do point this direction. Consider: “There are, then, both factive and non-factive 
ways of laying out the considerations in the light of which the agent acted. If this is so, it seems to 
me that the difference between the factive and the non-factive cannot be of any real significance 
when it comes to the explanation of action.” (p. 134) 
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representational understanding of the veridical case from the third-person 
perspective would in fact show an important asymmetry with the first-person 
perspective. For it seems that agents normally do not represent themselves to 
themselves when responding to a reason. 
The Relational Model is not wedded to a strong symmetry thesis regarding 
the first-person and second- or third-person perspective. In fact, it suggests an 
important asymmetry. From the first-person perspective, an agent may just 
respond to a reason, without conceiving of that response as a relation between 
herself and her reason. But the second- or third-person interpreter who is at-
tributing a reason to someone else must make room for the fact that it is the 
agent who is responding to that reason, and not she herself or someone else. 
The Relational Model accounts for this by having the interpreter conceive of 
the agent’s response as a relation between that particular agent and her reason. 
It is this asymmetry that allows a psychological element to enter into rela-
tional mindreading, an element that is arguably absent in first-person experi-
ence of reasons. 
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Mindreading in 
Sellars’s Myth of Jones
 
3.1 Introduction
Folk psychology often takes the form of what I have termed ‘goal-reason psy-
chology’: of explicating the behavior of fellow human beings as being directed 
at goals in response to reasons. How should we further characterize this? The 
vast majority of philosophers and psychologists has adopted the BD-Model 
and holds that goal-reason psychology is in fact belief-desire psychology. 
The idea of commonsense understanding of other people’s goals and reasons 
through the attribution of propositional, inferentially articulated, yet non-
representational mental states has largely been ignored in the debate on social 
cognition. 
As theorists reflecting on folk psychology, we are naturally inclined to 
adopt belief-desire terminology in characterizing the interpretation processes 
we try to understand. This inclination, so I suggested in chapter 2, stems from 
the fact that belief-desire psychology has precisely the function of reflecting 
on our goals and reasons when social understanding becomes problematic. 
The habit of parsing goals and reasons in terms of beliefs and desires upon 
reflection makes it very hard for philosophers and other theorists to get a rela-
tional stratum of goal-reason psychology into clear view. This chapter can be 
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regarded as an attempt to counter this reflective habit. 
For this purpose, I will carefully reconsider Sellars’s well-known ‘Myth of 
Jones’ in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (1956/1997). Sellars pre-
sents his myth primarily for expository reasons. It is a deliberately fictional 
story that aims at revealing certain important features of the conceptual struc-
ture of our folk psychology. Sellars is often credited with the dubitable honor 
of being the intellectual forefather of the Theory Theory of folk psychology. 
But what exactly did Jones teach the main characters in Sellars’s myth, our 
‘Rylean ancestors’? The answer, I argue, is that he taught them how to engage 
in relational mindreading, and nothing more. Importantly, representational 
mindreading was still beyond their grasp when Jones’s mindreading classes 
were over. I thus use Sellars’s myth for my own expository ends; it is a very 
useful philosophical tool for revealing a relational conception of mindread-
ing. At the same time, this puts the debate on folk psychology in a new light. 
What is widely regarded as the intellectual inspiration and conceptual basis for 
the representationalist theory theories of folk psychology actually provides us 
with nothing beyond a relational understanding of mind.  
The next section presents an overview of Sellars’s Myth of Jones, with a 
specific focus on the way in which Sellars lets Jones build his new ‘theory of 
mind’ on the foundations of certain pre-existent skills of our Rylean ances-
tors. In the third section, I will exploit Sellars’s bootstrapping techniques as re-
vealed in section 2. By carefully following through Sellars’s strategy, it becomes 
vividly clear that Jonesian folk psychology cannot go beyond a relational un-
derstanding of each other’s goals and reasons. The remainder of the chapter 
will put this conclusion in broader perspective. Section 4 homes in on the 
conceptual nature of the argument and distinguishes it from related empirical 
considerations. It also provides a friendly amendment to the working defini-
tion of relational mindreading presented in the previous chapter. Section 5 
ends with a cautionary note on the alleged theoretical nature of mindreading 
on Sellars’s account. In certain important respects, the Myth of Jones actually 
suggests a non-theoretical account folk psychological interpretation.  
3.2 How Jones Taught Our Rylean Ancestors
Sellars’s Myth of Jones in his seminal essay ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind’ (1956/1997; hereafter EPM) is often referred to as the original source of 
the Theory Theory of folk psychology. As explained in chapter 2.2, TT holds 
that our ordinary explanations, predictions, etc. of each other’s thoughts and 
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actions rest on the (tacit) application of a commonsense theory that specifies 
how mental states are causally related to environmental conditions, observ-
able behavior and other mental states. In certain crucial respects, however, the 
Myth of Jones does not lend credence to the details of TT. Most importantly, it 
does not support the dominant BD-Model of TT, according to which theoriz-
ing about other people’s goals and reasons demands quantification over their 
beliefs and desires (see chapter 2). But this will have to wait until the next 
section. This section first gives a brief overview of the place of the Myth of 
Jones in EPM. It will then provide a more detailed discussion of the first part 
of Sellars’s myth. 
Sellars’s ultimate target in EPM is the nature of certain forms of first-per-
son, rather than second- or third-person ascription of mental states.  He has 
in mind the judgments one can make about the contents of one’s own expe-
riences and thoughts. Sellars attacks traditional foundationalist accounts in 
epistemology with a special focus on so-called sense-datum theories, still very 
popular at the time he wrote the essay. According to foundationalist theories, 
our judgments about our own experiences and thoughts have the special epis-
temic status of being a warrant of absolute certainty for our further epistemic 
concerns. On this typically Cartesian picture, our epistemic access to our own 
thoughts and experiences is completely transparent; thoughts and experiences 
are self-authenticating episodes such that the mere having of an experience or 
thought entails knowing that one has the experience or thought. Accordingly, 
the mere act of experiencing or thinking provides one with incorrigible first-
person knowledge, an epistemic datum or Given, as Sellars calls it, on which all 
other knowledge is founded. For a number of reasons, not to be discussed here, 
Sellars thinks that the idea of such an epistemic Given is deeply problematic, 
a philosophical myth. The Myth of Jones is Sellars’s antidote against the myth 
of the Given. It is “a myth to kill a myth” (EPM, §63), a piece of anthropo-
logical fiction that purports to sketch an alternative picture of the first-person 
epistemology of thought and experience. Crucially, it starts by telling a story 
about second- and third-person ascription. It is this part of the myth that will 
occupy us further on. 
The Myth of Jones begins with a description of a prehistoric community 
of humans Sellars calls our ‘Rylean ancestors’. They are ‘Rylean’ in the sense 
that they do not have any conception of inner mental life, of their own in 
particular.27 Their concept of mind is confined to public displays of intention-
27 Obviously, this Rylean conception of mind is modeled on Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) behaviorist 
treatment of the concept of mind.  
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ality, such as the making of overt linguistic utterances. One day, a genius called 
Jones appears who comes up with a ‘theory of mind’, according to which overt 
utterances are caused by inner ‘thoughts’. The beauty of the theory is its sim-
plicity. For these theoretical posits Jones calls ‘thoughts’ are modeled on overt 
utterances themselves, an understanding of which the Ryleans have already 
mastered. Building on this understanding, Jones is able to teach the Ryleans 
his new theory by analogy. He thus tells them that when they speak, this is 
the result of something analogous going on inside them, a process of ‘inner 
speech’. He also tells them that such inner episodes can occur without overt 
linguistic manifestation. With the core of the theory in place, Jones trains his 
Rylean students to make correct ascriptions of thoughts to others; he shows 
them how ascription of the thought that p to an agent is correct when, roughly, 
the overt utterance that p would make proper sense for the agent in that con-
text. He then teaches them to apply this newly acquired skill to themselves. 
First they make self-ascriptions inferentially, on the basis of indirect behavioral 
evidence, behavior caused by the thought ascribed (e.g. their own overt utter-
ances). After a lot of practice, however, the Ryleans acquire the disposition to 
self-ascribe as a direct response to simply having the thought, thus ‘bypassing’ 
the inference from the behavior that it causes. As a result of their training the 
Ryleans have learned to respond to the thought that p by reporting rather than 
inferring that they are themselves thinking that p. As it turns out, this non-
inferential form of self-ascription is normally a very reliable indicator of the 
presence of the thoughts ascribed, more reliable, in fact, than most ascriptions 
by others. At the end of the story, therefore, “our ancestors begin to speak of 
the privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts” (§59) – privileged, 
but by no means infallible access, as traditional foundationalist accounts 
have it. In the last section of the essay Sellars proposes a similar treatment 
for first-person reports on sense-impressions, thus providing an alternative for 
the ‘sense-data’ of sense-datum theories. For our purposes, however, Sellars’s 
treatment of thoughts is of particular interest, since it specifically concerns 
attribution of mental states with propositional content. 
Sellars main concern, then, is to explain the privileged status of first-
person judgments about the contents of one’s own thoughts without falling 
victim to the myth of the Given. Using the notion of a theory as a model for 
his account of such folk psychological claims, he hopes to have shown how, 
like scientific theories, these claims figure in a rational, self-correcting social 
practice, rather than as its foundation. Thus, the Myth of Jones 
helps us understand that concepts pertaining to such inner epi-
M
indreading in S
ellars’s M
yth of Jones
46
sodes as thoughts are primarily and essentially intersubjective […] 
and that the reporting role of these concepts – the fact that each 
of us has a privileged access to his thoughts – constitutes a di-
mension of the use of these concepts which is built on and pre-
supposes this intersubjective status. (§59, emphasis in original)  
This last quote reveals that one of Sellars’s primary aims is to show that our 
concepts of ‘inner’ episodes such as that of thinking that p can be derived 
from our concepts of publically observable occurrences such as that of say-
ing that p.28 In later work, he would refer to the conceptual material out of 
which to reconstruct our commonsense folk psychological notions as ‘Verbal 
Behaviorism’ (VB). In ‘Meaning as Functional Classification’ (1974/2007; here-
after MFC) he explains: “According to VB, thinking ‘that-p’, where this means 
‘having the thought occur to one that-p,’ has as its primary sense saying ‘p’; 
and a secondary sense in which it stands for a short term proximate propensity 
to say ‘p’.” (p. 83, emphasis in original)29 Importantly, the VB model does not 
allow for the idea that thinking is a stream of consecutive inner episodes that 
may, but need not be, expressed in overt speech. According to the VB model, all 
thinking is thinking-out-loud, as we would put it. The VB conception of propo-
sitional mental content is confined to having the propensity or disposition to 
say certain things under certain circumstances; it conceives of the process of 
thinking as rapid and complex shifts of such dispositions. 
The pre-Jonesian Ryleans are such verbal behaviorists; their appreciation 
of each other’s mental lives is confined to an understanding of each other’s 
propensities to display certain kinds of behavior, linguistic acts in particular. 
This by itself is already a very sophisticated skill they possess. It requires that 
they have mastered a language, that they know when it is appropriate to say 
certain things and how to act on certain sayings, what follows from what one 
has said, what it follows from and what it is (in)compatible with, etc. The 
Ryleans already have a highly developed conception of intentionality, in the 
form of the aboutness of their sayings and the directedness of their doings. 
This is an important point. Unlike some forms of logical behaviorism, 
Sellars’s Verbal Behaviorism does not aim at reducing intentionality to behav-
ioral dispositions.30 Rather, the verbal behaviorist conception of intentionality 
28 For a discussion of the sense in which thoughts are conceived as ‘inner’ episodes on 
Sellars’s story, see section 4.      
29 A considerably revised version of this paper appeared in Naturalism and Ontology (1980, 
ch. 4). I will be referring to the original version, reprinted in Scharp and Brandom (2007).  
30 By calling the protagonists of his story ‘our Ryleans ancestors’, Sellars’s makes it clear that 
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the Ryleans already possess is confined to behavior, behavior that is already con-
ceived as intrinsically intentional, as instances of acting and saying.31 Another 
point worth stressing is that Sellars is making a conceptual claim here, not an 
ontological one. He is not saying that the pre-Jonesian Ryleans did not have in-
ner mental lives. They already instantiated inner episodes of thinking, episodes 
that, on Sellars’s story, caused their overt utterances and intentional actions. 
Verbal Behaviorism is an account of the Ryleans’ conception of the mental; the 
point of the Myth of Jones is to show how the Ryleans can be bootstrapped 
into a more sophisticated way of thinking about thinking, a way that is actu-
ally explanatorily superior to Verbal Behaviorism, in approximating the true 
causes of intentional behavior. Sellars’s strategy is to treat the VB conception 
of thought as thinking-out-loud is conceptually prior to our conception of inner 
thought episodes and to analyze the latter by analogy with the former. But 
this is compatible with the idea that inner thoughts are causally prior to the 
occurrence of meaningful speech. That, in any case, is what Jones teaches the 
Ryleans, and what Sellars regards as a first step toward an accurate understand-
ing of mind. 
Following Sellars’s methodological behaviorist strategy, pre-Jonesian folk 
psychology is thus to be understood as rather sophisticated in being sensitive 
to full-fledged propositional forms of intentionality, yet rather primitive in 
being sensitive only to public displays of such forms of intentionality. The 
challenge for Sellars is to show how this Rylean understanding of thinking 
as thinking-out-loud can be lifted up to a genuine appreciation of thinking 
as silent inner episodes causing overt speech, and to do so, of course, with-
out presupposing any reference to such inner episodes in pre-Jonesian folk 
psychology. In order to meet this challenge, Sellars starts by adding two ingre-
dients to the linguistic repertoire of the Ryleans, skills that by themselves do 
not rest on an understanding of thoughts as inner episodes, but which, when 
suitably combined, can yield such an understanding. These two ingredients 
are the capacities to engage in semantical and theoretical discourse.32 
he doesn’t interpret Ryle (1949) as having been aiming for a reductive behaviorist analysis of mind 
either. I think this is a fair interpretation of Ryle. Cf. Schwitzgebel (2002). 
31 Cf. ‘Language as Thought and Communication’ (1969/2007, p. 80): “Thus, at the primary 
level, instead of analyzing the intentionality or aboutness of verbal behavior in terms of its express-
ing or being used to express classically conceived thoughts or beliefs, we should recognize that this 
verbal behavior is already thinking in its own right, and its intentionality or aboutness is simply the 
appropriateness of classifying it in terms which relate to the linguistic behavior of the group to 
which one belongs.” (emphasis in original)
32 Talk of ‘addition’ of semantical and theoretical discourse here should be understood pri-
marily in the methodological sense of not being presupposed by the characterization of the ‘original’ 
Rylean language. It need not be interpreted as a phylo- or ontogenetic hypothesis concerning 
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First, the Rylean language “would have to be enriched with the funda-
mental resources of semantical discourse.” (EPM, §49) The Ryleans, that is to 
say, need to have a meta-language; they need to be able to speak about their 
first-order linguistic utterances. The meta-language Sellars adds to the Rylean 
language gives expression to a form of functional role semantics. Building on 
their capacity to use their language, Sellars grants the Ryleans the capacity 
to talk about their language use, i.e. to state the function of a certain expres-
sion in their linguistic practice according to the way they use that expression. 
Sellars characterizes the function of linguistic acts in terms of three kinds of 
norm-governed behavioral uniformities: (i) non-inferential language entry 
transitions from worldly features in perceptual situations to perceptual claims, 
(ii) inferential intra-linguistic transitions and (iii) non-inferential language 
departure transitions from avowals of intention to the corresponding actions 
(see appendix). Mastery of a language requires that one displays the behavioral 
patterns specified by the entry/inference/exit rules of the expressions belong-
ing to that language.33  
In order to say in descriptive terms what the function of a given expres-
sion in a language is, one would have to explicitly state all the entry/infer-
ence/exit rules that specify its meaning – crudely, in what perceptual situations 
(not) to use the expression, what (not) to infer from it or to infer it from and 
what (not) to do upon drawing practical conclusions related to the expression. 
Fortunately, this is not something the Ryleans need to be able to do in order 
human linguistic practice (see section 3.4 for discussion). Thus in MFC (p. 89), Sellars comments: 
“It would be a mistake to suppose that a language is learned as a layer cake is constructed: first the 
object language, then a meta-language, then a meta-meta-language, etc. […] The language learner 
gropes in all these dimensions simultaneously. And each level of achievement is more accurately 
pictured as a falling of things belonging to different dimensions into place, rather than an addition 
of a new story to a building.” 
33 According to Sellars, being a full-fledged member of a linguistic community not only 
requires that one behaves in conformity with the rules of the language, but also that one can 
obey the rules, i.e. that one is able to think of oneself as complying to the rules, i.e. that one 
has an understanding of these rules as such. A full treatment of Sellars’s account of linguistic 
behavior goes beyond the scope of this chapter. In essential outline, the idea is that members of 
a linguistic community train their children and correct each other so as to display the behavioral 
patterns that there ought to be in conformity with the rules of the language, which requires that 
they themselves as teacher or critic understand that one ought to do as the ought-to-be rules dictate. 
In teaching their children or criticizing each other, language users must therefore have a grasp of 
the rules themselves. Importantly, the child learning a language, or the adult speaking ‘candidly 
and spontaneously’, is not acting intentionally in accordance with the rules, she merely displays the 
pattern-governed behavior she has been trained to exhibit (see section 3.3). Sellars accounts for 
the normativity of the behavioral uniformities exhibited in linguistic practice by placing them in a 
deontic social context in which trainers, by obeying the ought-to-do’s, condition the trainees into 
behaving in conformity with the ought-to-be’s. See e.g. ‘Some Reflections on Language Games’ 
(1954/2007) and ‘Language as Thought and as Communication’ (1969/2007). For a comprehensive 
introduction to Sellars’s account of rule-governed behavior, see Rosenberg (2004/2007), deVries 
(2005, ch. 2) and O’Shea (2007, ch. 4). 
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to grasp the idea that their utterances have a function in linguistic practice. 
They already speak the language; their newly acquired meta-language can ride 
piggyback on their first-order language use. What Sellars needs to add to their 
linguistic competence is, in effect, only a relatively simple ‘procedure’ that 
enables them to comment upon this competence (see appendix for discussion). 
Roughly, this procedure tells them that the function of an expression E in their 
language is exhibited by their proper use of E in actual linguistic practice. This 
function can be made explicit on demand and to the relevant extent, by fol-
lowing through and writing down the entry/inference/exit rules of E exhibited 
in proper use. Yet the fact that E has a function that is describable in this way 
and exhibited in its proper use is something that the Ryleans are now able to 
make intelligible to themselves. This first addition to the Rylean language, 
then, endows the Ryleans with a rudimentary functionalist conception of 
their own linguistic utterances, i.e. a conception according to which their lin-
guistic utterances have a functional role that can be characterized in terms of 
entry/inference/exit transitions.  Importantly, this conception does not appear 
to presuppose the concept of thought as inner episode. If an understanding of 
(being disposed to) thinking-out-loud does not presuppose this concept, then 
neither does talking about such understanding. 
The second addition concerns the enrichment of the Rylean language 
with theoretical discourse: 
Thus we may suppose these language-using animals to elaborate, with-
out methodological sophistication, crude, sketchy, and vague theories 
to explain why things which are similar in their observable proper-
ties differ in their causal properties, and things which are similar in 
their causal properties differ in their observable properties. (EPM, §52) 
We should endow the Ryleans, that is, with the capacity to explain and predict 
the dispositions of observable entities by positing unobservable, i.e. theoreti-
cal entities: underlying non-dispositional states with certain causal proper-
ties. Thus, to use two of David Armstrong’s (1980) examples, we should allow 
the Ryleans to theorize about the internal structure of a vase that causes it 
to break when pushed off the table, or about the microscopic properties that 
explain the poisonous effect of some substance upon ingestion. Theorizing 
in this sense, Sellars proposes, consists in finding an appropriate model for 
the theoretical entities posited, “i.e. to describe a domain of familiar objects 
behaving in familiar ways such that we can see how the phenomena to be 
explained would arise if they consisted of this sort of thing.” (EPM, §51) The 
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Ryleans could for example use some of the macroscopic properties of, say, 
termites – e.g. their capacity to eat their way through wood – as a model for 
the causal roles of the theoretical entities they posit to explain the toxicity of 
the poisonous substance – e.g. poison particles ‘eating’ their way through the 
intestinal walls causing internal bleeding and, eventually, death. Importantly, 
a model is always accompanied “by a commentary which qualifies or limits – 
but not precisely nor in all respects – the analogy between the familiar objects 
and the entities which are being introduced by the theory.” (ibid., emphasis in 
original) To carry on with our example, the poison particles could be consid-
ered like termites insofar as they make holes in the intestinal walls, but not to 
the extent that they, say, have jaws and walk on six legs. Again, it should be 
realized that this capacity to theorize simpliciter also does not presuppose an 
understanding of thoughts as inner episodes. After all, theorizing about such 
things as poisonous substances or vases does not seem to touch on matters of 
intentionality at all, let alone in covert form. 
With the addition of semantical and theoretical discourse to their linguis-
tic practice, the Ryleans are finally in a position to appreciate the teachings 
of genius Jones. For Jones can now simply teach them how to combine their 
meta-linguistic and theoretical skills into a new capacity to theorize about their 
minds. First, he shows them how to apply their capacity for theoretical think-
ing to the objects of their own meta-linguistic discourse. He tells them that 
their disposition to use an expression to the effect that p in certain conditions 
can be explained by positing an unobservable inner episode of ‘thought’ that 
causes the overt utterance under those circumstances. Jones, in other words, 
“develops a theory according to which overt utterances are but the culmination 
of a process which begins with certain inner episodes.” (EPM, §56)
Secondly, he exploits their meta-linguistic skills by having them character-
ize the causal roles of thoughts in terms of the functional roles of their linguis-
tic utterances, thus teaching them, in effect, how to model thoughts on the 
overt utterances they serve to explain – i.e. as thinking that p.  Differently put, 
Jones’s model for these episodes “is that of overt verbal behavior itself. In other 
words, using the language of the model, the theory is to the effect that overt verbal 
behavior is the culmination of a process which begins with ‘inner speech’.” (§56, em-
phasis in original) Jones’s theory uses overt speech as a model; it also includes 
a commentary on the model that qualifies the analogy being proposed. Inner 
thoughts are like speech acts in being semantically evaluable, i.e. in meaning or 
being about something, but not, the commentary hastens to add, in involving 
“the wagging of a hidden tongue” or the production of any sounds (§57).  
Modeling inner thoughts on overt linguistic utterances, the Ryleans are 
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able to infer the presence of a thought that p in someone whenever an utter-
ance of this person to the effect that p would make proper sense of her behav-
ior under the circumstances. And this, in turn, helps the Ryleans to appreciate 
“the fact that [their] fellow men behave intelligibly not only when their con-
duct is threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes – that is to say, as we would 
put it, when they ‘think out loud’ – but also when no detectable verbal output 
is present.” (§56, emphasis in original) For now that they understand that 
someone’s disposition to think-out-loud that p when she for example observes 
a certain state of affairs is causally mediated by the state of thinking-to-herself 
that p, it is but a short step to coming to realize that her observing might cause 
her thinking without the latter giving rise to overt speech. Similarly, seeing 
someone’s disposition to e.g. act to the effect that p when she intends-out-loud 
to p as being instigated by an intending-to-herself to p, the Ryleans can come 
to appreciate the fact that such silent intendings might directly cause the cor-
responding actions, without intervening utterances. 
As a result of Jones’s teachings, the Ryleans have evolved from verbal be-
haviorists to ‘verbal’ functionalists. Applying the functional classification of 
their linguistic utterances to the theoretical entities posited to explain each 
other’s utterances, the Ryleans have bootstrapped themselves into a rudimen-
tary functionalist understanding of each other’s displays of intentionality. The 
concept and contentfulness of inner thought is modeled on the concept and 
meaningfulness of public speech. At the same time, however, the occurrence 
of public speech is explained by the occurrence of inner thought. On Sellars’s 
account, this puts the conceptual and causal dependencies exactly right. 
This concludes our survey of Sellars’s Myth of Jones. At this point in the 
story, the Ryleans have learned how to attribute thoughts to one another in 
the service of making sense of their behavior. As we have seen in the overview 
at the beginning of this section, in the final stage Jones conditions the Ryleans 
to apply their new theory of mind non-inferentially to themselves, thus giving 
them very reliable and even privileged access to their own thoughts (and, in 
the last paragraphs of EPM, to their own experiences). This final stage is the 
crux of the story within the context of the overall aim of EPM, i.e. to kill the 
myth of the Given. The present focus lies elsewhere, however. Our discussion 
of the first part of Sellars’s myth has revealed how Jones taught the Ryleans a 
theory of mind by having them model their conception of inner thoughts on 
their verbal behaviorist conception of public speech. The question before us 
is what notion of mind Jones thereby endows the Ryleans with, in specific: 
whether it is a genuinely representational notion of mind.
M
indreading in S
ellars’s M
yth of Jones
52
3.3 What Jones Taught Our Rylean Ancestors
After Jones’s teaching sessions are over, the Ryleans are genuine mindread-
ers, in the sense specified in chapter 2: they understand each other’s behav-
ior in terms of unobservable, propositionally articulated thoughts. The term 
‘thought’ that Jones introduces into his new theory is actually a generic no-
tion that covers different forms of ‘saying-to-oneself’ that the Ryleans already 
‘thought-out-loud’ before Jones’s arrival. Consider the distinction between 
claims stating or inferring how it is with the world and practical avowals speci-
fying how the world is to be changed as a result of one’s actions. Interpretation 
of each other’s utterances in pre-Jonesian social practice proceeded in con-
formity with the entry/inference/exit rules that specify the appropriate use 
in their language. The pre-Jonesian Ryleans were quite good in assessing the 
non-inferential responsiveness their compatriots exhibited in making percep-
tual claims. Based on prior experience of others’ dispositions to respond (in)
appropriately to the perceptual scene, for example, the Ryleans displayed a 
remarkable sensitivity to the (un)reliability of each other’s overt perceptual 
judgments. They knew whom they could treat as a reliable indicator of which 
aspect of the world. Having mastered the inferential roles of the expressions 
belonging to their language, they also had a keen eye for the (im)propriety of 
the inferences people overtly made. On the language exit side, they displayed 
a nuanced appreciation of each other’s ‘intendings-out-loud’, knowing which 
such practical avowals were (in)compatible with which others, for example. 
And keeping track of each other’s (in)appropriate non-inferential responsive-
ness to such overt intendings by performing the corresponding actions, they 
knew whose practical avowals to perform what kind of actions they could rely 
on.
But interpretation in the pre-Jonesian community was not restricted to 
the making of simple factual claims and practical avowals. Sellars carefully 
notices that the Ryleans were already capable of making and understanding 
subtle use of the subjunctive conditional.34 They had the resources to wield 
dispositional concepts, which was manifested in their ability to talk about 
what would happen and what people would do in hypothetical situations. It 
34 See EPM, §48: “Imagine a stage in pre-history in which humans are limited to what I shall 
call a Rylean language, a language of which the fundamental descriptive vocabulary speaks of pub-
lic properties of public objects located in Space and enduring through Time. Let me hasten to add 
that it is also Rylean in that although its basic resources are limited […] its total expressive power 
is very great. For it makes subtle use not only of the elementary logical operations of conjunction, 
disjunction, negation, and quantification, but especially of the subjunctive conditional.” 
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is this capacity for counterfactual thinking that allowed them to start using 
their functionalist meta-language (characterizing their first-order language use 
in terms of what would be appropriate to say or do under certain circum-
stances) and to engage in theorizing (explaining dispositional properties in 
terms of underlying non-dispositional states), already before the arrival of 
Jones. Building on their capacity for counterfactual thinking, it is not unlikely 
that they also already had come to terms with rudimentary notions of pos-
sibility and necessity. This would have manifested itself in their intelligent use 
and interpretation of terms like ‘perhaps’, ‘certainly’, ‘possibly, ‘probably’, etc. 
Accordingly, they would know how to differentiate between the significance 
of someone’s claiming that p is perhaps the case and her stating that p is cer-
tainly the case, or someone’s predicting that p will occur and her assessment 
that it might happen. 
There is also no reason to think that pre-Jonesian appreciation of each 
other’s sayings was restricted to the purely verbal aspects of each other’s overt 
sayings. Plausibly, the Ryleans were sensitive to certain emotional cues present 
in one another’s linguistic performances, such as tone of voice, facial expres-
sion and bodily posture. They probably knew how to differentiate between the 
epistemic merits of a doubtful answer and a confident response. Nor should we 
assume that their interpretation of each other only concerned the more ‘cog-
nitive’ varieties of ‘thinking-out-loud’, such as claiming, affirming, denying, 
supposing that or wondering whether p. More emotional counterparts, such 
as regretting, fearing, hoping or being angry about the fact that p would also 
have been within their interpretative grasp. They need not have experienced 
any problems in responding appropriately and differentially to someone’s 
dreadful whisper, as opposed to, for example, her enthusiastic announcement 
that p. 
In sum, the pre-Jonesian Ryleans already treated each other as more or 
less reliable indicators – each other’s sayings as more or less reliable indica-
tions – of (emotionally significant) situations or events reported on or to be ef-
fectuated by their own actions. Their linguistic sophistication allowed them to 
understand some of these sayings as concerning counterfactual scenarios and 
probably also as stating the (im)possibility or (im)probability of (past, present 
or future) states of affairs or events talked about. 
Jones could exploit all these pre-existent interpretation skills when he 
showed the Ryleans how to model the theoretical entities of his revolutionary 
theory on each other’s overt sayings. The question we should ask at this point, 
however, is whether, in their post-Jonesian stage, the Ryleans are sensitive to 
the representational dimension of all these different forms of thinking-to-oneself 
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they have now come to appreciate. Do their Jonesian mindreading skills allow 
them to appreciate the fact that the contents of a person’s thoughts specify 
the world as it appears to this individual person, as opposed to the way the world 
presents itself to them? Do they understand that other people’s thoughts can 
be true or false, in the sense that their thoughts articulate a worldview that 
(mis)represents the world? Our discussion of Jones’s bootstrapping techniques 
in the previous section reveals in a fairly straightforward fashion that this can-
not be the case.
In their pre-Jonesian stage, the Ryleans had no inkling of the private 
mental lives of others. They were verbal behaviorists: their understanding of 
each other’s minds was confined to public manifestations of intentionality, 
such as overt sayings. As we have seen in the previous section, the addition, 
before the arrival of Jones, of semantical and theoretical discourse to their 
linguistic repertoire, did not change the Ryleans’ verbal behaviorist conception 
of each other. When Jones finally enters the scene, he doesn’t add anything to 
their existing skills. He simply, ingeniously, combines their skills into a new way 
of reading the minds of their fellow men and women. He shows them how 
to apply their theoretical skills to their own linguistic performances by using 
the functionalist meta-language they had already mastered to characterize the 
theoretical entities posited by this new theory. The functional specifications of 
these inner episodes are thus modeled on the functional specifications of their 
pre-Jonesian language, specifications which are given entirely in terms of the 
state of the world as it is publically conceived. Jones’s theory enables the Ryleans 
to interpret overt action as being caused by inner intentional episodes, but 
the contents of these episodes are still characterized entirely with reference to 
the public world. In their pre-Jonesian state of mind, the Ryleans interpreted 
each other’s utterances solely with reference to the world – things that (might 
have) happened in the past, states of affairs that (possibly) obtain at present, 
events that will (probably) occur in the future, etc. The whole idea of there 
being different views on these worldly states of affairs and events (or their likeli-
hood, etc.) eluded them. The only thing that Jones does upon his arrival is, 
in effect, to teach the Ryleans how to exploit their understanding of each 
other’s overt speech in the service of applying his new theory of thought. By 
doing so, Jones does not miraculously endow them with a representational 
understanding of intentionality; Jonesian mindreading is still entirely bound 
to the public sphere. 
Let us go over this more slowly. There is an ambiguity in the notion of 
mental representation that makes the present point particularly difficult to 
understand. In one sense of the term, the Ryleans already had a concept of 
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mental representation before the arrival of Jones, a concept Jones teaches 
them to apply to the silent counterparts of their overt utterances. 
Consider once more the pre-Jonesian stage in Sellars’s myth. Already at 
this point in the story, the Ryleans are able to talk about proper use of their 
language in semantical discourse. They understand that proper use is a mat-
ter of how an utterance of a particular type is supposed to function within 
the game of giving and asking for reasons: in response to which perceptual 
circumstances one is supposed or (not) allowed to make certain perceptual 
claims (entry transitions), which premises should or may (not) elicit which 
conclusions (inference transitions), and which actions one ought or may (not) 
perform in response to which practical conclusions (exit transitions). By com-
menting on proper entry transitions, they can say what a certain perceptual 
statement ought to track in the immediate environment; by criticizing each 
other’s inferences, they can reveal what their (perceptual) statements ought to 
say about the wider, non-perceivable world; by monitoring each other’s practi-
cal avowals to act, they can explicate what such avowals ought to tell about the 
way the world is to be changed as a result of the intended action. 
Engaging in semantical discourse in this manner, the Ryleans are in effect 
using a respectable notion of representation. Appropriate use of an utterance 
is specified by what, according to its entry/inference/exit rules, it is supposed to 
indicate about the world, both the perceptual environment (entry transitions) 
as well as the world at large – past, present and future (inference and exit 
transitions). The sounds their compatriots make are treated as linguistic vehi-
cles whose function it is to map onto certain aspects of the world, and this is 
something the Ryleans are able to say in so many words in their semantical 
meta-language. 
Let us term this the ‘functional role’ or FR-notion of mental representa-
tion.35 Some readers may be reminded of so-called ‘teleosemantic’ theories of 
mental representation. In general, teleosemantic theories hold that something 
is a representation in virtue of the function it performs in a representational 
system. On Dretske’s (1988) account, for example, a state (lawfully) co-varying 
with some environmental condition becomes a representation of that condi-
tion when it acquires the function of co-varying with it in causing certain 
behavior. And on Millikan’s proposal (e.g. 1984), the function of the repre-
sentational vehicle is characterized in terms of its role in guiding co-operating 
35 Thus, overt utterances (and, by analogy, their inner counterparts) are considered repre-
sentational vehicles in virtue of fact that they occupy a functional role specifiable in terms of the 
entry/inference/exit rules that capture their proper use in linguistic practice. 
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consumer devices in the performance of their proper functions by mapping 
reliably enough on certain environmental features. For our purposes, the de-
tails of and differences between these (and other) teleosemantic accounts are 
not important. The point of bringing them to mind is to direct attention to 
the fact that pre-Jonesian interpretation allows for a rudimentary, folk notion 
of representation that is in important ways analogous to the teleosemantic 
notion.36 
What unites all teleosemantic theories, as Millikan (2004, ch. 5) points 
out, is their story about what it is for a representation to misrepresent. 
Misrepresentation is explained in terms of a representational vehicle’s mal-
functioning in some way or other. False representations fail to perform their 
proper function and thereby fail to represent. The failure of false representa-
tions to represent should not be understood in terms of a mismatch of some 
sort between what is represented by the false representation on the one hand 
and the way the world actually is on the other. On teleosemantic accounts, 
Millikan concludes, “’What is represented’ by a false representation is indeed 
‘something that does not exist,’ because a false representation represents nothing 
at all.”  (p. 65, emphasis added)
And so it is on the Ryleans’ pre-Jonesian understanding of ‘overt’ mental 
representations. At this stage in their development, incorrect use of their lan-
guage can only be regarded as a failed attempt to perform a linguistic act. If a 
speaker amongst them claims that not-p when it is in fact the case that p, she 
is interpreted as merely having failed to assert that p, not also as having success-
fully expressed an inner world-directed thought that not-p. Errors of this kind 
are taken as evidence of a misalignment with reality, a glitch in linguistic per-
formance, a malfunctioning of the speaker’s linguistic skills. She should have 
said that p under these circumstances; her failure to comply with the norms of 
their linguistic practice may be responded to by giving her incredulous stares, 
by firmly making claims to the contrary, or perhaps by beating her with sticks. 
Whatever sanctions her fellow Ryleans subject her to, their intention cannot 
be to change her views about whether or not p. What they intend to change, 
if anything at all, is her misuse of their language, period. As far as the pre-
Jonesian Ryleans are concerned, there is nothing behind her error that could 
36 There is also a sharp disanalogy, however. Teleosemantic theories are designed to give 
a naturalistic explanation of mental content. By contrast, the pre-existent Rylean meta-linguistic 
skills that Jones exploits for teaching them his theory merely serve the practical purpose of classify-
ing each other’s utterances in order to criticize, correct or praise their linguistic performances (see 
appendix for further discussion). Yet the notion of representation involved, whether in providing 
reductive explanations or in making mere classifications, is basically the same. 
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make her utterance rational from her individual point of view.  
The Ryleans take each other’s thoughts to indicate what they ought to tell 
them about the world. If the utterance is uttered in the appropriate circum-
stances, the interpreter takes it to be about what it is supposed to indicate; if 
it is used inappropriately, the interpreter takes it to have failed to indicate. 
Misalignment with the world is not also interpreted as a sign of successful 
expression of ‘something’ else – the speaker’s private take on the world. On 
the pre-Jonesian account, a linguistic utterance that misrepresents merely fails 
to indicate what it ought to. That’s all there is to it. Indication could be taken 
quite literally as ‘pointing’ towards some feature or features in the world.37 For 
the pre-Jonesian Ryleans, talking and thinking is just a sophisticated, propo-
sitionally articulated way of pointing. The pointing vehicle (the utterance or 
thought) can be considered a representation insofar as it has the function of 
aligning with certain features in the world, a function that can be described in 
terms of the entry/inference/exit rules, rules which the Ryleans can articulate 
to a certain extent in their semantic meta-language. Failure of a pointing ges-
ture to perform its function is regarded as just that: a failure. It is like a road 
sign pointing in the wrong direction: it simply misdirects the interpreter.
On a mere FR-understanding of representation, then, misrepresentation 
is mere malfunction leading to misalignment. Pre-Jonesian mastery of the 
FR-notion of mental representation by itself does not yield representational 
mindreading, in the sense I have been using the term: it does not amount to 
an understanding of the ‘overt’ mental representations attributed to others as 
giving expression to their own, subjective and possibly mistaken views on the world. 
As we have seen, Jones does not, upon his arrival, add anything to the Ryleans’ 
pre-existent ability to classify their language use in terms of FR-representations. 
He merely exploits their meta-linguistic skills for specifying the contents of the 
inner thoughts he introduces to explain their behavior. 
In their post-Jonesian stage, the Ryleans are just as baffled about their 
compatriot’s claim that not-p when in fact p: she simply failed to claim-to-herself 
that p. What they still cannot understand is that she thereby succeeded in rep-
37 My use of the term ‘indication’ here differs from Dretske’s (1988). Indication on Dretske’s 
account is mere law-like dependency between indicator (I) and feature indicated (F), such that 
F occurs whenever I occurs. The dependency either exists or it doesn’t; when it does there is an 
indication relation, when it doesn’t there is not. Hence, on Dretske’s use of the term, an indica-
tor cannot sensibly be said to fail to indicate. On a Jonesian reading, however, the indicator is a 
purposeful, rule-based (covert) linguistic act. Here, failure to indicate as one is supposed to makes 
perfect sense. Yet, as on Dretske’s account, indication is a relational notion. If a speaker uses an 
utterance according to its function, she indicates something about the world; if she uses an utter-
ance inappropriately, she fails to indicate. Hence, if she indicates, the indication implies the (past, 
present or future) existence of the indicated. 
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resenting the world to herself as if it were the case that not-p. The inner episodes 
the educated Ryleans attribute to one another are treated as silent events all 
right, but not as private ones. Their mental ascriptions still cannot make room 
for the fact that the contents attributed may give expression to the way one 
individual person conceives of the world, as opposed to the way the world 
is – publically, so to speak. The privileged access that the Ryleans grant each 
other with respect to their own thoughts only reflects the fact that first-person 
reports tend to be more reliable indicators of the presence of the thoughts as-
cribed than second-or third person ascriptions; it does not manifest apprecia-
tion of the fact that what one has privileged access to is how the world appears 
specifically to oneself and not necessarily to anyone else. 
Representational mindreading is not an option for the post-Jonesian 
Ryleans. When confronted with a false claim or an unrealistic intention of 
their fellow men and women, they can only regard it as a failed attempt to 
say or bring something it about the public world, not also as a successful ex-
pression of their own private take on the world. In this respect, they are just 
like their former pre-Jonesian selves. To their ears, a false statement is a sign 
of mere misalignment. To their eyes, a misinformed or misguided action is a 
matter of mere malfunctioning, like a missile missing its target. In such cases, 
their interpretation resources simply give out, and the only thing they can do 
is either shrug their shoulders or, in an attempt to realign them with reality, 
force their own views onto them.
If Jonesian mindreading doesn’t endow the Ryleans with the capacity 
to attribute thoughts as articulating someone’s subjective take on the world, 
then it doesn’t enable them to ascribe beliefs either. The Myth of Jones in EPM 
remains silent on matters concerning dispositional states of belief. However, 
in ‘Language as thought and as Communication’ (1969/2007; hereafter LTC), 
Sellars uses his verbal behaviorist framework to give an analysis of belief. 
Building on the notion of thinking already explicated, he analyses ‘Jones be-
lieves that-p’ as “Jones has a settled disposition to think that-p, if the question 
occurs to him whether-p, and, indeed, to think-out-loud that-p, unless he is 
in a keeping-his-thoughts-to-himself frame of mind.” (LTC, p. 75)38 Suppose 
we add this analysis to the curriculum of the Ryleans’ mindreading course. 
Will this enable them to achieve a genuine understanding of beliefs as subjec-
tive, possibly false representations of the world? No. The thoughts that figure 
38 In a footnote he adds: “The ‘if the question occurs to him whether-p’ condition can be 
taken to cover all cases in which, where the alternatives ‘p’ and ‘not p’ are relevant to his course of 
thought, he thinks that-p, even if the question whether-p is not actually raised.” 
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in the analysis are such that their contents are still determined entirely with 
reference to the public world. When someone is disposed to think a thought 
that defies the entry/inference/exit rules of the Rylean language game, she will 
simply be treated as being disposed to fail thinking a proper thought.39 
Notice that mere mastery of the subjunctive conditional required for an 
understanding of the notion of having a disposition, does not suffice here. 
To have a disposition to a is to actualize a under certain conditions. But as 
far as the (educated) Ryleans are concerned, these conditions are identified 
solely with reference to actual or possible states of affairs of the public world 
as described by their pre-Jonesian language. Their understanding of other peo-
ple’s disposition to think that p is confined to their own appreciation – and 
in their view the only, legitimate, common appreciation – of the counterfactual 
situations that specify the content of p. The idea that someone under different 
circumstances might sincerely claim ‘in a keeping-one’s-thoughts-to-oneself 
frame of mind’ something contrary to their public appreciation of the counterfac-
tual situation, this is something that still eludes the Ryleans, and perhaps even 
genius Jones himself. 
Counterfactual thinking is something the Ryleans could already do before 
the arrival of Jones. After his mindreading classes, they can also think about 
other people’s thinking in counterfactual circumstances, provided that other 
people’s take on these circumstances meshes with their own. Their concept of 
the standing state of belief shares much of the normative impact but lacks the 
subjective dimension of our concept of belief. The Jonesian idea of sincerely 
claiming to oneself that p in various counterfactual situations is like our con-
cept of belief in bestowing a commitment to it being the case that p on the 
believer, but it cannot make room for appreciation of the fact that such com-
mitments need not be shared by anyone else. 
An understanding of being disposed to think modeled on an understand-
ing of being disposed to assert that itself is confined to the public realm cannot 
yield a mature concept of belief. The same goes for a dispositional analysis of 
desiring p in terms of, roughly, being disposed to intend to p (and, subsequently, 
having the disposition to act accordingly) under suitable circumstances (e.g. 
Sellars 1966).40 The Ryleans’ post-Jonesian conception of an agent’s intending-
39 This point is not restricted to Sellars’s specific analysis; it applies generally to all disposi-
tionalist and/or functionalist accounts of belief. In Sellars’s myth, the dispositions or functional 
roles that are deemed definitive of beliefs on these accounts would also have to be characterized 
entirely in terms of the Ryleans’ pre-Jonesian language.  
40 Cf. Smith’s (1994) analysis directly in terms of being disposed to act to the effect that p 
under suitable conditions: “According to this alternative conception, desires are states that have 
a certain functional role. That is, according to this conception, we should think of desiring to j as 
M
indreading in S
ellars’s M
yth of Jones
60
to-herself to p (and acting accordingly) is entirely driven by their pre-Jonesian 
understanding of her overt avowal ‘I shall (now) p’ (followed at some future 
time by an action to the effect that p), and will thus be interpreted as a success-
ful case of intending only insofar as it is in conformity with the language exit 
rules that determine proper use of its overt counterpart in pre-Jonesian public 
language. Inappropriate or unrealistic intentions and actions that defy the 
rules of the pre-Jonesian language game will be treated as failed expressions 
of publically acceptable desires, not also as successful expressions of discrep-
ant personal desires. Attributing an unrealistic intention, for example, requires 
that the interpreter distinguish between what someone is supposed or allowed 
to bring about according to one’s own normative expectations, and what is 
represented by that person’s intention as the goal of the action, something she 
genuinely believes to be attainable (otherwise it would not be a case of sincere 
intending), but which the interpreter himself judges to be out of reach. Such 
representational understanding of intention goes beyond Jones’s teachings. 
Adding a dispositional dimension to this understanding, in the form of desir-
ing that p, makes no difference in this respect. 
The pre-Jonesian Ryleans had a conception of goals and reasons for action; 
goals were conceived as what was explicitly avowed in overt expressions of 
intention; reasons as what was explicitly stated in order to justify such explicit 
commitments to act. Importantly, these utterances could only be interpreted 
as intentional acts insofar as they were in accordance with the rules of their 
public language game; their verbal behaviorist conception of mind did not 
allow for an understanding of overt thoughts and intentions that somehow 
failed to comply with the entry/inference/exit rules that characterized proper 
(linguistic) conduct. Thus, people could only be judged to intentionally adopt 
goals and respond to reasons insofar as their answers to questions why were 
deemed acceptable in light of what one ought to say and how one ought to 
act given the circumstances, according to the public rules. The descriptions 
provided of people’s goals and reasons, to the extent that their answers could 
be conceived as voicing goals and reasons, portrayed these goals and reasons 
as things in the public world (past, present or future): events or states of af-
fairs one was expected to achieve, in the light of other events, states of affairs 
having a certain set of dispositions, the disposition to y in conditions C, the disposition to k in 
conditions C’, and so on, where, in order for conditions C and C’ to obtain, the subject must have, 
inter alia, certain other desires, and also certain other means-ends beliefs, beliefs concerning j-ing 
by y-ing, y-ing by k-ing and so on.” (p. 113) Notice that for the Ryleans, these ‘beliefs’ can only be 
regarded as dispositional relational states. 
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or facts that made their achievement worth pursuing by making certain lan-
guage exit moves, i.e. by performing certain actions. By accepting the answers 
given to their questions why, Rylean interpreters were in effect relating their 
fellow agents to their goals and reasons out in the world; to them, all goals and 
reasons that people could adopt and respond to were things that either had 
featured, did obtain or would come to be realized in the world. Thus, success-
ful interpretation of each other’s actions implied the past, present, or future 
existence of the goals and reasons attributed. This is relational mindreading 
(cf. chapter 2.4).
Jones only taught the Ryleans how to conceive of other people’s goals 
and reasons as being issued silently by their (dispositions to have) thoughts 
and intentions. He taught them how to move their game of giving and asking 
for reasons ‘inside’, but not how to sever the bonds with the public realm in 
doing so. Jonesian mindreading therefore did not allow for representational 
mindreading, it did not allow for the attribution to others of subjective repre-
sentations of the things they intend to achieve, nor of the things that make 
these ends and their means worth accomplishing. An agent acting on beliefs 
and desires incompatible with public evaluation of the world could not be 
regarded as acting with a goal and for a reason. Such an agent surely tried, but, 
on a Jonesian understanding, simply failed to do so. 
3.4 Why the Myth Matters  
I have exploited Sellars’s Myth of Jones with the purpose of making the no-
tion of relational mindreading more tangible. For two reasons, Sellars’s myth 
has been particularly helpful in this respect. First, the end stage of Sellars’s 
myth is still widely conceived as a basically adequate picture of our actual 
folk psychological concept of mind, the propositional episodes of ‘thinking’ 
and related propositional attitudes in particular. Showing that the end stage of 
Sellars’s myth actually depicts a relational stratum of social cognition will help 
positioning the technical notion of relational mindreading on the philosophi-
cal market. Second, Sellars devised his myth as a case of genuine conceptual 
bootstrapping, of showing how, as he puts it elsewhere
the  explanatory  function of ‘inner conceptual episodes’ can be con-
strued as resting upon an autonomous proto-psychological framework 
in which linguistic activity is described, explained and evaluated without 
reference to the framework of ‘mental acts’ which it supports. (MFC, p. 82) 
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If my conclusion regarding the end stage of Sellars’s myth holds out, then, to 
the extent that Sellars has succeeded in providing a non-circular account of 
the concept of inner thought built on the concept of overt linguistic acts, to 
that very extent will I have succeeded in characterizing a relational concept 
of propositional attitudes without presupposing a representational notion of 
mind. 
It is important that we be clear about the status of Verbal Behaviorism in 
Sellars’s philosophy. It primarily serves the expository purpose of laying bare 
some important structural features of the conceptual framework of common-
sense psychology. He chooses to treat VB as ‘methodologically autonomous’, 
i.e. to “present it in the guise of a claim that thinking at the characteristically 
human level simply is what is described by this framework.” (MFC, p. 83; em-
phasis in original) It serves to clarify certain key issues pertaining to the nature 
of our commonsense concept of thought, but, importantly, “It is not intended 
to be an adequate account of thinking; it is indeed radically oversimplified.” 
(ibid.) The methodological autonomy of the VB conception of intentionality 
need not be taken as implying the (phylogenetic or ontogenetic) developmental 
claim that this rather coarse-grained ‘behavioristic’ understanding of speech 
and action is fully acquired independently and prior to ‘mentalistic’ forms of 
interpretation. Neither need it be regarded as implying the psychological claim 
that interpretation in actual folk psychological practice tends to be ‘behavior-
istic’ by default. The point is that once we see the conceptual structure of our 
mature folk psychology as revealed by Verbal Behaviorism, the ‘radically over-
simplified’ developmental and practical claims of this expository framework 
can be left behind, or should at least be treated separately as crude hypotheses 
for further empirical research.41 Verbal Behaviorism need not be interpreted 
as a layer-cake model of the development or practical use of different inter-
pretation techniques. Rather, it is used as a philosophical tool for exposing 
the conceptual relations in commonsense psychology, once all the conceptual 
pieces are in place.   
41 Cf. MFC (p. 82): “For even if, as I do, one finds a reference to ‘inner conceptual episodes’ 
which are only in an analogical sense ‘verbal’ to be an indispensable feature of what might be called 
fine-grained psychological explanations, it is nevertheless possible to construe this ‘fine-grained’ 
framework as a theoretical enrichment of a ‘coarse-grained’ behavioristic explanatory framework 
which, from the former point of view, simply equates thinking with states which are ‘verbal’ – if I 
may so put it – in the literal sense. To be interesting for our purposes this ‘coarse-grained’ frame-
work would have to be methodologically autonomous in the sense hat it would contain categories 
of sense and reference, meaning and truth which could be fully explicated without any reference 
to non-verbal ‘inner conceptual episodes.’ Thus, in this behavioristic framework linguistic episodes 
would be characterized directly in semantical terms, i.e. without reference to the ‘inner conceptual 
episodes’ which, from the standpoint of the enriched framework, are involved in a finer grained 
explanation of their occurrence.”
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Sellars’s strategy is to develop an alternative account of our folk psycho-
logical concepts of inner mental states by treating Verbal Behaviorism as if it 
were an accurate picture of human phylogeny and/or ontogeny. But once the 
basic functionalist structure of the mental state concepts has been laid bare 
at the end of Sellars’s myth, the behaviorist bootstraps can be cut off, thrown 
away like Wittgenstein’s ladder. In their post-Jonesian frame of mind, inter-
nalization of Jones’s functionalist theory ensures that the concepts of overt 
and covert displays of intentionality mutually presuppose each other. This is all 
that Sellars needs to make good on his promise to deliver a viable alternative 
to the generally Cartesian idea of the Givenness of thought in awareness. For 
such mutual presupposition suffices to reveal the essentially intersubjective 
status of the concepts pertaining to such inner episodes as thoughts. The cru-
cial conceptual point of Sellars’s proposal is that although such concepts may 
have ‘a reporting use in which one is not drawing inferences from behavioral 
evidence it nevertheless insists that the fact that overt behavior is evidence for 
these episodes is built into the very logic of these concepts …’ (EPM 59; emphasis 
in original) At the end of Sellars’s story, all that is required is that we see that 
we ourselves might very well be using our own folk psychological concepts as 
if the myth were true.
Let me briefly illustrate this point. Lacking the concept of inner episodes 
of thinking, intending, etc., the pre-Jonesian Ryleans were not able to interpret 
each other as using speech for their own ‘covert’ ends. They cannot interpret 
each other’s linguistic utterances as speech acts, as the term is often used in 
the literature; speaker intentions of the familiar Gricean sort, for example, 
are beyond their grasp. On the VB conception, ‘thinking-out-loud’ is “to be 
equated with ‘candidly and spontaneously uttering “p”’ where the person […] 
who utters ‘p’ is doing so as one who knows the language to which ‘p’ be-
longs.” (LTC, p. 68). To know a language is, at a minimum, to use expressions 
belonging to the language in conformity with the rules of the language (see 
footnote 7). Making an utterance ‘candidly and spontaneously’ is an instance 
of, as we might put it, ‘unreflectively speaking one’s mind’ or, indeed, simply 
‘thinking-out-loud’, that is: appropriately voicing one’s language without us-
ing it with communicative intentions that are directed at the mental states of 
others.42 VB does allow for a conception of ‘intending-out-loud’ in the form of 
42  Cf. LTC (p. 68): “The phrase ‘candidly and spontaneously’ is intended to sum up an open-
ended set of conditions without which the suggestion cannot get off the ground. Jones’s thinking 
that-p obviously cannot be a quoting of ‘p’ or uttering it on the stage in the course of acting. The 
qualifying phrase also clearly rules out the case where Jones is lying, i.e. using words to deceive. 
Somewhat less obviously it is intended to imply that Jones is not choosing his words to express his 
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e.g. ‘I shall now go to the supermarket to by some milk’, which is treated as a 
practical commitment to perform the corresponding action. But such avowals 
of intentions cannot themselves be interpreted as intentional actions directed 
at the ‘inner’ mind of an audience. 
Again, however, this VB treatment of linguistic interpretation need not 
be regarded as an empirical claim about (the development of) the psycho-
logy of actual adult linguistic understanding. In fact, it seems compatible with 
a Gricean account of the interpretation practice of the educated Ryleans. In 
their educated state, the Ryleans may have evolved into occasional or regular 
Griceans, treating each other’s overt sayings as being caused by speaker inten-
tions, the contents of which include reference to the mental states of the inter-
preter herself. A Gricean picture of Human communication seems consistent 
with a broadly functionalist conception of speaker intentions along Sellarsian 
lines, and, I might add in the present context, with a fundamentally relational 
understanding of such intentions. For of course, post-Jonesian understand-
ing would be confined to a relational interpretation of each other’s speaker 
intentions. The educated Ryleans would not comprehend the idea that others 
might use their words to deceive them, for example, to willfully make them 
misrepresent the world, nor would they be able to understand themselves as 
such deceivers.
These same considerations apply to my exploitation of Sellars’s myth. In 
effect, I have used Sellars’s conceptual strategy for my own expository purpos-
es. My aim in this chapter is a purely conceptual one, namely that of making a 
start at revealing the conceptual coherence of the idea of relational mindread-
ing. At this point, I do not wish to make empirical claims about relational 
mindreading in actual folk psychological practice. That will have to wait until 
chapter 5. 
Yet as to the matter of conceptual coherence, it may seem that there are 
some further considerations that pose problems for my characterization of re-
lational mindreading. These concern my use of the term ‘relational’. In chap-
ter 2.4, I gave a provisional definition of relational mindreading as implying 
the past, present or future existence of the items the agent is interpreted as 
responding to or being directed at. As indicated there, this implication should 
be understood from the point of view of the participants, i.e. interpreter and in-
terpretee. If it is a feature of their common worldview that, say, rats are devils 
in disguise, then the interpreter may interpret the interpretee’s rats-directed 
convictions. He is neither lying nor speaking truthfully. In a sense, as we shall see, he is not using 
the words at all.” 
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intentions and actions by relating her to what they commonly presuppose rats 
to be, viz. devils in disguise, even if, from our point of view, there are no such 
things as devils in disguise. What matters for our purposes is the psychology 
of interpretation, whether the interpretative act proceeds by ascribing repre-
sentational or rather relational mental states. Normative questions regarding 
the ontological commitments exhibited are not of our primary concern. Thus 
when I speak of relational mindreading and the attribution of relational men-
tal states, it is not my intention to make claims about the ontology implied 
by the interpretation process described. Our Rylean ancestors may have had 
ridiculous ideas about the world around them, yet it was to entities of their 
ridiculous ontology that they, psychologically speaking, related each other when 
making sense of each other’s goals and reasons. That, at least, is what the 
previous sections revealed.  
Still, this provisional characterization of relational mindreading seems in-
adequate in light of our present discussion. As already noted, Jones could have 
exploited the Ryleans’ pre-Jonesian capacity for counterfactual thinking to add 
a dispositional dimension to the Jonesian concept of thought as inner episode. 
Such relational concept of belief would then amount to having the disposition 
to think certain inner thoughts under certain suitable circumstances. Jones, 
in other words, could easily have taught them to think about other people’s 
thinking in counterfactual circumstances. But given their pre-existent ability 
to engage in counterfactual thinking, we should not be surprised if they also 
learned how to think about their compatriots’ thinking about counterfactual 
circumstances, i.e. to interpret their fellow men and women as making sup-
positions or considering imaginative scenarios. To carry on where we left off 
in the previous sections, interpretation of other people’s thinking as such on 
the basis of Jones’s teachings could not have yielded a representational un-
derstanding of these thoughts. As we have seen, there is nothing in Jones’s 
theory that suggests the idea of inner episodes and related mental states hav-
ing such representational dimension. But in the case of interpretation of other 
people’s thinking about the counterfactual, the characterization of relational 
mindreading above does not suffice as the appropriate non-representational 
alternative.
The problem is that the current characterization does not allow for inter-
pretation of thoughts about things that, as far as the interpreter is concerned, 
do not exist, have never existed and will never exist. For appropriate interpre-
tation of such thoughts does not imply the past, present or future existence of 
what it is that is thought about. The notion of relational mindreading needs 
a slightly more relaxed reading, so as to include these forms of interpretation. 
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For this we only need to add a disjunctivist clause stating that the things the 
agent is related (‘related’) to can either be things in the past, present or future 
world or items in a merely supposed context. In both cases, interpretation 
proceeds by ‘relating’ another person to the contents of a shared context, as 
opposed to treating her responsiveness as a (mis)representation of that context. 
For practical purposes, it is vital that the Ryleans manage to distinguish 
between other people’s thinking and talking about the actual and their think-
ing and talking about the counterfactual – that they know when others are 
informing them about actual dangers, opportunities, etc. and when they are 
merely considering what-if scenarios. It is crucial for interpersonal coordina-
tion that they understand when someone is merely entertaining a thought in 
making a supposition and when she is endorsing a thought as pertaining to the 
actual world in making a claim. 
But this does not require the addition of a representational dimension 
to their understanding of each other’s thinking about the counterfactual. In 
particular, it does not require seeing the counterfactual context thought about 
as an as-if representation of the real world. In order to think about other people’s 
thoughts about the counterfactual, that is, it is not necessary to treat them 
as pretending to believe that the counterfactual propositions are true when in 
fact knowing them to be false. Engaging with another person’s counterfactual 
reasoning may simply consist in treating her as supposing that p (rather than as 
pretending to believe that p), when, in fact, p (rather than her believing that p) is 
not the case. An invitation, verbal or otherwise (e.g. ‘Suppose that…’) marks 
the beginning of engagement with the counterfactual scenario and other be-
havioral cues mark its limits or end. This enables the interpreter to keep a 
sharp focus on the distinction between supposition and reality. Explicit com-
mentary determines the context of the counterfactual scenario (e.g. ‘Suppose 
you were to receive one million Euros…’) and disagreement about the specifics 
can be solved by declaration or changing of the rules (‘No, you must spend it 
right away’; ‘OK, you can also invest it.’) – thought not by arguing about the 
correct interpretation of the rules. 
Thus, the suggested disjunctivist modification of the notion of relational 
mindreading does not threaten to blur the distinction between the actual and 
the counterfactual. Mindreading in the post-Jonesian Rylean community is by 
default strictly relational, bound to the actual world; it is only ‘relational’ by 
invitation to engage in counterfactual reasoning. In both cases, however, in-
terpretation is limited to a non-representational understanding of each other’s 
intentional directedness toward the context being talked about. In both cases, 
that is, interpretation is bound to the public sphere. The idea of thinking dif-
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ferently (‘privately’) about the same (‘public’) things, whether hypothetical or 
actual, has yet to dawn on them.43 
In the previous section, I argued that on a Rylean (FR-) understanding of 
thinking(-out-loud), a speaker’s claim that not-p when in fact p can only be 
interpreted as a failed attempt to assert that p and not also as an expression of 
a false belief that not-p. What we have learned from the present discussion, is 
that Rylean interpreters can also understand the speaker’s utterance of not-p as 
her making the supposition that not-p when in fact p. When confronted with a 
speaker’s utterance of a false sentence, the Ryleans can thus either interpret her 
as having failed to indicate something about the actual world (past, present or 
future), or regard her as having succeeded in saying something about a mere 
counterfactual scenario. What they cannot comprehend is that the speaker con-
siders the ‘possible world’ the false sentence is about as actual. They cannot un-
derstand her utterance as an endorsement of the thought that not-p although in 
fact p, as her undertaking a commitment to the effect that it is the case that not-p, 
i.e. as her believing that not-p. This requires mastery of a subjective notion of 
representation, a social skill that supersedes the interpretative capacities of the 
educated Ryleans. 
Although this disjunctivist amendment to the working definition of rela-
tional mindreading is necessary to accommodate non-representational inter-
pretation of each other’s thoughts about the non-existent, in what follows I 
will mainly focus on the vast majority of cases in which speech, thought and 
action are interpreted as responses to the state of the world as it is, as it has 
been or as it will be. In these cases, the original characterization of relational 
43 This discussion runs somewhat parallel to the issue in developmental psychology as to 
whether the concept of belief is required for engaging in pretend play, which children start do-
ing from approximately two years of age onwards. Following Leslie (1987), Fodor (1992, p. 290) 
claims that “Pretending involves acting as though one believes that P is true when, in fact, one 
believes that P is false. It would thus seem impossible for a creature that lacks the concept of a 
belief being false.” Following Perner et al. (1994), Harris et al. (1994) and others, Doherty (2009, 
pp. 95-104) provides an alternative to this characterization, suggesting the following revision of 
Fodor’s claim: ‘Pretending involves acting as though P is true when, in fact, P is false. It would thus 
seem to be impossible for a creature that lacks the concept of a proposition being false.” (p. 96) 
This, Doherty argues, adequately captures what is required in pretence, without having to posit 
metarepresentational understanding. Accordingly, pretence would only require appreciation of the 
fact that people may act on counterfactual propositions they – the child included – judge to be 
counterfactual. Understanding the representational state of belief would require differentiating 
between such cases and instances in which people act on counterfactual propositions they – but 
not the child – evaluate as being actually true. It is currently a hotly debated issue whether children 
below the age of 4 have a representational understanding of belief (see the appendix to chapter 5 
for discussion). If they do, a representational understanding of pretence along the lines suggested 
by Fodor may be a possibility for them. If they do no not, their understanding of pretence is similar 
to the Ryleans’ understanding of counterfactual reasoning. Putting matters of actual ontogenetic 
development to one side for now, the present point is merely that the idea of such ‘Rylean’ pre-
tence seems perfectly coherent.
M
indreading in S
ellars’s M
yth of Jones
68
mindreading still suffices. 
But even on the amended definition, the idea of relational mindread-
ing may seem at odds with Sellars’s conception of Jonesian thoughts as inner 
episodes. Relational mindreading is supposed to consists in the attribution of 
relational states, states which relate the ‘inner’ to the ‘outer’. So how can these 
states also be inner episodes? 
The first thing to notice is that Sellars’s talk of ‘inner’ episodes need not be 
taken to imply such episodes to reside somewhere in the brain or in the head, 
at least not within the context of the Myth of Jones.44 As far as the myth goes, 
Jones may be a rather primitive theorist, he may not know anything about 
brains, let alone where they are located. Perhaps he believes that thoughts 
are located in the chest, rather than in the head, or that they run through the 
whole body. Jones moreover conceives of inner episodes as forming a contrast 
class with behaviorally manifest ‘thinkings-out-loud’. For this contrast, it only 
matters that inner episodes are not directly manifested in behavior; their loca-
tion is rather immaterial. 
Secondly, and more importantly, even on Jones’s theory, an inner episode 
as an internal or embodied occurrence, when considered by itself, does not 
constitute a contentful thought; it only gains meaning within a wider context. 
Sellars has Jones model inner thought on over linguistic utterances. With re-
spect to the latter, Sellars argues that the making of a sound only becomes 
meaningful speech once it gets incorporated into a behavioral pattern that 
conforms to the entry/inference/exit rules of the language of the community 
to which the utterer of the sound belongs (see e.g. LTC; cf. footnote 7). As a 
result of intensive training, new members of a community start to behave as 
they should according to the rules. Thus, the causal pattern of the making of a 
certain sound comes to mirror the rules that specify its meaning as a linguistic 
utterance. The sound gains its meaning in virtue of the fact that its occurrence 
is taken up into the socio-culturally shaped causal pattern that ensures that 
the appropriate transition rules are met, i.e. that the utterance is used in the 
right entry circumstances, proprietary inferences are drawn and appropriate 
intentions are formed and actions taken.45 
Once a member of the linguistic community has reached this stage, in-
terpretation of her utterances as saying something in her native language can 
44 Sellars hints at the idea of inner thoughts being realized by brain processes (EMP, §55), but 
this plays no role in the overall argument of EPM.
45 See especially ‘Actions and Events’ (1973, especially pp. 192-195). See Rosenberg 
(2004/2007) and O’Shea (2007, ch. 4) for discussion.  Sellars’s proposal shows some interesting 
parallels with Dretske’s (1988) idea of ‘structuring causes’. 
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go accompanied by appreciation of the fact that there are causal connections 
between her utterances, the environment and her actions that explain the 
sequence of events. Thus, the interpreter of a series of meaningful events, e.g. 
a person’s saying “I shall now go to the supermarket” followed by his going to 
the supermarket, may acknowledge that there is also some causal connection 
between these events that explains why they occurred. But this is not to say 
that the interpretation of what the person is saying and doing is determined in 
terms of such causal connections. The overt utterance that, qua mere behavioral 
event, may be considered to be causally relevant in bring about certain other 
behavior, is also, qua meaningful saying, interpreted as being about something 
in the ‘outer’ world informing the action to which it has committed its utterer. 
These considerations carry over to the attribution of Jonesian inner 
thoughts. Sellars lets Jones exploit the pre-existent capacities of the Ryleans to 
engage in semantical and theoretical discourse. Jones teaches the Ryleans how 
to use the FR-notion of representation in terms of which they were already 
able to classify their utterances in order to theorize about the causes of such 
utterances. As mental representations, thoughts are specified in terms of the 
functional roles of the overt utterances they are modeled upon. At the same 
time, these thoughts also have certain causal roles to play in the production of 
speech and behavior, causal roles, which, from the theoretical point of view, 
somehow approximate their functional roles as ideally described from the se-
mantical point of view (i.e. in terms of entry/inference/exit transitions). Their 
causal role as ‘inner’ episodes in Jones’s explanatory theory is not to be conflat-
ed with their functional or inferential role as contentful thoughts in interpreta-
tion. If, as has been suggested in the previous section, Jonesian mindreading 
is a form of relational mindreading, then the Ryleans’ conception of inner 
episodes as contentful thoughts portrays them as relational entities. Whereas, 
qua causally relevant ‘inner’ events, they may be considered not constitutively 
but merely causally related to the outer world, qua contentful occurrences, 
they are interpreted as being related to what they are about in the outer world.46 
46 My treatment of the Rylean’s causal understanding of each other’s behavior shows paral-
lels with Jackson and Pettit’s (1988, 1990) ‘program model’ of explanations in terms of functional 
roles. They observe that “we can and often do explain by citing a feature which causally pro-
grammes without causing. Features which causally explain need not cause. This is typically what 
happens when we explain in terms of highly relational properties.” (1988, p. 392) The idea is 
that the psychological properties figuring in folk psychological explanations of behavior are not 
themselves causally efficacious properties with respect to that behavior, but rather ‘program’ for 
or ‘ensure’ the presence of some other properties (neural properties, say) that are. Morton (2003, 
ch. 4) suggests that folk psychological explanations are causally ‘shallow’, essentially contrastive 
explanations. Likewise, Hutto (2011a) speaks of the informational rather than the causal relevance 
of reasons, pointing out that the fact “that the factors cited by the folk are mention-worthy does 
not entail that they pick out (or attempt to pick out) causally relevant properties per se.” (p. 140) 
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Jones’s explanatory theory of mind only works because it rides piggyback 
on the pre-existent capacity of the Ryleans to interpret each other’s sounds 
and doings as meaningful sayings and actions (see section 3.5 and appendix 
for discussion). Some causal story is reflected in the entry/inference/exit transi-
tions that they can comment upon in their functionalist meta-language. This 
is all that Jones needs to introduce them to the revolutionary idea that this 
causal story, whatever it is, actually involves silent counterparts of the events 
they already interpret as meaningful. As contentful thoughts, these ‘inner’ epi-
sodes are interpreted in the same way as the overt utterances they are modeled 
upon, i.e. as one side of a relation that reaches out into the public world. At the 
same time, acknowledgment of the fact that these same episodes have some 
role to play in the causal story makes it possible to think about them as non-re-
lational states in or of the body. But it is not in virtue of such acknowledgment 
that thoughts are ascribed as contentful episodes in the course of interpretation. 
As far as mindreading is concerned, the thoughts ascribed relate the thinker to 
those features of the world they are interpreted as being about.47
3.5 The Myth of Jones and the Theory Theory
The end stage of Sellars’s Myth of Jones has widely been accepted as an accurate 
picture of our social practice as depicted by the Theory Theory of folk psycho-
logy. There has been discussion among theory theorists as to how exactly our 
folk psychological theory is supposed to be represented in our brains. As indi-
cated in chapter 2, there is disagreement as to whether we should explain our 
folk psychological capacities in a more nativist, modular way (e.g. Fodor, 1992, 
Leslie 1994, Baron-Cohen 1995) or rather in a more empirist, non-modular 
fashion (e.g. Gopnik and Wellman 1994, Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). Another 
point of dispute concerns the representational format of the folk psychological 
Consider also Schueler’s (2003) ‘minimalist’ treatment of the folk psychological use of the term 
‘cause’, according to which “the claim that one thing caused another amounts to nothing more 
than saying that the second happened because of the first, that is, that the one explains the other, 
period, with no information at all about how this explanation works.” (p. 14; emphasis in original)
47 Thus, the problem of mental causation (cf. Heil and Mele 1993; Kim 1998) is not a problem 
that Jones or his Rylean students need to solve in order to become fluent Jonesian mindreaders. 
The problem of mental causation is to explain why it is really in virtue of their content that mental 
states causally explain behavior. This is not something the Ryleans need to be able to explain. All 
they have to know in order to appreciate Jones’s teachings is that there is some or other causal story 
reflected into the sequence of events they interpret as meaningful according to the rules of their 
language (see footnote 46). In general, successful folk psychological interpretation does not require 
a solution to the problem of mental causation. The key to solving this problem, if there is such to 
be found, should not be expected to lie hidden in our folk psychological practice. 
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theory at the subpersonal level, whether, for example, it is stored sententially 
in a language of thought (e.g. Fodor 1987) or rather subsymbolically encoded 
in the distributed weights of connectionist networks (e.g. Churchland 1991, 
Ramsey et al. 1991). But as far as the information conveyed by the theory is 
concerned, however stored, acquired or applied, all theory theorists have re-
mained loyal to the basic functionalist insight that Sellars developed in EPM. 
This is most evident for the empirist, ‘scientific’ versions of the Theory 
Theory wedded to tacit but explicitly represented knowledge of the lawlike gen-
eralizations linking mental states to input, output and each other (e.g. Gopnik 
and Meltzoff 1997).  Here, our supposedly quasi-scientific folk psychological 
theory is basically an explicit version of Jones’s theory, stating all the nomo-
logical regularities between mental states, input and output that Jones’s model 
for inner thought, i.e. Sellars’s functional classification of Rylean language use, 
implicitly conveys. Thus, on these versions of the Theory Theory, the meaning 
of our mental state concepts is given by broadly Sellarsian functional roles in 
terms of which the theoretical terms of this quasi-scientific theory are defined. 
While modular theory theorists do not tend to endorse a holistic, functionalist 
semantics of our core folk psychological concepts (instead opting for e.g. an 
atomistic, purely denotational account of meaning, cf. Fodor 1990; see Hutto 
2008a, ch. 8 for discussion), the total information contained in the theory of 
mind module(s) must include reference to the causal relations between mental 
states, input and output if it is to be of any use in explaining or predicting be-
havior. This is to say that even if our folk psychological mental states concepts 
are not defined in terms of their functional role, the propositions stored in 
the theory of mind modules must nonetheless contain specifications of such 
functional roles. And although connectionists hold that our folk psychological 
theory is not propositionally, sententially represented in our brains, they agree 
with other theory theorists that propositional articulation in typical function-
alist fashion does provide a fairly adequate picture of the conception of mind 
according to that theory (cf. Churchland 1991; Ramsey et al. 1991). 
The tacit knowledge of our alleged folk psychological theory is thus con-
sidered to be at least roughly extensionally equivalent to a functional role 
description of mental states along the lines set out by Sellars in his Myth of 
Jones. As we have seen, however, Sellars’s myth does not give us the concep-
tual material needed to bootstrap the Ryleans into a representational under-
standing of mental states. As far as Sellars’s myth goes, the Theory Theory of 
folk psychology only posits relational mental states. In this context, consider 
David Lewis’s widely influential account of the semantics of theoretical terms 
(1970), which he applied to folk psychology in his defining paper on ana-
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lytical functionalism (1972). In this paper, Lewis explicitly mentions Sellars’s 
myth as the perfect illustration of his account, proposing to ‘adopt the work-
ing hypothesis that it is a good myth’ (p. 213). It is a good myth, he adds, 
‘if our names of mental states do in fact mean just what they would mean if the 
myth were true’ (ibid., emphasis added). Again, however, Sellars’s myth only 
brings us as far as a relational stratum of social cognition. So if, through Lewis’s 
powerful analysis, Sellars’s myth is still to be our guide to the semantics of the 
theoretical terms of our commonsense psychology, then there is every reason 
to think that some of our propositional attitude concepts, perhaps even the 
most important ones, take us exactly to the point where Sellars’s myth ends: 
a sophisticated, inferentially articulated, yet relational understanding of each 
other’s responsiveness to the world. 
This should give us pause. For if the most elaborate functionalist accounts 
of the semantics of our mental state concepts in fact do not dictate a represen-
tational reading of these concepts, then why insist on belief-desire psychology 
as the single core explanandum of commonsense goal-reason psychology? 
Since Sellars’s myth provides us with nothing beyond a relational conception 
of mental states, theory theorists would be well advised to reconsider their 
representationalist assumptions.
This last point should not mislead us into thinking that the conclusions 
reached thus far are premised on the idea that relational mindreading is theo-
retical in nature. It merely states that if folk psychology is indeed a theory, i.e. 
if our mental state concepts are indeed theoretical terms in an explanatory 
theory of human behavior, we should seriously consider the possibility that 
its core theoretical terms refer to relational, rather than representational men-
tal states. Once the idea of relational mindreading is on the table, however, 
there is nothing that should prevent us from applying similar considerations 
to other stories about the cognitive underpinnings of mindreading. The cur-
rent proposal cuts across the different versions of Theory Theory, Simulation 
Theory, and yet other alternatives. If, as I suggest, interpretation in terms of 
propositional attitudes indeed falls apart into two forms of understanding, i.e. 
relational and representational mindreading, then this differentiation of the 
explanandum of folk psychology should be brought to bear on all theories that 
purport to explain it (see chapter 5.2). 
Sellars’s own proposal in EPM actually falls short of a strictly theoreti-
cal rendering of folk psychology. First, determination of the contents of the 
mental states ascribed in their post-Jonesian stage is based on the Ryleans’ 
pre-Jonesian and non-theoretical linguistic know-how. Jonesian mindreading 
is parasitic on linguistic skills that are not theoretically mediated on Sellars’s 
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story. Second, mental state ascriptions may be non-inferential social responses 
on Sellars’s account. Many defenders of TT take it to be one of the defining 
commitments of TT that ascription proceeds by application of the theory, i.e. 
drawing an inference to the best explanation on the basis of behavioral and 
situational evidence.
As to the first, Jones teaches the Ryleans to exploit their understanding of 
each other’s linguistic utterances for learning his new theory, but there is no 
suggestion to the effect that the pre-Jonesian capacity the Ryleans exhibited 
in interpreting each other’s sayings is itself theory-based. In fact, the way in 
which Sellars sets up his story points to the contrary. Recall that semantical 
discourse is presented methodologically as an addition to the original Rylean 
language. The functionalist classification of the use of their language in se-
mantical discourse is parasitic on their first-order skills to appropriately use 
their language and assess its use by other people. These first-order linguistic 
skills themselves do not appear to be theoretical on Sellars’s story, since the 
capacity to theorize – the addition of theoretical discourse to their discursive 
repertoire – is also presented as an enrichment of the original Rylean language. 
Jones teaches the Ryleans his ‘theory’ of mind, but there is nothing in Sellars’s 
myth that suggests that prior to Jones’s arrival, the Ryleans have internalized 
a theory of meaning that enables them to interpret each other’s linguistic utter-
ances. Rather, Jones’s theory of mind builds on their pre-existent and, as far 
as the myth goes, pre-theoretical understanding of linguistic meaning. Once 
they have become skilled Jonesian mindreaders, the Ryleans determine the 
contents of the mental states they ascribe by exploiting their non-theoretical 
understanding of the meaning of each other’s linguistic utterances.48 Thus, 
Sellars’s Myth of Jones suggests that 
Our attributions of psychological states rest on a kind of pre-
theoretic know-how […] they rest on knowing how language 
and social situations work “from the inside”. This knowledge 
can then be recruited to make sense of both our own and oth-
ers’ behavior without having to take a detour through externaliza-
tion in an explicit theory of psychology. (deVries 2005, p. 198) 
48 The suggestion that content determination rests on non-theoretical linguistic know-how 
shows obvious parallels with Heal’s account of folk psychological interpretation as ‘replication’ 
(1986) or ‘co-cognition’ (1998). Rather than theorizing about the contents of other people’s 
thoughts, we may simply ‘replicate’ the thoughts of the other, ‘co-cognize’ with her, so to speak, 
in order to reach a verdict on the inferences she will draw concerning the subject matter at hand. 
See chapter 5.3 for further discussion. 
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Determination of content does not proceed by application of some natural-
istic theory of content that specifies the contents of mental states in purely 
causal terms. As explained in the previous section, it is enough for Jones and 
his Rylean students to realize that there are some such causal connections 
reflected in the meaning of their utterances, without having a clue, let alone a 
theory, as to how these causal relations give rise to content (see appendix for 
further discussion).49 
In order to appreciate the second aspect in which Sellars’s account does 
not support a theoretical rendering of folk psychology concerns, we should 
reconsider Sellars’s overall aim in EPM: to provide an alternative for a Given in 
first-person epistemology. One important point that often goes unappreciated 
is that the Myth of Jones actually contains two theories: Jones’s psychologi-
cal theory that is supposed to explain behavior in terms of mental states and 
Sellars’s philosophical theory that aims at elucidating the status and nature of 
our concepts of mental states (cf. deVries 2005, pp. 178-179; see also Parsell 
2010). Jones uses overt verbal behavior as a model for inner episodes; Sellars 
uses the introduction of theoretical concepts in science as his model for the 
concepts of inner episodes. Like Jones’s theory, Sellars’s theory also contains 
a commentary that places restrictions on the analogy suggested between the 
model and the subject matter of the theory. Jones’s proposal is that inner 
thought is like overt speech to the extent that it is semantically evaluable; it 
does not go accompanied by the making of inner sounds or the wagging of 
inner tongues. Sellars’s proposal is that folk psychological concepts are like 
theoretical concepts insofar as they have an essentially intersubjective status. 
Aside from a few brief remarks, Sellars does not provide an explicit commen-
tary on the model.50 Yet the limits of the analogy can be gleaned from his 
overall strategy in EPM.  
The analogy with scientific theorizing is Sellars’s antidote for the myth 
49 Cf. deVries (2005, p. 198): “They (and we) can assume that there are causal connections 
among our internal states that enable those internal states to relate to each other in ways that 
conform to their semantic characterization, but how those causal connections work, what kinds 
of mechanisms instantiate them, how they might develop and how they might break down, are 
left untouched. The “internal structures” recognized in Jonesian psychology are almost completely 
parasitic on the structure of the language Jones and company speak.”
50 But consider: “I am going to argue that the distinction between theoretical and observa-
tional discourse is involved in the logic of concepts pertaining to inner episodes. I say ‘involved 
in’ for it would be paradoxical and, indeed, incorrect, to say that these concepts are theoretical 
concepts.” (EPM, §51) And: “I have suggested a number of times that although it would be most 
misleading to say that concepts pertaining to thinking are theoretical concepts, yet their status 
might be illuminated by means of the contrast between theoretical and non-theoretical discourse.” 
(EPM, §59)
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of the Given. He contrasts theoretical terms and entities with observational 
terms and observable entities, respectively. What makes something a theoreti-
cal entity is that one can only come to know about it by making inferences 
on the basis of observable phenomena. Observable entities can also be known 
non-inferentially; observational terms can be used in making non-inferential 
reports. As Brandom comments: “To be observable is just to be non-inferential-
ly reportable.” (1997, p. 164). We might add: to be theoretical is just not to be 
non-inferentially reportable.51  Sellars uses this contrast to show how what is 
like a theoretical concept in being essentially intersubjective (and therefore not 
Given) may come to be used in making non-inferential reports – and hence 
may actually seize to be strictly theoretical – without losing its intersubjective 
status. This is the final stage in his myth, were Jones conditions the Ryleans 
into first-person non-inferential use of his newly introduced concepts of inner 
episodes: “what began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a 
reporting role” (EPM 59; emphasis in original).52 Sellars here tries to combine 
the ‘theoretical’ – i.e. essentially intersubjective – status of the concept of in-
ner episodes with its privileged, non-inferential – i.e. non-theoretical – use in 
first-person ascription. 
Sellars does not extend this idea to second- or third-person ascription of 
mental states in EPM. But there is nothing in Sellars’s philosophy against the 
idea that in a limited range of conditions, interpreters can report non-inferen-
tially on the propositional attitudes of others (cf. deVries 2005, pp. 194-195). 
On Sellars’s story, an experienced doctor, say, may acquire the reliable differ-
ential responsive disposition to non-inferentially see that his patient has lung 
cancer by looking at a chest-X-ray. The less experienced, in contrast, may only 
see a particular pattern of white-grey clouds from which they then infer that it 
51 Sellars’s distinction between observable and theoretical entities does not parallel the 
distinction drawn in chapter 2.6 between observable and unobservable mental states. There, the 
contrast was used to characterize the nature of the target states attributed. Observable states closely 
track specific behavioral types, whereas unobservable states, due to their holistic nature, only show 
tenuous connections to behavioral types. Propositional attitudes are typical unobservable states in 
this sense of the term. Sellars’s distinction pertains to the interpretation process, however. Here the 
contrast is between entities that can be perceived directly and entities that can only be inferred on 
the basis of other evidence.  
52  The text continues: “As I see it, this story helps us understand that concepts pertaining 
to such inner episodes as thoughts are primarily and essentially intersubjective, as intersubjective 
as the concept of a positron, and that the reporting role of these concepts – the fact that each of 
us has a privileged access to his thoughts – constitutes a dimension of the use of these concepts 
which is built on and presupposes this intersubjective status. […] it also makes clear that this privacy 
is not an “absolute privacy.” For if it recognizes that these concepts have a reporting use in which 
one is not drawing inferences from behavioral evidence, it nevertheless insists that the fact that 
overt behavior is evidence for these episodes is built into the very logic of these concepts, just as the 
fact that observable behavior of gases is evidence for molecular episodes is built into the very logic 
of molecule talk.”
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is probably lung cancer. Similarly, an experienced folk psychological interpret-
er may acquire the disposition to respond adequately, yet non-inferentially, 
to the mental states of others. For people less experienced in social life, or for 
those who do not know this particular person well, ascription of the relevant 
mental states may only be possible through inference to the best explanation 
from contextual cues. 
In the current debate on social cognition, allowing for non-inferential use 
of folk psychological concepts in the interpretation of other people would be 
a major concession for the Theory Theory of folk psychology. Some authors 
have recently framed the debate in terms of the question whether social un-
derstanding should be regarded as a form of non-inferential social perception 
(e.g. Gallagher 2008b, 2011, Zahavi 2007, Zahavi and Gallagher 2008, Zahavi 
2011) or rather as involving inferential mindreading (Herschbach 2008a, 
2008b, Spaulding 2010). Many defenders of TT take it to be one of the defining 
commitments of TT that ascription proceeds by application of the theory, i.e. 
drawing an inference to the best explanation on the basis of behavioral and 
situational evidence. Thus, Herschbach (2008b, p. 223) represents the majority 
of theory theorists when he says: “Mental state attribution occurs for Theory 
Theory via theoretical inference, by applying theoretical knowledge about the 
relations between observable behavior, environmental context and mental 
states.”53 In light of the current dialectics, the suggestion of non-inferential 
use of mental state concepts in social perceptual reports would firmly place 
Sellars in the anti-Theory Theory camp.54 
Having said this, it is important to realize that while, on Sellars’s story, 
second- and third-person mental state ascription may thus proceed non-in-
ferentially (and hence non-theoretically), for it to be treated as a genuine case 
of ascription, i.e. as a report with propositional content, this non-inferential 
response needs to have an inferential role. What makes the experienced inter-
53 Cf. Spaulding (2010, p. 121): “Theory Theorists argue that we attribute and theorize about 
mental states by employing folk psychological theories about how mental states inform behavior. 
With our folk psychological theories, we infer from another person’s behavior what his or her 
mental states probably are. And from these inferred mental states, plus the psychological laws in 
the theory connecting mental states to behavior, we predict the behavior of the other person.”
54 Notice that the issue whether or not propositional attitudes are ascribed through inferen-
tial processes runs orthogonal to the issue whether the attitudes ascribed are conceived as relational 
states or as genuine representational states (beliefs, desires). Perhaps propositional attitudes can be 
directly perceived in the behavior of others in relatively familiar circumstances. It may be the case 
that I am able to see the thought in my friend’s face that I have heard him express so many times 
before in similar situations. But even if one has to do a lot of conscious reasoning in order to figure 
out why someone acted the way she did, it is perfectly possible that this reasoning involves refer-
ence only to relational attitudes – drawing inferences about the world the other person is conceived 
as having access to.
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preter’s non-inferential ascription a report to the effect that e.g. his neighbor 
bought a new car in order to impress his neighbors, is, inter alia, its specific 
pattern of inference: the claims one is committed and (not) entitled to draw 
from it or to draw it from, etc. We thus need to distinguish 1) the manner of 
ascription from 2) the significance of the ascription. While 1) may proceed both 
inferentially and non-inferentially on Sellars’s account, 2) must be inferentially 
articulated in order to be meaningful in the first place and play a proper role in 
the game of giving and asking for reasons. This is particularly relevant for the 
ascription of states with propositional content in providing goals and reasons 
for action. While such ascription may thus be reached non-inferentially, the 
states ascribed must have an inferential role.55 
We should conclude that the idea of relational mindreading, as illustrated 
in this chapter by means of Sellars’s Myth of Jones, is not committed to a 
specifically theoretical rendering of the interpretation processes involved. 
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has been an exercise in ‘dishabituation’: an attempt to counter 
the habit of talking about goal-reason psychology in terms of representational 
belief-desire psychology. Sellars’s Myth of Jones has been a particularly useful 
tool in this respect. Sellars presents his myth as a means of conceptual boot-
strapping, of showing how one can bake a truly mentalistic cake out of respect-
able ‘Rylean’ ingredients. I simply exploited Sellars’s strategy: the functionalist 
conception of mind that one gets by merely pulling the Rylean conception 
inside is a relational conception, not a representational one. Following Sellars’s 
verbal behaviorist methodology, this chapter has thus presented us with a way 
of reflecting on goal-reason psychology without committing the reflective 
fallacy. 
Now that we have bootstrapped ourselves into a relational conception 
of the propositional attitudes, however, we can go beyond Sellars’s particular 
philosophical framework. The next chapters will put the notion of relational 
mindreading to the test, by plugging it into other theories of goal-reason at-
tribution. As we shall see, a relational conception of mindreading is not wed-
ded to any specific account of the psychology of goal-reason psychology. This, 
55 The inferential roles of propositional attitudes mirror their status as unobservable states 
in the sense used in chapter 2.6 (see footnote 51). Non-inferential ascription of propositional at-
titudes yields them as observable states in Sellars’s sense of the term. 
M
indreading in S
ellars’s M
yth of Jones
78
in turn, will clearly reveal what has already been suggested in this chapter: 
that the absence of a relational conception of the target explanandum of folk 
psychology should be regarded as a serious lacuna in the philosophical and 
psychological study of human social cognition. 
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Appendix: 
Relational Mindreading and Functional Role Semantics
The pre-existent Rylean meta-language that Jones exploits for his teachings 
gives expression to what Sellars later developed into his functional role ac-
count of semantics. The point of Sellars’s functional role semantics, however, 
is to give a non-relational account of meaning statements and of correspond-
ing statements about the intentional contents of mental states. This may give 
rise to the worry that something must have gone wrong in my argument in 
the main text of this chapter. For how can a theory of mind framed in terms 
of what is meant as providing a non-relational account of the meaning of 
linguistic acts, itself render a relational understanding of mental states? This 
worry will be addressed here. 
For reasons that go well beyond the scope of this chapter, Sellars finds a 
relational conception of meaning unsatisfactory. On Sellars’s functional role 
conception of meaning, meaning statements of the form “’x’ (in L) means y” 
do not give expression to there existing a relation of some sort between a lin-
guistic item on the left hand side and a non-linguistic entity on the right hand 
side. In this respect, Sellars’s semantics contrasts sharply with other popular 
accounts, such as causal theories of meaning or the different varieties of truth-
conditional semantics. Sellars does not deny that there must obtain relations 
between linguistic items and worldly entities for the former to have empiri-
cal meaning. For ‘red’ to mean what it does, it is vital that the expression is 
regularly used in statements made in perceptual response to red things, for 
example. In general, there must be certain reliable, causal relations between 
linguistic expressions and things in the world in order for the expressions to 
have empirical meaning. But from this it should not be concluded, according 
to Sellars, that meaning statements themselves function to refer to a relation 
of any kind between a linguistic item and a non-linguistic entity. As O’Shea 
(2007) puts it: 
Rather, the role of ‘means’ might be such that the truth of a mean-
ing statement entails that there must be certain kinds of empiri-
cal-causal relations established between persons’ utterances (and 
thoughts) and various entities, without there being any such thing in 
the world as a philosophically problematic meaning relation holding 
between those utterances (and thoughts) and those entities. (p. 56) 
According to Sellars’s analysis of meaning statements, the causal relations 
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between linguistic utterances and the world are indirectly reflected in the de-
scriptions of the functional roles of those utterances.  
On Sellars’s account, there are three types of norm-governed linguistic-
behavioral patterns that should be manifested for anything to count as a 
language: (i) language entry transitions (from world to language: perception), 
(ii) intra-linguistic transitions (from language to language: inference) and (iii) 
language departure transitions (from language to world: action). In general, as 
a speaker of the language, one ought to, inter alia and ceteris paribus, (i) make 
certain utterances in perceptual response to certain objects or states of affairs 
(and not make certain other utterances), (ii) be disposed to make certain infer-
ences on the basis of one’s own or other people’s statements (while refraining 
from making certain other inferences), and (iii) respond to certain utterances 
of the form “I shall now a” by displaying certain kinds of behavior (but not by 
displaying certain other kinds of behavior). Thus, to be a competent user of the 
English word ‘red’, for example, one ought to, inter alia and ceteris paribus, (i) 
reliably respond to the presence of red objects by uttering ‘this is red’ (but not 
by uttering e.g. ‘this is green’); (ii) be disposed to make certain inferences, e.g. 
from ‘this is red’ to ’this is colored’ (but not to e.g. ‘this is green’); (iii) reliably 
respond to one’s own utterances of e.g. “I shall now move the red object” by 
moving the red object (but not by moving e.g. the green object). 
A full characterization of the functional role of an utterance type in a lan-
guage would encompass a detailed description of all the language entry, intra-
linguistic and language departure transitions that are appropriate for a user 
of tokens of that type in that language. The entry and departure transitions 
describe relations between linguistic items and worldly entities; but these are 
ordinary causal relations, not basic semantical or intentional relations which 
meaning statements are supposed to assert. Spelling out the appropriate use of 
an expression in our language in terms of explicit rules is something ‘which 
we would find difficult if not (practically) impossible’ to do (MFC, p. 96) “In 
practice,” therefore, “the use of meaning statements is indispensable, for it 
provides a way of mobilizing our linguistic intuitions to classify expressions 
in terms of [their] functions…” (ibid.) Sellars proposes to treat meaning state-
ments of the form “’x’ (in L) means y” as illustrating for the speaker (and hearer) 
of such statements the function of the expression on the left hand side by 
assimilating it to the function in her own language of the expression on the 
right hand side. Since the utterer is a competent speaker of her own language, 
she can ‘mobilize her linguistic intuitions’ regarding the appropriate use of the 
expression on the right hand side in stating the functional similarity with the 
expression on the left hand side. 
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On Sellars’s analysis, then, “’x’ (in L) means y” roughly amounts to  “to-
kens of the expression type ‘x’ in L have the same functional role in L as tokens 
of the expression type ‘y’ in our language.” In Sellars’s notation: “’x’s (in L) 
are •y•s”. Here a ‘•y•’ is a sortal term, applying to any item in any language 
that plays that role, viz. the role ‘y’s play in the home language. The dot nota-
tion indicates that the expression on the right hand side is mentioned in a 
special way, i.e. as illustrating the function of tokens of that expression type. 
The utterer of the meaning statement does not use the expression on the right 
hand side; she rather talks about its use in her language, stating that the expres-
sion token on the left hand side falls under the functional sortal illustrated 
by the dot quotes. Thus “’rot’ (in German) means red” on Sellars’s analysis 
becomes “’rot’s (in German) are •red•s”, which asserts that tokens of the type 
‘rot’ have the same (similar) functional role in German as tokens of the type 
‘red’ in English for English speakers. In Sellars’s own words: “To say that ‘’rot’ 
means red’ is not to describe ‘rot’ as standing “in the meaning relation” to an 
entity red; it is to use a recognized device (the semantical language game) for 
bringing home to a user of ‘red’ how Germans use ‘rot’.” (Some Reflections of 
a language Game, 1954/2007, p. 39, emphasis in original) On this analysis, 
“meaning is not a relation for the very simple reason that ‘means’ is a specialized 
form of the copula.” (MFC, p. 95) Formally, that is, a meaning statement of the 
form “’x’ in L means y” does not read ‘aRb’, expressing a relation R between the 
linguistic particular on the left hand side and something referred by using the 
expression on the right hand side. Rather it is of the general sortal form ‘a is an 
F’, or, simply, ‘Gs are Fs’, stating inter-linguistic functional equivalence (similar-
ity) of two expression types (cf. O’Shea 2007, pp. 55-63; see also deVries 2005, 
chapter 2). 
Let us now return to the issue at hand: is Sellars’s non-relational account 
of meaning compatible with a relational account of Jonesian mindreading? As 
a first approximation, it should be noted that Sellars’s primary target here is 
semantical discourse, i.e. to give an account of the meaning of meaning state-
ments. His non-relational account of ‘means’ in meaning statements does not 
automatically carry over to folk psychology, which is primarily about interpre-
tation of non-semantical, first-order thought and talk. 
The dot quotes in Sellars’s analysis of meaning statements serve to indi-
cate a functional classifier that illustrates for the user of the right hand side 
expression the function of the expression on the left hand side, drawing upon 
the user’s ‘intuitive’ knowledge, as Sellars calls it, regarding appropriate use 
of the right hand side expression. This know-how does not only concern the 
speaker’s own use of the expression but also her assessment of its use by oth-
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ers, her ability to judge which language entry, intra-linguistic and language 
departure transitions are appropriate for another speaker. In other words, 
Sellars’s non-relational meaning statements rely, inter alia, on second- and 
third-person interpretation skills of the user of the language for whom the 
dot-quoted expression is supposed to serve as an illustrating functional clas-
sifier. But these interpretation skills appear to be relational on Sellars’s story. 
That is: assessment of the appropriateness of the use of an expression by others 
seems to proceed by, inter alia, relating others’ perceptual statements to the 
entry conditions that evoke them and relating their avowals of intention to 
the exit conditions that satisfy them. In any case, this is how things must work 
for the Ryleans. 
In order to see this, it should be realized that Jones taught the Ryleans a 
theory of mind by exploiting their linguistic know-how. He did not teach them 
a theory of language. As argued in section 3.5, there is no reason to think that 
the Ryleans’ interpretation of each other’s overt verbal behavior itself depended 
on a functionalist theory of language. To suppose that it did is to regard pre-
Jonesian interpretation to consist in the application of a theory that explicitly 
states the transition rules that specify the functional roles of the expression in 
their language. There is no support for this claim in Sellars’s myth. As far as 
the Ryleans are concerned, their functional role semantics is not a theory that 
explains the meaningfulness of their utterances; it is only a device that classifies 
their meaningful utterances in a functionalist way, so as to enable them to 
comment upon and criticize each other’s linguistic performances. These func-
tional classifications are parasitic on a prior, non-theoretical understanding of 
each other’s verbal behavior. It is this classificatory apparatus that Jones uses to 
characterize the contents of the theoretical posits of his new theory, the inner 
episodes he calls ‘thoughts’. 
In order to determine the meaning of a linguistic utterance or the content 
of a mental state there seem to be, in essential outline, two options. Either 
one draws upon one’s own recognition, emotion and response mechanisms 
(though not conceived as such) in order to determine the worldly features 
talked or thought about by the interpretee, or one applies a theory that ex-
plains not only how an utterance or thought can be about something (i.e. 
explains intentionality) but also what a specific utterance or thought is about 
(i.e. determines meaning or content). Importantly, for this second option to 
be a genuine alternative the first, it should not draw upon the applier’s own 
recognition, emotion and response mechanisms for its explanatory purposes. 
This means that the worldly conditions featuring in the theory (as entry and 
exit conditions, for example) should not be coined in commonsense terms, 
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the use of which would depend on the interpreter’s own recognition, emotion 
and response mechanisms. Rather they should be stated in properly naturalis-
tic terms. This, in effect, is precisely what naturalistic theories of content have 
been aiming for in the past decades. It is, to put it mildly, highly contentious 
to argue that folk psychological interpretation depends on a tacitly applied 
naturalistic theory of content (see also chapter 5.3). If we shy away from this 
bold claim, however, we should also discard the second option of explaining 
the interpretation (determination) of meaning and content. The first option 
reveals that, in one important respect at least, pre-Jonesian interpretation of 
linguistic utterances was non-theoretical. It also shows in what sense pre-Jo-
nesian interpretation was relational: in interpreting their fellows’ utterances, 
they related them to the commonsense worldly features these utterances were 
(supposed to be) about. 
By modeling thought on speech, Jones teaches the Ryleans to exploit 
their relational linguistic know-how for the purposes of mindreading. At first 
instance, this demands use of the pre-existent Rylean functionalist meta-lan-
guage. Jones shows them how the thoughts that cause their overt utterances 
can be characterized in terms of the functional classifications of the overt ut-
terances themselves. Thus, for example, he teaches them that an utterance in 
their language of the sort ‘It is raining!’ is caused by an inner episode of think-
ing an •It is raining!•. As the Ryleans start practicing, they at first explicitly go 
through the different steps of Jones’s teachings. Thus, when they hear some-
one say ‘It is raining’, they first think to themselves “This is an •It is raining! • 
caused by an inner •It is raining! •”. And when they see someone carrying her 
umbrella upon leaving the house, they might infer that her behavior is caused 
by an •It is raining! •, even though it did not result in an overt utterance ‘It 
is raining’. But there is no reason to assume that the educated Ryleans will 
remain bound to characterization of the thoughts of others in terms of their 
functionalist meta-language. 
Consider learning a second language. On Sellars’s story, one would first 
use translation rules such as “’Es regnet’s are •It is raining•s”.  But learning to 
speak a second language fluently, one presumably starts talking and thinking 
in that language itself at one point, rather than applying translation rules such 
as the above to every single instance of using the language or interpreting the 
utterances of others. Similar considerations apply to Sellars’s myth. Thus, the 
Ryleans may start to interpret each other’s silent behavior directly in terms 
of ‘inner speech’, rather than indirectly by functional classification of the 
thoughts attributed. Their training may reach a point, that is, where they are 
as fluent in reading each other’s minds as they are in interpreting each other’s 
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linguistic utterances. At this level of sophistication, mindreading proceeds 
by ‘hearing’ other people say things to themselves when going about their 
business, things the meaning of which is determined in the same relational 
fashion as pre-Jonesian interpretation of overt linguistic utterances. 
Thus, there appears to be no reason why pre-Jonesian interpretation of or-
dinary discourse and Jonesian mindreading of analogous thoughts could not 
be relational on Sellars’s story, and in fact some good reasons why it should be. 
It is crucial for Sellars’s proposal that the functional roles of linguistic expres-
sions are illustrated for the user of that language in making meaning statements. 
When combined with Sellars’s expository story of Jones and his Ryleans, this 
strongly suggests a relational understanding of first-order language use. In 
certain important respects, then, the plausibility of Sellars’s non-relational ac-
count of the meaning of meaning statements rests on assumptions pointing in 
the direction of relational linguistic interpretation. 
John McDowell’s critique on Sellars’s non-relational account (1998/2009) 
seems to be at odds with this conclusion. In earlier work, McDowell famously 
argued against a ‘sideways-on’ picture of the relation between mind and world, 
a picture according to which the mediating role of experience between our em-
pirical judgments and the world is a purely causal one (cf. McDowell, 1994). 
This mere causal rendering of the role of experience is hopeless, McDowell 
argues, “at least as a picture of how things are from the standpoint of experi-
ence” (1994, p. 51), that is, as a transcendental, Kantian story of how our 
empirical judgments come to have empirical content and appear to us in ex-
perience as rationally constrained by the world itself. 
Our concerns are not primarily transcendental in nature, nor do they 
touch upon the role of experience in establishing the relation between mind 
and world. But if we look at McDowell’s position from the point of view of 
(second- or third-person) folk psychological interpretation, his alternative 
to the ‘sideways-on’ picture comes very close to the idea that interpretation 
proceeds by relating each other’s utterances and actions to the commonsense 
world, that the relations drawn between their minds and the world, moreover, 
are never merely causal but also always intrinsically contentful, i.e. contentful 
in a way that is not analyzable in purely causal terms.56 In order to interpret 
56 The link between McDowell’s more transcendental concerns and the nature of folk psy-
chological interpretation is suggested by McDowell himself when he discusses Davidson’s radical 
interpretation (1994, pp. 34-35): “What I do mean to rule out is this idea: that, when we work at 
making someone else intelligible, we exploit relations we can already discern between the world 
and something already in view as a system of concepts within which the other person thinks; so 
that as we come to fathom the content of the initially opaque conceptual capacities that are opera-
tive within the system, we are filling in the detail in a sideways-on picture – here the conceptual 
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others as ‘having the world in view’ (McDowell 1998/2009), we have to relate 
them to the world as it is commonsensically conceived. But in doing so we rely on 
our own ‘second nature’, as McDowell (1994) calls it, our own evolutionarily 
and socio-culturally shaped cognitive and emotional capacities for carving up 
the world. 
I have suggested above that such folk psychological conception of ‘inten-
tionality as a relation’ (cf. McDowell 2009, ch. 3) is compatible with Sellarsian 
functional role semantics. McDowell, however, criticizes Sellars’s account pre-
cisely for precluding a relational understanding of propositional, conceptually 
contentful utterances and mental states. He construes Sellars’s functional role 
semantics as an attempt to constitutively explain the meaningfulness of utter-
ances and the contentfulness of mental states in terms of the rule-governed 
uniformities of entry/inference/exit transitions that determine the functional 
roles of the relevant utterances and states. Some of Sellars’s remarks indeed 
point in that direction. As we have seen, Sellars regards illustrating meaning 
statements of the form “’x’s (in L) are •y•s” indispensable in practice, because 
it is practically impossible to explicitly state all the rules that govern the pat-
terns in appropriate language use. Nevertheless, he thinks that “The rule gov-
erned uniformities […] which constitute a language (including our own) can, 
in principle, be exhaustively described without the use of meaning statements.” 
(1980, p. 92)57 McDowell takes this remark to reveal Sellars’s aspiration to con-
stitutively explain the normativity of meaning “from outside the semantical” 
(2009, p. 61), i.e. from a sideways-on, non-participatory point of view.58
Although this may very well have been one of Sellars’s bolder philosophi-
cal ambitions, I hope to have shown that it does not follow from his non-
system, there the world – that has been available all along, though at first only in essential outline. 
It must be an illusion to suppose that this fits the work of interpretation we need in order to come 
to understand some people, or that a version of it fits the way we acquire a capacity to understand 
other speakers of our own language in ordinary upbringing.” 
57 This quote is from ‘Meaning and ontology’, chapter 4 in ‘Naturalism and Ontology’ (1980). 
Interestingly, the original version (MFC, 1974/2007) doesn’t contain the clause ‘in principle’ as in 
the quote above. 
58 Cf. McDowell (2009, pp. 60-61): “On Sellars’s interpretation, the content of a statement of 
significance is a reflection, into a statement of a relation within the conceptual order, of relations 
that there ought to be, according to the proprieties that constitute a linguistic practice, between 
two sets of elements in the real order, one of which comprises linguistic items considered in ab-
straction from the practical proprieties in virtue of which they are meaningful at all. The “ought” 
with which meaning and aboutness are fraught gets into the picture as a sentential operator, in 
whose scope there occur specifications of relations that would ideally hold between linguistic items 
so considered and other elements in the real order. The content of the “ought” with which some 
fact about significance is fraught – what it is that, according to the “ought” in question, ought to 
be the case – can be factored out from the statement of significance and specified in terms that are 
not themselves meaning-involving.” 
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relational account of meaning statements, when considered by itself. Quite 
to the contrary, the psychological plausibility of Sellars’s account of meaning 
statements in human linguistic practice hinges on the illustrative role of the 
dot-quoted expressions that figure on the right-hand side of meaning state-
ments. This illustrative role may very well build on a relational interpreta-
tion of each other as first-order language users, an understanding according 
to which the aboutness of linguistic utterances and the directedness of actions 
are already treated as intrinsically meaningful and contentful.  
McDowell contrasts Sellars’s functional role semantics with Tarskian/
Davidsonian truth conditional semantics. On Davidson’s account (e.g. 
1967/2001b), meaning statements of the form “’x’ in L means y” are trans-
formed into “’x’ in L is true if and only if y”. Crucially, the expression on 
the right hand side is used by the utterer of the meaning statement to refer 
to the conditions that make true the mentioned expression on the left hand 
side, thereby in effect relating that expression to its truth conditions. On this 
account, McDowell argues, “we relate the conceptual order to the real order, 
mentioning elements of the real order by making ordinary uses of the words 
on the right-hand sides of these statements. But we affirm these relations with-
out moving outside the conceptual order – without doing more that employ-
ing our conceptual capacities.” (2009, p. 63) I agree with McDowell insofar 
as he holds that a Davidsonian rendering of meaning statements is perfectly 
compatible with a relational account of interpreting each other as having the 
commonsense world in full view (although the former does not seem to imply 
the latter). It may even suggest itself more readily than the Sellarsian account. 
But in order to decide between the two, other philosophical considerations 
should be brought to bear that go beyond the issues with which we are pres-
ently concerned.
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Relational, Representational, 
Subjective
4.1 Introduction
Commonsense explanations of people’s actions are often framed in terms of 
the goals with and the reasons for which they act. Our question concerns 
the underlying structure of such explanations. The BD-Model claims that our 
commonsense understanding of others as rational agents evolves around the 
concepts of belief and desire. Accordingly, interpreting someone as adopting 
goals in the light of reasons hinges on the ascription of desires representing 
those goals and beliefs representing those reasons. On the Relational Model, 
by contrast, our primary epistemic route to the practical concerns of others is 
essentially world-bound. It is a form of what I have termed ‘relational mind-
reading’ and consists in the attribution of states relating people to their goals 
and reasons out in the public world. 
Chapter 3 enabled us to isolate a relational stratum of goal-reason psy-
chology in Sellars’s Myth of Jones. The aim of this chapter is to show that 
the basic idea of relational mindreading does not depend on any particular 
conception of the propositional attitudes attributed. Section 2 provides a short 
review of other accounts that have been challenging the BD-Model of folk 
psychology: Ratcliffe’s (2007) and Perner’s (e.g. 1991) respective ‘situational’ 
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approaches and Gordon’s (e.g. 2001) ‘factive’ account of reason explanation. 
These accounts also seem to point in the direction of relational mindreading, 
but, interestingly, object to a Jonesian rendering of the attitudes attributed in 
terms of FR-representational states. In order to accommodate these accounts, 
I propose a distinction in section 3 between ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ 
relational states, and, correspondingly, between first- and second-order rela-
tional mindreading. FR-representational states are typical second-order states; 
first-order states lack specifications in terms of functional role. 
Section 4 then asks the critical question whether the relational constraints 
on Jonesian mindreading are explained by the specific notion of mental repre-
sentation that Jones used to teach the Ryleans his theory: the functional role 
notion. Is there some other account of mental representation that would have 
enabled Jones to bootstrap the Ryleans into genuine belief-desire psychology? 
The answer to this question will turn out negative. Exploiting Sellars’s exposi-
tory story once more, we will come to see that the social impairments of the 
Ryleans cannot be alleviated by merely introducing them to some or other 
concept of mental representation. Genuine understanding of belief and desire 
involves appreciation of the fact that how others represent the world may defy 
the public norms of representation; in addition to merely attributing mental 
representations to others, it requires the capacity to incorporate information 
incompatible with the public view on the world into the content clauses of the 
world-directed representational attitudes ascribed. Belief-desire psychology 
adds an essentially subjective or private dimension to a second-order relational 
understanding of mind. We can thus distinguish between the attribution of 
mental representations simpliciter as a means of relational mindreading and 
the attribution of subjective representational states as required for genuine 
belief-desire ascription. 
With these distinctions in place, I argue, we have enough material to meet 
the first challenge laid out for Relational Model in chapter 1: that of meeting 
the minimal demand of conceptual validity of the notion of relational propo-
sitional attitudes and the idea of relational mindreading.
4.2 Situational Understanding and Factive Explanation
Relational mindreading consists in the attribution of relational mental states, 
states that relate the agent to his goals and his reasons out in the public world 
as it presents itself to the interpreter: events or states of affairs that the agent 
is expected to accomplish in the light of events, states of affairs or facts that 
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make his action an appropriate or the right thing to do. Ratcliffe (2007) seems 
to have a similar idea in mind when he observes that “the reasons people offer 
for actions often take the form of simple assertions about features of a situa-
tion.” (p. 97) He directs attention to short question-answer dialogues, such 
as (Q) “Why did she turn left?” (A) “The road to the right is one-way.” Or (Q) 
“Why is he in a hurry?” (A) ”His bus is about to leave.” (ibid.) According to 
Ratcliffe, however, what examples such as these reveal is that “What often is 
expected is a description of the situation that makes clear the relevant norms 
of activity, rather than an account of people’s psychological predicaments.” (ibid., 
emphasis added) Ratcliffe claims, correctly in my view, that folk psychology 
and explanations in situational terms have a similar structure. He continues:
Just as one can say ‘if B believes p and desires q, all things being equal, B 
ought to do r’, one can say ‘if p is the case and q is the case, all things be-
ing equal, B ought to do r’. Norms are integral to the relationships that 
comprise situations, just as many proponents of FP claim that they are 
integral to the relationships between beliefs, desires and actions. The 
systematic structure we require in order to interpret people is out there 
in the shared world. So the burden need not be carried by a complicated 
understanding of the relationships between mental states. (pp. 97-98) 
As I have characterized relational mindreading, the systematic structure we 
find in the shared world between goals and reasons is what we relate the agent 
to when interpreting him in terms of his goals and reasons. We interpret him 
as intentionally directed at his goals and his reasons, perhaps as reasoning about 
which goal to adopt in the light of which reasons. On the current proposal, 
our understanding of the systematic structure between the agent’s goals and 
reasons simply is an understanding of the relationship between his mental 
states – mental states that relate him to his goals and reasons in the shared 
world. Ratcliffe’s critique is directed at folk psychology conceived as belief-
desire psychology (see also Ratcliffe 2006, 2009). Of course I concur that at-
tributing goals and reasons does not require the ascription of corresponding 
beliefs and desires, considered as representational mental states. But by saying 
that we often make sense of people’s reasons “by referring to aspects of situa-
tions, rather than to psychological states” (2007, p. 186), Ratcliffe runs the risk 
of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Understanding people in terms 
of the norms embedded in the shared world, norms that tell us what in a given 
situation serves as a reason to perform a certain action, can at the same time be 
a form of truly mentalistic interpretation in terms of relational propositional 
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attitudes. 
Much depends on how precisely we are to understand ‘relational propo-
sitional attitudes’. What Ratcliffe appears to be objecting to, is the view that 
understanding people’s actions in terms of reasons requires that we ascribe ‘in-
ternal’ mental states to them (ibid., p. 186), states that represent the situation 
at hand and cause the ensuing action. Our discussion of Jonesian mindreading 
in the previous chapter suggests an understanding of relational states that cor-
responds to this view. Recall that according to Jones’s theory, overt behavior 
is caused by inner episodes whose causal roles mirror the functional roles (in 
terms of specifiable entry/inference/exit rules) of the overt utterances that ei-
ther make up the behavior to be explained or would have made most sense in 
the context of the behavior to be explained. As we have seen, the semantical 
characterization of inner episodes in terms of functional roles amounts to an 
FR-representational understanding of such episodes. What Jones taught our 
Rylean ancestors, then, is how to causally explain each other’s behavior with 
reference to FR-representational states, states to be interpreted analogously to 
the overt utterances on which they are modeled. 
But this is not the only way to conceptualize relational propositional at-
titudes. Consider Perner’s (1988, 1991) ontogenetic account of folk psycho-
logy, for example. Interestingly, Perner (1988) contrasts propositional attitudes 
with mental representations. He uses the term ‘propositional attitude’ to refer 
to non-representational ‘situational attitudes’: attitudes that relate an agent 
to a situation in propositionally articulated ways. Perner argues that children 
under the age of 4 are mere ‘propositional attitude theorists’ (1988) or ‘situa-
tion theorists’ (1991). As situation theorists, 3-year-olds can understand that 
other people evaluate descriptions of a situation as true or false. But what they 
cannot understand, according to Perner, is that their propositional attitudes 
towards a situation are mediated by mental representations. This requires 
a ‘representational theory of mind’, which, Perner argues, children acquire 
around the age of 4.59 This ‘theory change’ should not be understood as a 
59 Perner’s notion of propositional or situational attitude shows some similarities with what 
Flavell (e.g. 1988) terms ‘cognitive connections’.  On Flavell’s account, children of 2-3 years old 
have learned that other people can be ‘cognitively connected’ to things in the world in a variety 
of different ways. They understand, for example, that one may become cognitively connected to 
something by means of different sense-modalities (e.g. seeing it or hearing it) and attitudes (e.g. 
thinking about it or remembering it), that these connections can change over time, that their 
own connections to external objects are independent of those of other people and that they go 
accompanied by inner experience. However, “young children tend not to understand that form-
ing cognitive connections to things entails mentally representing those things in various ways.” 
(1988, p. 246) This comes out, Flavell explains, in situations in which different people (or a single 
individual at different times) represent a single thing in several different ways – “ways that would 
be mutually contradictory if they described the object itself rather than mental representations 
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process in which the old theory (the situation theory) is completely replaced 
by the new and better theory (the representational theory), however: “The 
representational view does not supplant the situation theory, but only amends 
it for certain problems. Even as adults we remain situation theorists whenever 
possible and treat mental states as straight propositional attitudes.” (1991, p. 
252) This comes close to the current proposal of relational mindreading: as 
adults, our default interpretation strategy is to relate people to certain ‘situ-
ations’ that make up their reasons and their goals. In a recent paper, Perner 
and Roessler (2010) argue that young children explain other people’s actions 
by appealing to evaluative facts about the external world. These children con-
ceive of such normative facts as reasons that motivate an agent to adopt a goal 
and act correspondingly. Importantly, these motivating reasons are treated as 
fully ‘objective reasons’, “relativized neither to the agent’s instrumental beliefs 
nor to her pro-attitudes.” (p. 205) For the young child, that is, an agent’s ac-
tions are explained by the facts that dictate how one ought to be motivated in 
the agent’s situation; there is no room for personal deviation from this public 
norm. As a picture of adult goal-reason psychology, this characterization ap-
proximates the level of social understanding reached by our Rylean ancestors 
in the previous chapter. Yet, if we were to follow Perner’s (1988, 1991) account, 
it would not involve any notion of mental representation.  
Robert Gordon (1987, 2000a, 2000b, 2001) has also stressed the relational, 
or in his terminology, ‘factive’ nature of ordinary reason explanation. Gordon’s 
characterization of reasons for action is broadly similar to my use of the term 
in the ordinary sense of goal-reason psychology: things in or about the world 
that favor adopting certain goals and performing certain actions. In Gordon’s 
own words, a reason for action, in the strict sense, is “a favorable considera-
tion, something about the world—a fact—that, at least to the agent’s eyes at 
the relevant time, favored, or argued in favor of, doing what he did.” (2001, 
p. 178) Giving an explanation of someone’s action in terms of his reason that 
p, Gordon argues, normally goes accompanied by the presupposition that it is 
the case that p. Explanations of the form ‘she a’s because p’ are ‘factive’ insofar 
that they commit the interpreter to it being the case that p. For a fact to be 
considered as the agent’s reason, and thus for it to serve as an explanation of 
his action, “it must be a fact of which the agent is aware, a fact that is known 
to the agent…” (2000a, p. 77) Considering the fact that p as an agent’s reason 
of it.” (ibid.) Later, approximately from 4 years onwards, children “gradually realize that people’s 
cognitive connections engender inner, mental representations of their external objects, and that 
the same object can be represented in different, seemingly contradictory ways.” (p. 247)
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for action therefore not only presupposes that it is the case that p, but also that 
the fact that p is a fact to the agent. 
The concept of knowledge at play here does not, however, presuppose the 
concept of belief. Attributions of knowledge in the relevant sense “bespeak 
not sophistication but rather lack of it – or, at least, failure to use the com-
petence one has.” (1987, p. 130-131, emphasis in original) This means that 
in default cases of reason attribution, interpreters simply confine the agent’s 
knowledge to their own epistemic horizon, thereby failing to make allowance 
for the agent’s possibly false or differing beliefs. Factive interpretation, Gordon 
argues, is our default strategy, “the form that is used unless one has some 
reason not to use it.” (2000b, p. 105) Explicit belief explanations make sense 
when the factive implication is unwarranted. But this is exception rather than 
rule: ”knowledge, attributed by default, is the normal epistemic condition of 
others; mere belief is the noted exception.’ (Gordon, 1987, p. 132)
The state of knowledge attributed in default reason explanation is a rela-
tional state, a state that relates the agent to what the interpreter considers to 
be some reason-constituting fact. But on Gordon’s account, relational states 
are not to be conceived as functional role states. In a paper directly targeting 
Sellars’s Myth of Jones, Gordon invites us to consider another fictional an-
cestral tribe he calls the ‘Outlookers’ (2000b). Although the Outlookers never 
referred to mental states or episodes, “they gave appropriate explanations of 
action – causal explanations, it would appear, in terms of the reasons for which 
the actions were performed – though strictly in terms of public properties of 
public objects, or at least what they took to be public properties.” (p. 105) 
Gordon calls them the Outlookers because “they were always looking outward 
to the world, never inward to the mind of the agent.” (ibid.) For them, that is 
to say, “the mental is spread out over the world, coloring objects and situations 
with emotional and motivational charges, and not yet bottled into minds.” 
(ibid.) The explanations the Outlookers gave of each other’s actions were of 
the factive kind illustrated above, the kind Gordon argues we also tend to 
provide by default. The Outlookers were able to attribute default knowledge 
to one another in the course of reason attribution, but they lacked the sophis-
tication we have “to speak also, when the need arises, of the mental causes of 
action.” (p. 106, emphasis in original) Yet the similarity between their reason 
explanations and the ones we tend to give most of the time clearly suggests 
that “mental causes are in general a second best, invoked when there is reason 
not to locate the explanans out in the world.” (p. 106)
The kind of knowledge Gordon claims we attribute to others in default 
cases of reason explanations is not to be conceived as a mental cause of the 
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action, then. The cause of the action is something out in the public world, not 
something ‘bottled in the mind’. The knowledge attributed, it seems, merely 
connects the agent to the facts explaining his action; it is not itself part of 
the explanans.60 Gordon’s view on reason explanation is closely connected 
to his understanding of the Simulation Theory. According to Gordon, “it is 
simulation that makes it possible to think of people as acting from or because 
of reasons.” (2001, p. 177) Simulating another person, he explains   
requires an egocentric shift, a recentering of my egocentric map on 
[the other]. He becomes in my imagination the referent of the first 
person pronoun “I,” and the time and place of his [action] become 
the referents of “now” and “here.” And I […] cease to be the refer-
ent of the first person pronoun […] Such recentering is the prel-
ude to transforming myself in imagination into [the other] much 
as actors become the characters they play. (Gordon 1995, p. 55)61 
Having transformed myself, in imagination, into the other, I then ‘look out’ 
into the world from the other’s perspective and use my own response mecha-
nisms and practical reasoning skills to identify the relevant reason-constitut-
ing facts. Thus far, the simulation routine does not make any reference to (FR-)
representational states. And the subsequent attribution of the reasons identi-
fied to the other, it seems, does not require reference to such states either. The 
other can simply be interpreted as looking out onto the reason-constituting 
facts identified through simulation. Having the capacity to attribute default 
knowledge through simulation, Gordon argues, his Outlookers, unlike Sellars’s 
Ryleans, were in no need of a Jones to teach them how to explain behavior in 
terms functional/causal role states.62 The implication is that we do not need to 
60 cf. the ‘non-psychologistic’ account of e.g. Dancy (2000), discussed in the appendix to 
chapter 2. 
61 Gordon rejects the idea simulation is 1) an analogical inference from oneself to others, 
2) premised on introspectively based ascriptions to oneself, 3) requiring prior possession of the 
concepts of the mental states ascribed (1995, p. 53). Contrast Goldman’s version of the simulation 
theory in section 5.2 (see especially Goldman 2006, pp. 185-188). It should be noted that Gordon’s 
rejection of the last point concerning concept possession primarily applies to simulation of emo-
tions (cf. Gordon 2008) and proximal goal-directed actions (cf. Gordon 2005). It is does not seem 
to apply in the case of attributing propositionally articulated goals and reasons to others.
62 Gordon (2000b) presents his visit to the ‘Outlookers’ as an alternative to Sellars’s Myth 
of Jones. But one wonders whether his Outlookers are really all that different from the Ryleans. 
Gordon’s treatment of Sellars’s myth seems to be premised on the idea that Sellars’s Verbal 
Behaviorism (see section 3.1) attempts to reduce mind to behavior. On this construal of behav-
iorism, Gordon has a point when he states that Sellars’s Ryleans “carry a much heavier burden 
than the restriction to public language. They are restricted to a much more austere idiom, which 
eschews not only causal explanations of human action in terms of mental states and episodes, but 
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refer to mental causes either when providing factive reason explanations of 
the actions of others, i.e. when engaging in relational mindreading. 
The general idea of relational mindreading seems to allow for more than 
one interpretation. Both Perner’s ‘situational’ attitudes and Gordon’s ‘factive’ 
attitudes lack the (FR-)representational/causal dimension of Jones’s teach-
ings in Sellars’s myth. In light of this, I propose a distinction between rela-
tional mindreading understood as consisting in (i) the attribution of first-order 
states and (ii) the attribution of second-order states. As we shall see, Perner’s 
and Gordon’s proposals are examples of the first option, whereas our discus-
sion of Jonesian mindreading in the previous chapter suggested the second. 
Interestingly, however, Sellars’s myth also allows for a first-order reading of 
relational mindreading.
4.3 Relational Ascent 
Consider the pre-Jonesian Ryleans once more. John walks down the street and 
his Rylean friend asks him what he’s up to. John replies: “I’m going to buy 
some milk at the supermarket.” His friend asks him why. John answers: “The 
supermarket will be closed tomorrow.” John has succeeded in giving his goal 
and his reason for his action (a) of walking down the street: his goal is to buy 
some milk at the supermarket and his reason is that the supermarket will be 
closed tomorrow. How does his Rylean friend interpret him? Let us focus on 
the attribution of John’s reason and let his goal therefore be incorporated in 
the description of his action as “going to buy some milk at the supermarket.“ 
also causal explanations of human actions in terms of reasons …” (pp. 105-106; emphasis added) 
But as we have seen in chapter 3.1, the verbal behaviorist treatment of the Ryleans was only meant 
to reveal that their conception of mind was confined to public displays of intentionality. In fact, 
Sellars (e.g. 1953/2007, 1954/2007, 1969/2007, 1974/2007) tries to account for the meaningfulness 
of public language in terms of the inferential roles of linguistic expressions in ‘the game of giving 
and asking for reasons’. Gordon moreover thinks that Sellars’s story cannot account for the fact 
that ascription of propositional attitudes is systematically coordinated with their verbal expres-
sion, since ‘outlooking’ expressions only requires training in a public language, whereas ‘inward-
looking’ ascriptions are guided by Jones’s functionalist theory of mind. In general, he thinks that 
Theory Theory accounts cannot explain so-called ‘Moorean paradoxes’ such as S: “It is raining, 
but I don’t believe it is” – a formally consistent sentence, assertion of which is self-defeating. TT-
accounts, Gordon argues, fail to capture the paradoxical nature of sentences such as S: utterance of 
the assertion “It is raining” may be outweighed by other behavioral evidence that serves as input 
for the theory, so as to yield the ascription “I don’t believe it is raining.” Although this may indeed 
be true of present-day versions of TT, it is a mischaracterization of Sellars’s myth. Chapter 3 clearly 
revealed that Jones’s functionalist characterizations of mental states are derived from, and are thus 
systematically coordinated with, the Ryleans’ pre-existent (first-order) understanding of each other’s 
‘outlooking’ linguistic utterances. See Rosenberg (2004/2007) for a detailed discussion of Gordon’s 
(2000b) interpretation of Sellars. 
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It seems the interpreter has two options. 
According to the first, she interprets him simply as follows: “John is going 
to buy some milk at the supermarket because the supermarket will be closed 
tomorrow,” or “John is a-ing because p.” On her verbal behaviorist under-
standing, this would mean “John is a-ing because p-out-loud(J),” where ‘p-out-
loud(J)’ means something like ‘p out of John’s mouth’.  Of course, for John’s 
answer that p to make sense to her, it has to be framed in an inferentially 
articulated context, e.g. that one can buy milk at the supermarket, that John’s 
brought some money to pay for the milk, that he will reach the supermarket 
before the end of the day, etc.  For the Rylean interpreter, this means that 
John should have access to the world and the inferences that it licenses if his 
answer that p is to make proper sense of his action, access evidenced by e.g. his 
giving proper answers to subsequent questions. The mental state ‘p-out-loud’ 
attributed to John is what I will call a first-order relational state: it is the state of 
being-directed-at what is specified by the content clause that p, in this case: that 
the supermarket will be closed tomorrow. 
On the second option, John’s friend interprets him not (only) as “John 
is a-ing because p-out-loud(J)” but (also) as “John is a-ing because he says that 
p” or “John is a-ing because he thinks-out-loud that p.” For his friend to inter-
pret him in this way, she needs to use their semantical meta-language, i.e. she 
needs to ascend from attending to what he’s saying or ‘thinking-out-loud’ to 
attending to his saying it or ‘his thinking-it-out-loud’. As we have seen in chap-
ter 3, engaging in semantical discourse in this manner allows the Ryleans to 
comment upon or criticize each other’s sayings, and to do so with a generally 
functionalist conception of such sayings in mind: how, in accordance with fur-
ther specifiable entry/inference/exit rules, a certain utterance type is supposed 
to function in their linguistic practice. A shift towards Rylean semantical dis-
course is a form of what Quine (1960) called ‘semantic ascent’: “the shift from 
talking in certain terms to talking about them.” (p. 271) Since this functional 
classification of their language use in semantical discourse amounts to the 
FR-concept of mental representation, I shall refer to this shift to Rylean seman-
tical discourse as an instance of ‘functional role representational ascent’ or 
FRR-ascent.63 On this second option, then, John’s friend makes an FRR-ascent 
from “John is a-ing because p-out-loud(J)” to “John is a-ing because he thinks-
out-loud that p.” The mental state ‘thinking-out-loud that p’ is what I shall term 
63 Using Sellars’s dot-notation (see appendix chapter 3), the difference between the first and 
the second option is the difference between “John a’s because p-out-loud(J)” and “John a’s because 
an overt ·p· (J),” or between “John a’s because p(J) and “John a’s because a ·p· (J).”
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a second-order state: it is the state of the agent of being-in-a-state-about what is 
specified by the content clause that p. 
Let us now apply the same considerations to John’s friend’s post-Jonesian 
interpretation of his action. Strictly following Jones’s teachings, John’s friend 
would interpret the reason he issued in his response “because the supermarket 
will be closed tomorrow” as being caused by an inner episode of thinking-to-
himself that the stores will be closed tomorrow. On this post-Jonesian silent 
counterpart of the second pre-Jonesian option discussed above, she would 
interpret him as “John a’s because he thinks-to-himself that p,” where ‘thinks-to 
himself that p’ is a second-order FR-representational (FRR-)state. Following the 
first pre-Jonesian option, however, she would interpret John as “John a’s be-
cause p-to-himself,” where the state attributed is the ‘offline’ counterpart of the 
first-order overt state ‘p-out-loud(J)’. Applying FRR-ascent to this first-order state 
of ‘p-to-himself’, we get the second-order FRR-state of ‘thinking-to-himself that p’. 
The discussion of Sellars’s myth in the previous chapter pointed in the 
direction of the second option for Jonesian mindreading. And perhaps this 
is also the best way to read Sellars’s myth. For if John’s friend is indeed sup-
posed to interpret John’s utterance that p strictly according to the teachings of 
Jones’s theory, i.e. as being caused by its silent counterpart, it seems she would 
have to make an FRR-ascent: the semantically characterized FRR-state of think-
ing that p according to specifiable entry/inference/exit rules could then also be 
regarded as the theoretical causal role state specifiable in causal patterns mir-
roring these rules (see chapter 3.4). Without FRR-ascent, it is not clear whether 
the interpreter would have enough conceptual material to consider the attrib-
uted state as a causal role state: there would be no functional classification to 
exploit as a model for the causal role to be assigned to the relevant state. But 
even though the second option may be closer to Jones’s teachings in Sellars’s 
myth, there appears to be no reason why the first option could not have been 
available for Jonesian mindreaders as well. 
Notice first that even in their post-Jonesian stage, the Ryleans would still 
seem to be able to make perfect sense of each other’s overt utterances in their 
pre-Jonesian style. There seems to be no gain for his Rylean friend to inter-
pret John’s utterance “because the stores will be closed tomorrow” as being 
caused by an inner episode with the functional role of saying that the stores 
will be closed tomorrow. For in order to give a useful characterization of this 
functional role, she would first have to understand the utterance classified 
by it, the very utterance John utters in response to her question.64 And this is 
64 Recall that on Sellars’s story, the Rylean’s interpretation of each other’s utterances as lin-
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something she could already do prior to Jones’s teachings. So why not simply 
skip the reference to an inner episode and the FRR-ascent required to specify 
its causal role?  
But now consider interpretation of behavior without the guidance of the 
agent’s overt utterances. According to the second option, the interpreter is 
supposed to reason as follows: “this behavior of the agent would make most 
sense if he thought-out-loud that q, so the inner episode causing the behavior 
is likely to be an inner ‘thinking-to-himself that q’.” But why couldn’t she 
simply think: “this behavior of the agent would best make sense in the pres-
ence of ‘q-out-loud(A)’ so A q’s-to-himself?” That is: why apply FRR-ascent and 
go through the trouble of characterizing the causal role of the posited inner 
episode, if she can model the inner episode directly on her first-order under-
standing of the overt utterance that would best fit her behavior? Presumably, 
this would not be the way in which the Ryleans initially learned to engage in 
Jonesian mindreading. But couldn’t they train themselves, through practice, 
to make a shortcut on Jones’s theory?65   
To give an example: suppose John’s Rylean friend knows his daily routine 
and hence knows that John goes to the supermarket every day to buy some 
milk because he ran out of the milk he bought the day before. Instead of strictly 
following Jones’s theory and model the causal role state posited to explain his 
walking down the street on the FR-representation of the overt utterance that 
would have made most sense of John’s behavior, she would interpret John’s 
walking down the street as “a-ing because (I ran out of milk)-to-himself,” thus 
using her Jonesian mindreading techniques without FRR-ascent and, it would 
seem, also without considering his mental state as having a causal role in the 
explanation of his behavior. 
On this reading of Jonesian mindreading, interpreting John as going to 
the supermarket because he ran out of milk would consist in ‘hearing’ or hav-
ing ‘heard’ him say to himself that he ran out of milk, analogous to the way 
guistic acts does not rest on their ability to engage in semantical discourse (see chapter 3.5 and 
appendix to chapter 3). Rather, FRR-ascent appears a useful way for Rylean interpreters to classify 
each other’s linguistic performances for further purposes, e.g. to criticize such performances or, 
indeed, to provide causal explanations of each other’s behavior. See also chapter 5.2. 
65 It should be noted that attribution of both the first-order state “because q-to-himself” and 
the second-order state “because he though-to-himself that q” could either (a) be the result of draw-
ing a theoretical inference from observable behavioral phenomena to the occurrence of the thought 
episode, or (b) be an instance of making a non-inferential, perceptual report about the occurrence of 
the episode. As explained in chapter 3.5, Sellars’s treatment of mindreading allows for both (a) and 
(b). In the case of first-order state attribution, (a) would be an inference from certain behavior to ‘q-
to-himself’ and (b) would be the perception of ‘q-to-himself’ in behavior. Correspondingly, second-
order state attribution would involve (a) an inference from behavior to ‘thinking-to-himself that 
q’, or (b) perceiving ‘thinking-to-himself that q’ in the behavior manifested. 
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pre-Jonesian interpretation could proceed by hearing or having heard him say 
“I ran out of milk,” i.e. without engaging in semantical discourse in order 
to classify his utterance in functional terms. It would be analogous only to 
the extent of being semantically evaluable, of course, not necessarily in being 
accompanied by inner sounds or ‘the wagging of inner tongues’ (cf. chapter 
3.2). Just as the Ryleans would have been able to learn to communicate in a 
second language after first having gone through a phase of thinking about it 
(by matching, in their meta-language, the functional roles of utterance types 
of the foreign language to the functional roles of utterance types of their 
own language in order to figure out what the foreign utterances mean), they 
could also have learned to think about other people’s mental lives directly 
in a ‘mental language’ rather than always having to think about it in the FR-
representational terms of corresponding overt linguistic acts  (see appendix 
chapter 3).66 
At this point, I do not wish to advocate either of the two options identified 
above, i.e. (i) relational mindreading by merely attributing first-order states or 
(ii) relational mindreading by (also) attributing second-order states, such as 
FRR-states through FRR-ascent. Prima facie, both options seem to be available 
as a further specification of the general idea of relational mindreading. And 
even on Sellars’s fictional story, it is perfectly possible that the Ryleans used 
both techniques in daily social interaction. Rylean interpreters would have 
been prone to making FRR-ascent especially in those situations in which other 
people’s overt linguistic acts (or the occurrence of their silent counterparts) 
did not seem to accord with proper language use. The use of FRR-ascent would 
have enabled them to criticize each other’s apparently improper thoughts and 
utterances. In such relatively problematic social situations, commenting upon 
each other’s thinkings and sayings in terms of second-order FRR-states would 
also have invited them to think about the mental causes of each other’s behav-
ior and to seek further explanations as to why someone acted in the strange 
manner he or she did. In more spontaneous and less problematic social situa-
tions, interpretation could then have proceeded according to the first option, 
by merely attributing first-order states to one another.67
66  Of course, this ‘mental language’ would not be a private language, in Wittgenstein’s 
(1953) sense, for it would be modeled entirely on the Rylean’s public language. 
67  A causal analysis of reason explanation is often combined with a BD-Model of action 
explanation. The first thing to notice is that the causal analysis of reason explanation is neutral 
with regard to the question whether the states attributed are genuine representational states or 
merely second-order relational states. Jones taught the Ryleans to attribute second-order FRR-states 
to one another: relational, yet causally relevant ‘inner’ states (see chapter 3.4). Perner and Roessler 
(2010, pp. 206-210), however, argue that a causal analysis of reason explanation need not refer to 
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Let it also be noted in passing that the distinction between first-order and 
second-order mental states is not wedded to a particular Sellarsian conceptual 
framework. As we shall see in the next section, one could replace Sellars’s FR-
conception of representation with some other representational notion and 
still maintain the distinction between a relational conception of another agent 
as (i) being directed at the world and (ii) being directed at the world in virtue 
of internal representations of the world. In general, the distinction hinges on 
the question whether or not an agent’s intentional attitudes towards and her 
interaction with the environment should be conceptualized as being mediated 
by mental representations. A first-order conception of mental states implies 
a negative answer to this question, a second-order conception an affirmative 
one. Sellars’s myth allows us to make this distinction at the level of folk psycho- 
logy. But it also seems to apply at the level of cognitive science. The current debate 
about the status of mental representations in (the philosophy of) cognitive sci-
ence comes down to the question whether it pays off explanatorily to conceive 
of the internal neural processes underlying interaction with the environment 
as representations of the worldly offerings the organism that instantiates these 
processes is directed at (cf. Ramsey 2007). Proponents of the embodied cogni-
tion and enactivist paradigms lean towards a negative answer to this question 
(e.g. Menary 2006, Gallagher 2008a, Hutto 2008a, Hutto 2011b, Thompson 
2007, Chemero 2010), whereas defenders of the more classical cognitivist para-
digm stick to a positive answer (e.g. Fodor 2008, Bechtel 2008).
With the distinction between first-order and second-order relational mind- 
reading in place, we can read Ratcliffe’s objection to the idea that reason expla-
nation in terms of situations additionally requires reference to mental states 
as an objection specifically directed at interpretation conceived in terms of 
second-order relational attitudes, e.g. FRR-states causing the action to be ex-
plained. Perner’s proposal can be interpreted as saying that young children 
(and adults, by default) interpret other agents in terms of first-order, non-
representational propositional attitudes, states relating them to the situations 
that constitute what he calls their ‘objective reasons’. Gordon’s Outlookers can 
now also be regarded as first-order relational mindreaders. The relational state 
inner mental causes, but could also be given in terms of the outer, worldly causes of action. They 
suggest that causal explanations advert to facts that ‘make a difference’, where this is spelled out 
in terms of counterfactual dependence along the lines of J. Woodward’s (2003) ‘interventionist’ 
analysis of causal relations. Crudely, the idea is that an ‘objective reason’, i.e. some worldly fact, 
causally explains an action in the sense that, were there to be an intervention on the facts that give 
someone a practical reason, there would be a corresponding change in her action. It seems this 
analysis of reason explanation is also available on a first-order understanding of relational mental 
states.
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of knowledge attributed to another agent when explaining her action in terms 
of the factive reason that p can be modeled as the agent’s silent assertion that 
p, i.e. as ‘p-to-herself’. Attributing such first-order state, an interpreter would 
merely conceive of the agent as being intentionally directed at the explanans 
of the action out in the public world, i.e. the fact that p; he would not also 
understand the action as being caused by a representational state about p.68 
4.4 Metarepresentation Is Not Enough 
It is time we ask ourselves a question that has been staring us in the face ever 
since Jonesian mindreading was revealed as being restricted to the relational 
level of discursive understanding, somewhere along the way in chapter 3. By 
carefully following through Sellars’s conceptual bootstrapping strategy in his 
Myth of Jones, we discovered that the move from a verbal behaviorist towards 
a functionalist conception of mind doesn’t add up to a genuine understand-
ing of belief and desire, an understanding on which one person’s take on the 
world may defy another’s. Jones, that is, didn’t bootstrap the Ryleans into 
representational mindreading. The question, then, is: How could these inter-
pretative shortcomings of the educated Ryleans be alleviated? What should be 
added to their social skills in order to transform them into mature representa-
tional mindreaders?  What does it take, for example, to make them understand 
differing beliefs, beliefs that might turn out false?
One important lesson from chapter 3 was that mental states can be con-
ceived as inner representational states without thereby being understood as 
subjective or private representational states, i.e. states that specify the way 
the world appears to a specific individual, and not necessarily to anyone else. 
It is the latter conception that is required for genuine understanding of false 
beliefs, commitments as to how things are in the world that are in conflict 
with commitments of, and hence not shared by, the interpreter herself. Jones 
taught the Ryleans how to apply their preexistent understanding of each 
other’s overt utterances as FRR-states in order to characterize the posits of his 
new theory of mind. But by doing so, he didn’t take away what we might call 
a disjunctive constraint on their interpretation skills. 
Recall that even in their post-Jonsesian stage, the Ryleans could only inter-
pret the thinking(-out-oud) of a false thought that p either as a failed attempt to 
68 Relational ascent should not be conflated with Gordon’s ascent routines for propositional 
attitude ascription (1995, 1996, 2000b, 2007). See appendix for discussion. 
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perform the world-directed mental act of thinking that not-p, or as a successful 
attempt at indicating a mere possible scenario according to which p. They 
could not grasp the idea of a speaker or thinker considering such counterfac-
tual scenario as actual; they could not appreciate the fact that other people’s 
attitudes towards the world could be informed by false representations of the 
world. The Ryleans were disjunctivists of sorts. Their conception of mind did 
not allow for an understanding of both true and false claims/thoughts as be-
ing sincere, world-directed propositional attitudes. Such ‘common factor’ un-
derstanding of true and false (overt) thoughts would require representational 
mindreading.69 For the educated Ryleans, world-directed propositional atti-
tudes incompatible with the public take on the world were still unintelligible. 
Jones’s theory didn’t sever the bonds of public assessment that constrained 
pre-Jonesian mindreading. In their educated state, the Ryleans were still oblivi-
ous to this private dimension of the mental (chapter 3.3). 
It may appear as if this shortcoming of Jones’s theory is a consequence 
of the particular notion of representation he exploited, the FR-notion. Recall 
that on this FR-understanding, a mental representation is merely some sym-
bolic vehicle that ought to indicate something in the world (or some pos-
sible scenario), according to the entry/inference/exit rules that define its use 
in linguistic practice. Importantly, the indicating vehicle need not show any 
resemblance to what it is supposed to indicate. But what if Jones had used the 
idea of a model as a model for his theory? In contrast to symbolic representa-
tions, models (maps, pictures, miniatures, etc.) represent in virtue of sharing 
certain structural features with their representational targets. With respect to 
those features, a model is supposed to match or correspond with its target.70 
Suppose that Jones had added to his theory something along the following 
lines: “Overt utterances about the world or their silent counterparts are actu-
69 One could draw a parallel here with disjunctivist theories of perception (e.g. Byrne and 
Logue 2009). The difference is that disjunctivist theories of perception are typically concerned with 
the nature of perceptual experience, whereas our (Sellars’s) Jonesian account would (merely) tar-
get the folk concept of perceptual experience. Accordingly, our basic (i.e. relational) commonsense 
understanding of perceptual experience would be of a disjunctivist kind. It would only be from 
a more reflective stance that we stop being ‘naïve realists’ and start conceiving of our perceptual 
contact with the world as being mediated by our subjective and possibly misleading impressions. 
70 Like the functional role notion of mental representation, this model notion is also widely 
used in the philosophy of mind and (the philosophy of) cognitive science. See e.g. Braddon-
Mitchell and Jackson 1996, O’Brien and Opie (2004, 2011), Ramsey (2007). Millikan (e.g. 2004) 
uses the model notion within her teleosemantic account of mental content. Sellars also used a 
‘picture’ notion of representation, but not to characterize the folk concept of mind. It plays an im-
portant role in his attempt to fuse the ‘manifest’ or commonsense image with the ‘scientific’ image 
of man (Sellars, 1963/1991). For discussion of this aspect of Sellars’s philosophy see e.g. Millikan 
(2005, ch. 4), deVries (2005, ch. 2), O’Shea (2007, ch. 6), Rosenberg (2007, ch. 5). 
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ally about an internal world that is about the world, a model of the world projected 
onto the world like a movie shown on a screen; it is the resemblance between 
the internal model and the external world that ensures successful exploration 
of the world through thought, talk and action.” With this addition to Jones’s 
theory, it may seem as if the Ryleans would have been given the necessary 
tools for representational mindreading. By interpreting each other’s behavior 
as being caused by mental models of the world, the possibility of a mismatch 
between model and world may seem to come within the purview of their so-
cial understanding. 
But this is a mistake. The mere positing of internal miniature worlds pro-
jected outwards, does not enable Jones to remove the disjunctive constraint 
on Rylean interpretation as outlined above. Let us take a step back and ask 
ourselves again why Jones’s original theory didn’t take the Ryleans beyond 
a relational conception of one another. As we saw in chapter 3.3, the reason 
was that application of his theory of thought relied entirely on the Rylean’s 
pre-existent verbal behaviorist understanding of each other’s overt linguistic 
acts. The functional roles of inner episodes were derived from pre-Jonesian 
meta-linguistic specifications of Rylean language use, specifications made ex-
clusively with reference to what was publically accessible, out in the open for 
everyone to see. The same considerations apply to the modification of Jones’s 
theory currently under discussion. Jones’s teachings still depend entirely on 
the Rylean’s pre-existent linguistic understanding. As before, inner episodes 
are modeled on overt linguistic acts. The only difference is that he now also 
introduces an inner world, modeled on the outer world. Again, however, 
merely moving the game inside does not sever the bonds of public assessment. For 
the Ryleans, the internal models posited by Jones as representational interme-
diaries are simply copies of the world outside, which still serves as the ultimate 
and only reference when it comes to interpreting other people’s world-directed 
attitudes. On their new understanding of mind, utterance of the false sentence 
that not-p would be interpreted either as being about a malformed model of it 
being the case that p, or as being about a replica of a counterfactual scenario in 
which not-p. Addition of a ‘mental model’ conception of representation by it-
self does not extend to the idea that other people’s attitudes towards the actual 
world can be informed by representations of counterfactual scenarios.  
What we need is a shift from understanding the speaker as representing a 
counterfactual scenario towards understanding her as representing the actual 
world in counterfactual terms. In the case of the Ryleans, this requires that 
a distinction be made between how one ought to be representing the world 
and how one actually is representing the world. According to the rules of 
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their linguistic practice, utterance of a false sentence ought to be directed at 
a counterfactual scenario. What the Ryleans still have to learn is that the way 
an individual person conceives of the world may defy these public, intersub-
jective oughts, that the utterance of a false sentence may give expression to 
the speaker’s subjective view on the world. This subjective dimension of mind 
cannot be accounted for simply by conceiving of mental representations as 
‘inner’. The public-private dimension of mind runs orthogonal to the distinc-
tion between ‘inner’ mental states and their ‘outer’ manifestations.   
Most participants in the debate on folk psychology remain silent on what 
concept of mental representation they think is involved in representational 
mindreading. Perner (e.g. 1988, 1991, 1995) has been a notable exception. On 
Perner’s earlier account (1988, 1991), mental representations are modeled as 
mental models, as suggested above. Acquisition of a representational theory 
of mind around the age of 4 requires that children come to represent other 
people’s mental models as such, i.e. that they become meta-representers in 
Pylyshyn’s (1978) sense of the term, representing the representation relation 
between the agent’s mental model and what it models. As we have seen in sec-
tion 4.2, Perner holds that children start out as ‘situation theorists’, ‘looking 
through’ the agent’s representational medium and directly relating the agent 
to the situation attended to. Around 4 years of age, however, they come to 
understand that the agent’s intentional directedness is actually mediated by 
internal models of what it is directed at. This requires that they distinguish 
between what is being represented – the situation attended to – and how the 
agent represents it – the content of the model of the situation. And this, Perner 
argues, should allow them to understand that mental states may guide action 
in the real situation (what is being represented) as if it were a different situa-
tion (how the model represents it), i.e. to understand false belief. 
In later work (e.g. 1995), Perner proposes an analysis of mental represen-
tation along Fodorian lines, according to which to believe that p is to stand 
in a relation of semantic evaluation to the proposition expressed by a token 
mental representation.71 Situation theorists can semantically evaluate proposi-
tions, but cannot conceive of the fact that propositions are semantically 
evaluable. Thus they simply relate others to what they evaluate as true (real 
situation) or false (pretend situation). What children learn around at 4 years 
71 Cf. Fodor’s (e.g. 1987) formulation of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM): “For any 
organism O, and any attitude A toward the proposition P, there is a (‘computational’/‘functional’) 
relation R and a mental representation MP such that: MP means that P, and O has A iff O bears R 
to MP (p. 17). Perner’s modification is to conceive of R not in terms of computation but rather in 
terms of semantic evaluation.   
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of age, is to regard others as semantically evaluating the proposition expressed 
by a mental representation, i.e. as evaluating the proposition expressed as true 
or false. Children can now distinguish between what is being said about a 
situation – the proposition expressed – and the situation itself – ‘of which’ the 
proposition is evaluated as true or false. And this, again, should allow them 
to understand that others may assign a different truth value to a proposition 
expressed than the one it has, as in the case of false belief. 
In many interesting ways, Perner’s developmental account runs parallel 
to our discussion of Sellars’s Myth of Jones. Perner’s situation theorists suf-
fer from a similar disjunctive constraint on their social understanding as the 
Ryleans. They can entertain multiple models, mark some as merely as-if and 
relate others to the (as-if) situations modeled, but they cannot understand 
that others may have a mismatching model of the real situation at hand. The 
situation theorists’ concepts of belief and pretence are confined to respectively 
‘acting on a true proposition’ and ‘acting on a false proposition’; they cannot 
understand that others may act on a false proposition they evaluate as true. 
These primitive concepts, Perner argues (1995, see also Perner, et al. 1994), can 
be regarded as two sides of one single concept of ‘prelief’. Understanding oth-
ers in terms of ‘prelief’, they either adopt an attitude of ‘holding true’ towards 
true propositions or adopt an attitude of pretence towards false propositions. 
This easily extends to the disjunctive constraint as explicated above: if some-
one’s action is informed by a false proposition, she must either be engaged in 
pretend play or have failed to act in a ‘holding true’ frame of mind.  
I merely take issue here with Perner’s suggestion that the capacity to meta-
represent, i.e. represent the mental representation relation, suffices to ascribe 
false belief. Understanding of someone’s intentional directedness towards the 
world as merely being mediated by a model of the world does not amount to 
an understanding of that model as a subjective model of the world, i.e. as not 
necessarily shared by interpreter and interpretee. The ability to conceive of 
someone as semantically evaluating a proposition does not by itself endow 
one with the capacity to interpret that person as evaluating the proposition 
other than she ought to. 
On Sellars’s ‘deflationary’ analysis of truth in terms of ‘semantic assert-
ibility’, for example (e.g. 1967/1992, ch. IV)72, the function of truth statements 
of the form ‘that p is true’ is, roughly, to explicitly authorize the performance 
of asserting that it is the case that p, i.e. to comment upon the move towards 
72 This analysis of truth in terms of semantic assertibility should not be conflated with 
Sellars’s complementary ‘picture’ theory of truth (e.g. 1967/1992, ch. V – see footnote 70). 
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saying(-to-oneself) that it is the case that p as being in accordance with the en-
try/inference/exit rules that define ·it is the case that p·s in the home language 
(cf. appendix chapter 3). Accordingly, semantically evaluating a proposition 
only requires ascent to semantical meta-language (cf. chapter 3.2 and chapter 
4.3). In theory, it is something that Perner could teach his situation theorist 
without teaching them our mature concept of belief. On this proposal, saying 
that a proposition is true (false) is merely a means of making explicit that as-
serting that proposition is (im)permissible according to the ‘public oughts’ of 
linguistic practice. Similar results are obtainable using other deflationary ana-
lyses that explain truth exclusively in terms of the expressive role of truth-talk 
in discursive practice (e.g. Brandom 1994, 2002). There may be other concepts 
of truth, proper use of which does require the capacity for representational 
mindreading (see chapter 6.4). The point here is merely that acquisition of the 
concept of semantic evaluation can be cashed out in relational terms. Without 
further specification, Perner cannot use it to characterize the ontogeny of re-
presentational mindreading.73 
So it seems that the conclusion from the chapter 3 generalizes: mere 
metarepresentational interpretation, whether in terms of FR-representations, 
mental models or semantically evaluated propositions, does not suffice for an 
understanding of others as subjectively representing the world to themselves, 
and hence does not suffice to remove the disjunctive constraint on Rylean 
interpretation. 
Let it also be noted that the distinction between relational and represen-
tational mindreading cannot be framed exhaustively in terms of the linguistic 
contrast between extensional/transparent and intensional/opaque contexts. 
The sentence S ‘There is a bottle of water in the fridge’, has an extensional or 
transparent context, such that the truth of S entails that there is a bottle of 
water in the fridge and that the truth-value of S is not altered by substitution 
of co-referential terms (e.g. ‘water’ by ‘H2O). Accordingly, on an extensional 
interpretation of John’s utterance (U) of S, U would imply that there is a bottle 
of water in the fridge and substituting ‘water’ for ‘H20’ would not render the 
interpretation inadequate.  The sentence S* ‘John believes that there is a bottle 
of water in the fridge’, by contrast, has an intensional or opaque context. S* 
does not entail that there is water in the fridge (John’s belief may be false) and 
substitition of co-referential terms ‘water’ and ‘H20’ is not automatically truth-
73 Perner is of course well aware of the fact that belief ascription requires sensitivity to this 
subjective dimension of propositional attitudes. My point is merely that the subjectivity of belief 
cannot be analyzed in terms of some or other notion of representation, as Perner seems to suggest. 
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preserving (John may not know that water is H20, so that the sentence ‘John 
believes that there is a bottle of H20 in the fridge’ may be false). Carried over 
to our understanding of John’s utterance U ‘There is a bottle of water in the 
fridge’, an intensional interpretation of U does not imply that there is in fact 
a bottle of water in the fridge (U may be based on a false belief) and substitu-
tion of co-referential terms ‘water’ and ‘H20’ may render the interpretation 
inadequate (for John may not know that water is H20). The intensional inter-
pretation captures the way in which John’s propositional attitude expressed by 
U represents the referent under a certain description, a description that may 
turn out to be false. 
In order to clarify which elements of the content clause of an expressed 
propositional attitude are supposed to be understood intensionally and which 
elements extensionally, one could divide the content clause into two parts, an 
extensional ‘de re’ part marked by ‘of’ or ‘about’ and an intensional ‘de dicto’ 
part marked by ‘that’. Thus, depending on the situation and what one knows 
about John, one may infer from U that, e.g., John believes of (about) the bottle 
in the fridge that there is still water in it (one knows, for example, that the bot-
tle has been refilled with milk since John last saw it). The extensional, de re part 
of the ascription is removed from the content clause of the ascribed belief and 
reflects the ascriber’s own attitude towards what it refers to; the intensional, de 
dicto part of the ascription captures the way in which the extensionally speci-
fied referent is interpreted as being conceived by the ascribee.74   
Now there is no reason to assume that Jonesian mindreading only allows 
for a purely extensional understanding of other people’s minds. Suppose six-
year-old John thinks that there is a bottle of water in the fridge. His Rylean care- 
givers know perfectly well that they should not ascribe to John the thought 
that there is a bottle of H20 in the fridge. This is not something six-year-old 
John is disposed to meaningfully think-out-loud (or, derivatively, think-to-
himself) under any circumstance. Similarly, the Ryleans would have no trou-
ble recognizing experts amongst them. Such experts would give descriptions 
of worldly things that go beyond their own knowledge; learning something 
74 Cf. Brandom’s (1994) treatment of the de re/de dicto distinction: “The suggestion is that 
the expressive function of de re ascriptions is to make explicit which aspects of what is said express 
substitutional commitments that are being attributed and which substitutional commitments are 
being undertaken. The part of the content specification that appears within the de dicto ‘that’ clause 
is limited to what, according to the ascriber, the one to whom the commitment is ascribed would 
(or in a strong sense should) acknowledge as an expression of what that individual is committed to. 
The part of the content specification that appears within the scope of the de re ‘of’ includes what, 
according to the ascriber of the commitment, but not necessarily according to the one to whom 
it is ascribed, is acknowledged as an expression of what the target of the ascription is committed 
to.” (p. 506)  
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from the experts would amount to acknowledging that what they have to say 
about these things reveals part of their hidden nature. In general, the Ryleans 
can conceive of people’s knowing and not-knowing (remembering or forget-
ting, slower or faster reasoning, etc.) as cases of better or limited (restored or 
degraded, slow or upgraded, etc.) access to the public world and the inferences 
that it licenses. The phrase ‘access to’ is extensional, yet the adverbial quali-
fiers make it partly intensional. Jonesian mindreading, that is to say, allows for 
understanding different points of view on a publically accessible world.
But at the same time, Jonesian mindreading cannot accommodate a wholly 
intensional conception of propositional attitudes either. The different ‘modes 
of presentation’ in terms of which interpreters make sense of each other must 
at least be compatible with their own ways of conceiving things. The disjunc-
tive constraint on their interpretation skills reveals itself as soon as a speaker 
makes a claim incompatible with public assessment. When this happens, the 
speaker can only be interpreted as either having failed to make a claim, or 
as indicating something about a mere counterfactual or imaginary scenario. 
The authoritative or persuasive speaker could of course try to indoctrinate her 
Rylean audience in order to cause them to change their views. But neither the 
speaker nor the audience could interpret the event as a case of discarding belief 
in light of new considerations. Jonesian mindreading does not allow for an 
understanding of incompatible views on the world ‘from the same point’, so to 
say. Genuine ascription of false beliefs is not an option. 
Jonesian mindreaders are blind to the subjective or private dimension 
of each other’s propositional attitudes. This deficit cannot be captured solely 
in terms of some or other concept of mental representation that the Ryleans 
would lack. Add any notion of representation to their mentalistic repertoire 
and their social understanding would still be confined to public evaluation. 
Nor can it be framed as a purely extensional understanding of each other’s 
propositionally articulated directedness towards the world. For in certain 
important respects, they could exhibit a nuanced appreciation of the inten-
sional aspects of each other’s propositional attitudes, in terms of degrees of 
epistemic access to the inferentially articulated public world. These traditional 
contrasts between representation and metarepresentation, extensionality and 
intensionality, de re and de dicto, all fail to capture the essential feature of the 
Ryleans’ social impairment: the inability to acknowledge that there is a private 
dimension to the public life of minds.75  
75 Brandom (1994, ch. 8) claims that the representational dimension of discursive practice 
can be explained by offering an account of the use of the de re/de dicto distinction in the attribution 
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Mastery of our mature concepts of belief and desire consists in the ca-
pacity to attribute subjective representational states. The relevant contrast is 
between relational mindreading and subjective representational mindreading. 
Psychologically, the difference lies in the information available for interpreta-
tion of someone’s world-directed attitudes. The disjunctive constraint on 
relational mindreading has it that a speaker’s utterance that p when in fact 
(according to the interpreter) not-p can either be interpreted as a failed attempt 
at claiming that not-p, or as a successful attempt at making the supposition that 
p. Relational mindreading does not enable the interpreter to regard the failed 
claim that not-p as a false claim that p, expressing the speaker’s false belief. 
In order to understand the utterance of a false sentence as the making of an 
empirical claim, one needs to take what is represented by the false sentence, 
i.e. some counterfactual scenario, as pertaining to the actual world. But this is 
impossible for the mere relational mindreader: not only is there nothing she 
can find in the actual world to relate the speaker to, but all that she could find 
there plainly contradicts what the speaker is saying. Contents incompatible 
with her take on things cannot be considered as the contents of world-directed 
attitudes, only as the contents of suppositional attitudes. 
Representational mindreading takes away this informational constraint: it 
enables the interpreter to incorporate information incompatible with public 
evaluation into the content clauses of other people’s world-directed attitudes. 
In our example, the representational mindreader can take the speaker’s suc-
cessful attempt at indicating the counterfactual scenario that p as a failed at-
tempt at claiming that not-p, thus turning it into the false claim that p. On this 
understanding, the speaker can succeed in performing a world-directed linguis-
tic act by talking about the counterfactual. What is represented by the speaker’s 
of commitments to others (cf. note 16). If my observation is correct, however, the mere use of this 
distinction does not evince a subjective understanding of other minds. According to Brandom, 
“…to grasp the representational content of [the] claims [of others] … is just mastering the social 
dimension of their inferential articulation – the way in which commitments undertaken against 
one doxastic background of further commitments available for use as auxiliary hypotheses can be 
taken up and made available as premises against a different doxastic background.” (p. 517) What 
I have been trying to show, is that the (educated) Ryleans, though oblivious to the subjective 
character of mental representation, did master this social dimension of the inferential articulation 
of the contents of each other’s (overt) mental states, but only insofar as the ‘doxastic backgrounds 
of further commitments’ against which to assess these states could be considered compatible with 
their own. Brandom’s analysis of representational locutions does not by itself account for the sub-
jective dimension of the practice of giving and asking for reasons. Brandom claims that “Beliefs and 
claims that are propositionally contentful are necessarily representationally contentful because their 
inferential articulation essentially involves a social dimension.” (ibid., p. 519, emphasis in original) 
On a subjective understanding of the notion of representation, I contend, this claim is false. The 
intersubjective dimension of discursive practice does not necessitate a subjective understanding of 
other minds on the part of the participants of that practice. 
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utterance, i.e. the counterfactual scenario that p, can now be considered as 
a successful expression of her personal take on what she ought to have said, 
i.e. that not-p. Criteria for private success in taking a stand towards the world 
become differentiated from the dictates of public oughts.
(A short not on terminology: Up to this point, I have been using the term 
‘representational mindreading’ to indicate non-relational interpretation of 
other people’s goals and reasons in terms of genuine (false) beliefs and (dis-
crepant) desires. In light of our present discussion, this may start to sound a 
little confusing. What I mean by the term, and have meant by it all along, is 
what I should now perhaps refer to as ‘subjective’ or ‘S-representational mind-
reading’. This explicitly distinguishes interpretation in terms of our mature, 
subjective concepts of belief and desire from second-order relational mind-
reading using some or other concept of mental representation. From here on, 
I shall therefore add this qualifier.)  
In light of the previous section, we can distinguish between two ways in 
which the ‘subjective shift’ from relational mindreading to S-representational 
mindreading can be accomplished: by adding a subjective dimension to (i) 
first-order relational states and (ii) second-order relational states. Suppose it is 
not raining but John believes it is. His (silent) utterance ‘It is raining’ can be re-
garded as an FR-representation, the function of which is to indicate conditions 
of rain (or some other kind of representation with the content ‘It is raining’). 
What is represented by John’s utterance ‘It is raining’ is the proposition that 
it is raining. But in the present circumstances, John ought to have said and 
thought that it is not raining. His representation of the world as the possible 
scenario in which it is raining misrepresents the fact that it is not raining. On 
this reading, then, what John’s representational state ‘thinking that p’ is about, 
a scenario in which p, is taken as John’s mistaken subjective view on what his 
thought ought to have been about: that not-p. The alternative is to replace 
the second-order state of ‘thinking that p’ by its first-order counterpart ‘p-to-
himself’. On this first-order reading of S-representational mindreading, what 
John’s ‘p-to-himself’ is directed at, a p-scenario, is regarded as his misrepresenta-
tion of what he ought to have been directed at: the fact that not-p. On both 
options, the shift to S-representational mindreading enables the interpreter to 
understand the agent’s assessment of the actual world in counterfactual terms, 
thereby adding a subjective dimension to the interpreter’s social understand-
ing. In general, the things the agent tries to accomplish (i.e. her goals) and 
the things that make them accomplishable and worth accomplishing (i.e. her 
reasons) can now be assessed from the agent’s personal point of view, as the 
things she intends to do out of her desires in light of the things she believes. 
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The two options for S-representational mindreading are presented in figure 1. 
Relational mindreading S-representational mindreading
First-order State attributed to A:
‘being-directed-at’ 
 goal/reason
Subjective shift: 
‘being-directed-at’ 
 goal/reason
 as conceived by A
Second-order Relational ascent:
‘being-in-a-state-about’…    
 (e.g. FRR-state)
 goal/reason
Relational ascent/subjective shift: 
‘being-in-a-state-about’…  
 (e.g. FRR-state)
 goal/reason
 as conceived by A
Figure 1: relational ascent and subjective shift
In chapter 3.3 I hinted at an ambiguity in our use of the notion of mental 
representation, an ambiguity that stands in the way of genuine appreciation 
of the social predicaments of the post-Jonesian Ryleans. I explained that the 
Ryleans already had a concept of mental representation before Jones came 
along, a concept that Jones relied on in teaching them his new theory, i.e. the 
FR-notion. Yet this notion of mental representation did not enable them to go 
beyond the public confines of relational mindreading. It did not enable them 
to enter the private dimension of other minds through S-representational 
mindreading. What we have seen in this section, is that this ambiguity in the 
notion of mental representation does not so much lie in the fact that there 
are two kinds of mental representation that, when conflated, render the term 
ambiguous. Rather, it has to do with the fact that we often add a subjective 
element to whatever kind of mental representation we are talking about, and 
that we do so without realizing it. Now that we have made this subjective 
dimension explicit, it should become easier to at least appreciate the possibility 
that there lies fault in the habit of projecting our sophisticated understanding 
of folk psychological practice in terms of beliefs and desires onto ordinary 
goal-reason psychology (see chapter 2.5). For now that we see that the concept 
of mental representation simpliciter does not entail the subjective character of 
our mature concepts of belief and desire, it should become apparent that it is 
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at least conceptually possible that the two might come apart, and hence, that 
framing commonsense goal-reason psychology exclusively in terms of belief-
desire psychology may indeed be a fallacy. 
4.5 Conclusion
In chapter 1 I identified two challenges for the Relational Model of folk psy-
chology: to show that the distinction between attributing relational propo-
sitional attitudes and attributing S-representational propositional attitudes, 
i.e. the distinction between relational mindreading and S-representational 
mindreading, is 1) conceptually valid and 2) empirically robust. We are now 
in a position to meet the first challenge. The distinction made in section 3 
between first-order and second-order mental states enabled us to conceive 
of relational mindreading outside of the functionalist framework of Jones’s 
theory. Relational states may be construed as second-order states, but they 
need not. Thus we were able to incorporate the accounts of Ratliffe, Perner and 
Gordon, all of which seem to endorse a non-representational account of our 
default understanding of each other’s goals and reasons. This already strongly 
suggested that the concept of relational mindreading does not depend on 
one’s specific views about the nature of the mental states attributed. The dif-
ferentiation into an intersubjective/public and a subjective/private treatment 
of mental representation in section 4 furthermore revealed that no concept of 
mental representation, functionalist or otherwise, by itself entails the subjec-
tive element of our mature understanding of belief and desire. Taken together, 
I contend, this goes a long way toward establishing the conceptual validity of 
the distinction between (the attribution of) relational and S-representational 
propositional attitudes. If the distinction turns out to be compatible with all 
influential philosophical treatments of the propositional attitude concepts, 
then accepting it as philosophically sound will not beg any important ques-
tions to any one of these accounts. And so, everyone should take the idea of at-
tributing relational propositional attitudes seriously as an empirical possibility.
We have reached the turning point of this book. For now that we have met 
the first challenge and have established the conceptual coherence of relational 
mindreading, the next question is whether we should indeed expect it to be a 
practically robust phenomenon in folk psychological practice. This will be the 
topic of the next chapter.  
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Appendix: Ascent Routines
The discussion of relational ascent in section 3 may have reminded some 
readers of Gordon’s ascent routines for propositional attitude ascription (1995, 
1996, 2000b, 2007). There are two important differences, however. First, the 
performance of an ascent routine, unlike relational ascent, is not a form of 
genuine semantic ascent. Second, Gordon appeals to ascent routines in order 
to explain propositional attitude ascription within the context of his ‘radical’ 
version of the Simulation Theory (e.g. 1996). The notion of relational ascent, 
by contrast, has been developed independently of any simulationist considera-
tions. This appendix briefly elaborates on these points. 
Suppose someone asks you whether you believe it is raining. Rather than 
introspecting your mind in search of some experiential mark of belief or exam-
ining your recent behavior in light of a psychological theory, Gordon suggests 
that what you normally do, is simply recast the mentalistic question ‘Do you 
believe it is raining?’ as the object-level question ‘Is it raining?’ To answer that 
question, you might e.g. try to recall your last glimpse of the world outside, a 
few minutes ago. If the answer to this meteorological question is affirmative, 
you are probably prepared to step up a level and say ‘Yes, I believe it is rain-
ing’. On Gordon’s account, self-reports of mental states are accomplished by 
procedures “that allow one to answer a question about oneself, and specifically 
about one’s mental states, by answering a question that is not about oneself, nor 
about mental states at all…” (2000b, 111, emphasis in original) The general 
idea, Gordon explains, is “that we coordinate one type of verbal behavior, 
self-reports of a mental state or episode, with another, the outward-looking 
“expression” of the state or episode.” (ibid., pp. 111-112)
Gordon appeals to ascent routines in order to explain the reliability of 
self-ascriptions of mental states, and to do so without relying on introspection 
or invoking a folk psychological theory (see especially Gordon 2007).76 The 
idea is that caregivers train children to use the correct attitudinal prefix when 
they express their mental states. In the case of desire, for example, they train 
the child to use ‘I want…’ when her behavior clearly indicates that she wants 
something, reinforcing its use by satisfying her desire when she expresses it 
correctly. Ascent routines do not explain mastery of the relevant propositional 
attitude concepts, however. One could teach a child who lacked the concept of 
belief to add the prefix ‘I belief that’ to her utterances whenever she makes an 
76 Gordon also uses his ascent routine account to explain so-called ‘Moorean paradoxes’ – see 
footnote 62. 
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assertion. Although that would make her a good indicator of her own beliefs, 
it would not turn her into a self-ascriber of beliefs. Similarly, children who 
are reinforced to say e.g. ‘I hope that p’ when they hope that p thereby do not 
automatically self-ascribe the hope that p. The mere performance of an ascent 
routine therefore does not result in genuine semantic ascent, a move from ex-
pressing one’s thoughts to conceiving of one’s thoughts as such and in this sense 
meaningfully talking about them. Only someone who has already mastered 
the propositional attitude concepts can understand ascent routines as a form 
of semantic ascent. 
On Gordon’s radical version of the Simulation Theory, mastery of the 
propositional attitude concepts depends on simulation; it requires that the 
relevant ascent routines be embedded within a simulation of the person to whom 
the attitudes are ascribed. Recall that on Gordon’s understanding of simula-
tion, simulating another person requires that I imaginatively transform myself 
into the other and ‘look out’ onto the world from his perspective (section 2). 
The capacity for imaginative transformation into other ‘first-persons’ ensures 
that the ascent routine method for making self-reports is also applicable for 
ascribing propositional attitudes to others. As concerns belief ascription, for ex-
ample, Gordon explains: “Whether in my own person or within a simulation 
of O, I can settle the question, “Do I believe that p?” by asking […] whether it 
is the case that p […] To ascribe to O a belief that p is to assert that p within 
the context of a simulation of O.” (1995, p. 60) In general, ascription of a 
propositional attitude to another person consists in expression of the attitude 
within the context of a simulation of that person. Carrying out the relevant 
ascent routines then enables the interpreter to explicitly mark the simulated 
attitude as the attitude of the person simulated.77 
Ascent routines thus take us from the world as simulated to the attitude 
of the simulated other, not from an ascribed first-order attitude to an ascrip-
tion of a second-order attitude. On Gordon’s account, comprehending other-
77 It is an interesting question how exactly one is supposed to get from expressing an attitude 
in the context of a simulation of another person to ascribing the attitude to the other. Gordon says 
very little about this. Does it require ‘shifting back’ to one’s own egocentric frame of reference 
again, so as to relate the agent, now perceived from one’s own point of view, to the attitudinal 
objects identified through simulation?  Notice that ascent routines cannot provide the answer here; 
they only account for the reliability of (simulated) self-ascription, not for whatever psychological 
skills are involved in genuine other-ascription. Given this restricted role for ascent routines on 
Gordon’s account, what is their practical use? It seems they serve the mere communicative purpose 
of labeling the descriptions of the world yielded through simulation as pertaining to the point of 
view of the simulated other. The need for such explicit allocation of views is especially acute when 
the simulated attitudes differ from one’s own, as in the case of false belief ascription. Cf. Dancy’s 
(2000, pp. 128-130) ‘appositional account’ of reason explanations citing the agent’s beliefs (see 
appendix chapter 2).  
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ascription of propositional attitudes results in a first-order understanding of 
the attitude ascribed. Suppose I wonder why my colleague has still not left 
the office. Having recentered my egocentric map onto my colleague in im-
agination, I ‘look out’ onto the world from his perspective and use my own 
response mechanisms and practical reasoning skills to identify the relevant 
reason-constituting facts and ensuing intentions. Suppose I find myself hav-
ing the simulated object-level thoughts ‘it’s raining’, expressing the other’s 
knowledge of the fact that it is raining, and ‘let’s wait a while’, expressing the 
other’s intention to wait for it to stop raining. Carrying out the relevant ascent 
routines then allows me to express the simulated ‘it is raining’ and ‘let’s wait 
a while’ as the other’s decision to wait a while for the reason that it is raining. 
The products of these ascent routines are best captured, it seems, as ‘it is rain-
ing’ resp. ‘let’s wait a while’ from his point of view, i.e. as the first-order states ‘it 
is raining’(O) and a ‘let’s wait a while’(O) (see section 3). 
Note, as a final point, that Gordon’s ascent routine method can be applied 
to both relational mindreading and S-representational mindreading. In the 
case of factive reason explanation, simulating the other only requires minor 
adjustment to one’s egocentric map. Suppose I see someone running to catch a 
bus. The reason why she’s running is the fact that the bus is about to leave. But 
to interpret this fact as her reason requires, on Gordon’s story, that I approach 
that fact from her point of view, recentering in imagination my egocentric 
map onto hers. Performing an ascent routine for the implied relational state 
of knowledge would then allow me to say explicitly that she is aware of the 
fact that the bus is leaving. In the case of false belief ascription, much more 
drastic adjustments are needed to successfully simulate the other. In particular, 
it requires that I go beyond the context of the shared world, replacing the facts 
where necessary with the other’s subjective beliefs. Yet, once the appropri-
ate adjustments have been made, explicit ascription of belief is just a sim-
ple matter of performing the appropriate ascent routine. By itself, the ascent 
routine method does not distinguish between relational and representational 
mindreading. 
On Gordon’s account, the difference between relational and 
S-representational mindreading is a difference in the context of simulation. 
Relational mindreading merely requires that I simulate an egocentric change 
in spatial (and/or temporal) coordinates; representational mindreading addi-
tionally demands a modification of some of the facts (cf. Gordon 1992/1995). 
It is a matter of looking out onto the public world from the other’s point of 
view versus adopting the other’s personal, divergent view on the public world. 
As will become clear in the next chapter, this difference in the context of 
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simulation on Gordon’s account applies more generally to other dominant ac-
counts of mindreading, as a difference in the context of interpretation, however 
accomplished.
R
elational, R
epresentational, S
ubjective
5_ 
Making Sense in a 
Common World
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 introduced the technical notion of relational mindreading by ex-
ploiting Sellars’s functionalist treatment of the propositional attitude con-
cepts. Chapter 4 then revealed that the idea of relational mindreading is not 
wedded to any particular account of the propositional attitudes concepts. The 
general idea of ‘high-level’ mindreading, i.e. the attribution of propositional 
attitudes to agents when making sense of their thoughts and actions (see 
chapter 2.5), allows for both a (first- or second-order) relational and subjective 
(S)-representational reading. Together, chapters 3 and 4 rose to the first chal-
lenge laid out for the Relational Model of folk psychology and established the 
conceptual validity of the distinction between (the attribution of) relational 
and S-representational propositional attitudes. But is the distinction between 
relational mindreading and S-representational mindreading also empirically 
valid? That is: does the distinction actually make a difference in our day-to-day 
interactions with one another? Does it provide us with an accurate descrip-
tive tool for modeling human discursive engagements? This was the second 
challenge set for the Relational Model in chapter 1, and it will be taken on in 
this chapter and the next. In this chapter, the focus lies on the importance 
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of relational mindreading in our actual daily encounters with one another. 
In chapter 6, attention will shift towards the complementary functions of 
S-representational mindreading in human discursive practice. 
Thus the aim of this chapter is to show why, in addition to being a philo-
sophically sophisticated notion, relational mindreading is also a practically ro-
bust phenomenon of human intersubjectivity. In section 2, I continue where 
I left off in the previous chapter. I show how the distinction between (second-
order) relational mindreading and S-representational mindreading can also be 
made on dominant sub-personal, explanatory accounts of mindreading: the 
‘scientific’ Theory Theory proposed by Gopnik and colleagues (e.g. Gopnik 
and Meltzoff 1997), the modular approach to theory of mind as put forward 
by Leslie and co-workers (e.g. Leslie et al. 2005), Nichols’ and Stich’s (2003) 
hybrid account, Goldman’s (2006) introspectionist Simulation Theory and 
the so-called ‘two-systems approaches’ to human social cognition that have 
recently been developed. I conclude that the psychological plausibility of re-
lational mindreading is not undermined by considerations regarding the na-
ture of the cognitive processes involved. The Relational Model is neutral with 
respect to the cognitive implementation of mindreading; it does not preclude 
any dominant account found in the current literature, nor does it commit 
itself to any bold claims about the cognitive underpinnings of human social 
cognition. 
Section 3 focuses on two problems that haunt the BD-Model of folk 
psychology: the so-called ‘holism problem’ and what I shall term the ‘know-
ledge problem’. The holism problem is the problem of underdetermination 
of propositional attitude ascription in quotidian social contexts. I show why 
attempts to solve the holism problem from within the framework of the BD-
Model are either psychologically implausible or question begging with respect 
to the Relational Model. More importantly, I show how the Relational Model 
dissolves the holism problem by taking a different perspective on the ex-
planandum of human discursive understanding. I then direct attention to the 
fundamental role of knowledge attribution in the interpretation of others. The 
attribution of knowledge can easily be accounted for on the Relational Model, 
but it poses a significant challenge to the BD-Model. In short, the BD-Model 
seems to have no other option than to explain attribution of knowledge as 
the ascription of a special kind of true belief. But it is notoriously difficult to 
give a satisfactory analysis of knowledge in terms of true belief. And it is seri-
ously doubtful whether any such analysis will give us a realistic model of the 
psychology of commonsense knowledge attribution.
In section 4 I discuss the work of several philosophers who have recently 
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stressed the regulative function of folk psychology (e.g. McGeer 2007, Hutto 
2008a, Zawidzki 2008). Propositional attitude attribution, they argue, plays a 
crucial role in regulating each other’s behavior so as to meet our interpretative 
needs. I place this insight in the light of the ontogeny of mindreading and 
re-interpret it as making a good case for the importance of relational mind-
reading in teaching our children the do’s and don’ts of common practice. In 
particular, I show how Hutto’s (2008a) ‘Narrative Practice Hypothesis’ (NPH) 
provides a clear example of the way in which young children could benefit 
from relational mindreading when taking their first steps into the space of 
reasons.  
After having established the practical virtues of relational mindreading in 
our everyday encounters with one another, we should also pay attention to its 
shortcomings. Relational mindreading only works to the extent that we have 
a practical worldview in common. Section 5 explores two ways in which com-
mon practice can be extended beyond the strict confines of agential similarity. 
Relational mindreading allows for specification of goals and reasons relative 
to point of view and socio-cultural characteristics. It does not, however, have 
the means to account for individual differences that go beyond public agree-
ment. The social benefits of such private understanding of other minds will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
5.2 Relational Mindreading on All Accounts
Many philosophers and psychologists think that our commonsense psychol-
ogy defines propositional attitudes as representational mental states. This 
has generally been taken to imply that our ordinary understanding of one 
another as being intentionally directed at propositionally articulated goals 
and reasons is a form of mature belief-desire psychology. The previous chapter 
revealed that this does not follow. An understanding of the mental representa-
tion relation simpliciter does not entail a subjective understanding of what is 
represented. Once this is appreciated, it is possible to tease out the difference 
between relational and S-representational mindreading even on accounts that 
explicitly adopt the BD-Model. Importantly, most of these accounts have been 
presented in the literature as explanatory accounts of mindreading, directed at 
the sub-personal level of social cognition. The Relational Model, by contrast, 
is primarily a descriptive account directed at an important explanandum of 
human intersubjectivity. By isolating a relational conception of the explana-
tory posits of mentioned sub-personal accounts, however, it becomes vividly 
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clear that the Relational Model of human discursive engagement is prima facie 
compatible with all existing accounts of goal-reason attribution in the current 
literature, whether targeted at the personal, descriptive or the sub-personal, ex-
planatory level of social cognition. And this, in turn, should erase any remain-
ing skepticism concerning the cognitive feasibility of relational mindreading. 
Our discussion of Sellars’s Myth of Jones in chapter 3 has already opened 
the door to an alternative interpretation of the Theory Theory, according to 
which the central posits in our folk psychological theory are relational mental 
states. As we have seen, this interpretation also throws a different light on 
Lewis’s (1972) influential account of analytic functionalism, an account which 
adopted “the working hypothesis that [Sellars’s] myth is a good myth”, i.e. 
that “our names of mental states do in fact mean just what they would mean 
if the myth were true.” (p. 213) Armed with the distinctions made chapter 
4.3, we could say that TT naturally invites a second-order reading of relational 
mindreading: the posits of our folk psychological theory are FRR-states, the 
occupants of functional roles defined in terms of perceptual input (entry 
transitions), behavioral output (exit transitions) and each other (inferential 
transitions). 
The shift towards S-representational mindreading would then consist in 
adding a subjective dimension to the functionally classified world-directed 
attitudes attributed. Along Lewisian lines, we could speculate that this is ac-
complished by imaginatively placing the world-directed attitudes attributed in 
an ‘near possible world’, such that the functional classifications of the states 
attributed to the agent in the actual world mirror the entry/inference/exit 
transitions of the relational states the agent would (and ought to) have had 
in this possible world. Accordingly, ascription of the false belief that p to an 
agent would require that one conceive of the agent’s actual state as a relational 
attitude of belief in a near possible world in which p, and then ‘project’ this 
possible world onto the actual world in which the belief that p is ascribed, 
yielding the agent’s personal view on the world, an ‘agent-centered possible 
world’ (Quine 1969; Lewis 1979) according to which p.78 
78 This comes close to the idea Dennett (1987, ch. 5) expressed in terms of a ‘notional at-
titude psychology’, a variety of the intentional stance according to which we attribute ‘notional 
attitudes’ to one another, attitudes that relate an agent to a ‘notional world’. The idea of a notional 
world is the idea of an agent-centered fictional world, of “a model […] of one’s internal representa-
tions.” This model, Dennett explains, “does not consist itself of representations but of representeds. It 
is the world “I live in,” not the world of representations in me.” (p. 154, emphasis in original) On 
this proposal, the shift to representational mindreading would consist in a shift from attributing 
strictly relational attitudes in interpreting someone’s world-directed behavior, to attributing mere 
‘notional’ attitudes. 
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Thus we can construe a TT-account of belief-desire psychology on which 
the folk psychological theory itself is entirely framed in (second-order) relation-
al terms, and on which overcoming the informational constraint of relational 
mindreading is explained in terms of the application of the relational theory 
in a counterfactual context of interpretation. Addition of the required subjec-
tive dimension for belief-desire psychology would consist in applying one’s 
relational theory of mind to imagined possible scenarios the interpreter pro-
jects onto the actual situation of the interpreted agent. But on such construal, 
one would expect that the relational theory could often simply be applied 
‘extensionally’ in the actual world, i.e. without taking into account the ‘agent-
centered possible world’ that informs the agent’s behavior in the actual world. 
Interpretation of other people’s world-directed attitudes would be strictly re-
lational by default; agent-centered possible scenarios would be called upon 
especially when relational interpretation runs aground.  
It seems these considerations directly apply to the empirist, ‘scientific’ 
versions of TT. Recall from chapter 2.3 that scientific TT holds that our folk 
psychological theory is acquired in much the same way as real scientific theo-
ries develop, i.e. by means of theory construction and revision, underpinned 
by domain general learning mechanisms rather than innate modules devoted 
to mindreading.  Our alleged folk psychological theory is also thought to show 
important structural similarities to real cognitive-scientific theory, consisting 
of tacitly but explicitly represented knowledge of the causal generalizations 
linking mental states to input, output and other mental states (e.g. Gopnik 
and Wellman 1992; 1994; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). As indicated in chapter 
3.5, this proposal invites an interpretation according to which this quasi-scien-
tific folk psychological theory is an explicit version of the theory Jones taught 
the Ryleans. On this reading, the theoretical posits of our folk psychological 
theory would be FRR-states. Gopnik et al. are not specific about the nature of 
the representational states that are supposed to figure on our mature repre-
sentational theory of mind. But whatever notion of mental representation is 
involved, it seems a perfectly coherent option that qua functionally defined 
theoretical concept, it can be deployed without addition of the subjective di-
mension required for representational mindreading. 
In the debate on mindreading, it is often argued that our default interpre-
tation strategy is to attribute our own beliefs to others. Leslie et al. (2005) are 
particularly clear about this: 
A true-belief default is ecologically valid because, at least about mundane 
matters, people’s beliefs usually are true. We can go a little further than 
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this. For a basic belief-attributing system—one whose business concerns 
simple everyday beliefs—the true-belief attribution ought to be the de-
fault. This is because, in the absence of specific information, the only 
general constraint on belief attribution is provided by the state of the 
world (as it appears to the attributer). (pp. 48-49, emphasis in original) 
In similar fashion, Nichols and Stich (2003) point out that  “people are very 
good at attributing beliefs to others even in cases where they have no apparent 
evidence.” (p. 69). They explain this in terms of a process of ‘default belief 
attribution’ in which the interpreter lets her own beliefs enter into her model 
of the interpretative target’s beliefs. Now, before having a closer look at Leslie’s 
and Nichols and Stich’s respective proposals, it should be noted that we could 
easily explain default true belief attribution in terms of default attribution of 
the relational attitude of ‘belief’.79 In fact, Leslie’s et al. remark in the quote 
above, that “in the absence of specific information, the only general constraint 
on belief attribution is provided by the state of the world,” readily suggests a 
relational understanding of the default attribution of shared beliefs. If, in the 
absence of specific information, we are supposed to interpret other people’s 
behavior in terms of the state of the world, then why couldn’t the beliefs we 
attribute by default be states that simply relate the agent to the state of the 
world?  
On Leslie’s modular account of mindreading (see also Leslie and Thaiss 
1992, Leslie 1994, Leslie and Polizzi 1998, Scholl and Leslie 1999, Leslie et al. 
2004), our mindreading abilities are subserved by two central mechanisms: 
an innate modular ‘theory of mind mechanism’ (ToMM) and a non-modular 
‘selection processor’ (SP), which develops through first few years of life. ToMM 
incorporates innate concepts of propositional attitudes such as belief and de-
sire and its job is to spontaneously infer form observed behavior candidate 
contents for the mental states to be attributed to the agent. SP is supposed 
to select among competing candidates those contents that best fit all the 
evidence, including e.g. the agent’s past behavior, his whereabouts, etc. As 
Scholl and Leslie (1999) make clear, “ToMM always makes the current situa-
tion available as a possible and even preferred content, because (a) the current 
situation is a truer picture of the world, and (b) beliefs tend to be true.” (p. 147) 
Ascribing false beliefs “requires this default interpretation to be inhibited by 
SP, so that the weaker [less salient] false content be selected.” (ibid.)  
79 That is: a state of common knowledge. See section 5.3.
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Now why should we assume that the contents that ToMM generates al-
ways include counterfactual contents, contents that are incompatible with 
the interpreter’s own beliefs? In many standard social situations, it seems, 
there are simply no such counterfactual possibilities available to be automati-
cally inferred by ToMM. Consider seeing someone hiding for the rain under 
a tree. He hides under the tree because (he believes) it is raining. Even when 
we consciously think about the situation, it may be hard to come up with an 
alternative explanation as to why he stands under the tree. It seems implau-
sible that, unconsciously, ToMM actually provides several. I see no reason, 
then, to concur with Leslie et al. (2005) that, according to their own account, 
“The typical mode of operation (MO) of ToMM is to offer more than one can-
didate content for a mental state attribution.” (p. 49, emphasis added) And 
even if ToMM does infer more than one candidate content for the belief to 
be attributed, these contents will often be reflecting the real situation as as-
sessed by the interpreter. Perhaps the man is hiding behind the tree because 
he believes the two policemen over there are looking for him. Here we have 
two competing contents for the belief to be attributed in order to explain the 
man’s behavior. But why couldn’t SP here be selecting between two relational 
‘beliefs’? ToMM is supposed to be a ‘metarepresentational’ device (Leslie 1987, 
1994), but as we have seen in chapter 4.4, metarepresentational interpretation 
does not automatically amount to S-representational mindreading. Whatever 
concept of representation ToMM is supposed to incorporate, it seems it can 
be deployed without the subjective dimension required for S-representational 
mindreading. 
One could speculate that ToMM operates under the disjunctive constraint 
outlined earlier (see chapter 4.4), inferring either world-directed states with 
content that reflects the real situation or suppositional states with counterfac-
tual contents. It would then be SP’s job to inhibit, in false belief conditions, 
true contents and select the counterfactual contents as the contents of the 
target’s world-directed attitudes, thus marking it as the target’s subjective rep-
resentational state. When ToMM does not pass counterfactual contents on to 
SP, the latter would issue a mere relational understanding of the interpreted 
agent.80 
On Nichols and Stich’s account of third-person mindreading (2003), the 
80 Cf. Doherty’s (2009, pp. 51-54) discussion of Leslie’s ToMM/SP account. He suggests a 
reading on which ToMM only comes with the concept of ‘prelief’ (Perner et al. 1994, Perner 1995), 
leaving full-blown ‘theory of mind’ reasoning to SP. As indicated in section 4.3, interpreting others 
in terms of ‘preliefs’ would be an instance of relational mindreading, also subject to the disjunctive 
constraint. 
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mindreader builds a model of the interpretative target in what they call her 
‘possible world box’ (PWB), a workspace “in which our cognitive system builds 
and temporarily stores representations of one or another possible world.” (p. 
28) The PWB, in other words, is a device for hypothetical reasoning, using 
the same inference mechanisms that are used for the formation of real beliefs 
(cf. p. 85). In order to explain default belief attribution, they hypothesize that 
“when the PWB gets co-opted for mindreading, all of the mindreader’s own 
beliefs are included in the model of the target’s beliefs that is being built in the 
PWB.” (p. 85) 
The first thing to notice here is that this explanation of default belief at-
tribution appears to be slightly at odds with their own characterization of the 
PWB as containing token representations whose job “is not to represent the 
world as it is or as we’d like it to be, but rather to represent what the world 
would be like given some set of assumptions that we neither believe to be true nor 
want to be true.” (p. 28, emphasis added) For default belief attribution ensures 
that the model of the target’s beliefs is a model of the world as the interpreter 
believes it to be. What Nichols and Stich mean, is that only the contents of 
the mindreader’s belief are by default transferred to the PWB, dissociating 
them from their normal functional role in guiding the interpreter through the 
world. Still, that does not imply that in the case of default belief attribution, 
the model of the target should be anything other than a model of the actual 
world, i.e. a copy of the interpreter’s own assessment of the world. There ap-
pears to be no reason why this model of the interpretative target’s belief should 
be marked as a possible world considered by the target as actual. It would seem 
to suffice to merely mark it as the target’s model of the actual world. If so, our 
default belief attribution strategy comes close to the idea expressed in chapter 
4.4, i.e. of conceiving of other people’s minds as models, pictures or maps of 
reality. But as we have seen, merely adding a pictorial intermediary to the 
target’s relation to the world does not amount to an appreciation of the target’s 
subjective view on the world. The beliefs attributed by means of default belief 
attribution would be relational ‘beliefs’, not subjective representational beliefs. 
So in the case of default belief attribution, why couldn’t the interpreter 
simply build a model of the target’s belief in her ‘actual world box’, i.e. her 
‘belief box’? She would simply use her own inference mechanisms on her 
own beliefs and let the contents enter into the model of the target’s beliefs. 
Crucially, the model would not be marked as a model of a possible, and pos-
sibly counterfactual, world. Nichols and Stich’s PWB would be left out the 
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interpretative loop in these standard cases of default belief attribution.81 The 
PWB would only be called upon for belief attribution when and insofar as 
‘discrepant belief attribution mechanisms’ (p. 87 ff.) kick in. When discrepant 
beliefs are detected, the PWB could work out the consequences of those beliefs 
and feed those back into the default model of the target in the interpreter’s 
belief box. The interpreter’s inference mechanisms would then ensure that the 
model of the target’s beliefs remains consistent and that some of the interpret-
er’s own beliefs copied into the model of the target get ‘erased’ and supplanted 
by the incompatible beliefs worked out in the PWB. The interpreter’s model 
of the target’s beliefs would be a model of the actual world modified only to 
the relevant extent in order to allow for discrepant beliefs. To that extent, the 
model of the target’s beliefs would be marked as a model of a counterfactual 
world, considered by the target as actual, i.e. as the target’s subjective beliefs 
of the world. 
On both Leslie’s and Nichols and Stich’s account, then, we can understand 
default belief attribution as consisting in the attribution of relational beliefs, 
and hence as an instance of relational mindreading. The conclusions we drew 
from Sellars’s myth of Jones thus not only apply to strictly theoretical render-
ings of FP, such as scientific TT. Also on the modular account of Leslie et al., 
as well as the hybrid account of Nichols and Stich, a relational dimension of 
mindreading is easily incorporated. 
The same goes for Goldman’s account of the Simulation Theory (e.g. 
2006). On Goldman’s account, third-person action prediction proceeds by 1) 
pretending to be in the other person’s situation, i.e. ‘putting oneself in the 
other’s shoes’, 2) using one’s own resources for practical reasoning in order to 
figure out what one would do in that situation, 3) introspectively classifying 
the pretend-output as one’s intention or decision to perform a certain action 
in the pretend scenario, and finally 4) attributing that decision in non-pretend 
mode to the interpretative target. The simulationist aspect of Goldman’s pro-
posal lies in the central role played by the interpreter’s own practical reason-
ing system, fed by pretend beliefs and desires. However, Goldman allows for 
elements of TT to enter into the overall story. Theoretical resources may be 
required to figure out the right kind of pretend input, i.e. which pretend beliefs 
and desires to feed into one’s own practical reasoning system. 
But making such theoretical inferences would be unnecessary in standard 
cases in which one simulates under the assumption that other people share 
one’s own beliefs and desires. In these cases of ‘default belief and desire at-
81 Cf. Nichols and Stich (2003), figure 3.5 and 3.6 (pp. 93-94). 
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tribution’, a description of the actual situation of the target would suffice: 
one could simply feed that description into one’s offline practical reasoning 
system and see what happens. On Goldman’s story, the outputs generated by 
the interpreter’s offline practical reasoning system are classified as mental state 
kinds by means of introspection. Thus, in the case of action prediction, one 
would find oneself in the pretend scenario thinking to oneself ‘let’s do a!’ 
and subsequently classifying this as one’s pretend-decision to perform action 
a. Then one performs an analogical inference from oneself to the other and 
judges that the other will decide to perform action a. As long as the inter-
preter simulates under the basic assumption of a shared take on the world, it 
seems unnecessary that anywhere along the simulation route, the interpreter 
conceives of her own mental states as subjective representational states. The 
pretend decision can simply be classified as a (second-order) relational state 
of ‘being in a pretend state of intending to do a’. Goldman thinks that in-
trospection proceeds by recognizing an ‘introspective code’ or ‘I-code’ (2006, 
pp. 260-264) that is attached to the pretend-output generated by the practical 
reasoning system. He identifies three possible dimensions or parameters the 
I-codes might have: the doxastic/credal dimension, the preference or valence 
dimension and the bodily feeling dimension (p. 261). None of these dimen-
sions include the particularly subjective dimension that would be involved in 
first-person S-representational mindreading. In other words, one could easily 
maintain, on Goldman’s story, that the interpreter observes herself simply as 
being related to a (pretend) situation, rather than as having a particular or pe-
culiar view on the (pretend) situation. Through analogical inference, it would 
by such relational states that are attributed to the simulated agent. 
The same line of reasoning can be applied to Goldman’s story about expla-
nation of actions already preformed in terms of beliefs and desires. Goldman 
dismisses the idea that the practical reasoning system can work backwards, 
from intentions to the beliefs and desires that generated it. Instead, he pro-
poses to approach this kind of ‘retrodictive’ mindreading via a generate-and-
test strategy (2006, pp. 183-185). On Goldman’s introspectionist version of ST, 
this is supposed to work as follows. The interpreter asks herself why she would 
perform or have performed the particular action under consideration, were she 
to be or have been in the target’s situation. She then generates certain possible 
candidate pretend states and runs these through her offline practical reasoning 
system. If the resulting pretend decision matches the observed action of the 
target, she attributes the generated states to the target, again through intro-
spective classification and analogical inference. If the pretend decision doesn’t 
match, she tries again with other candidate states, until she hits upon an out-
M
aking S
ense in a C
om
m
on W
orld
126
put that does match. Goldman suggests that the hypothesis generation part 
of the ‘generate and test strategy’ might be mediated by theory, perhaps with 
the help of prior simulations. The test part of the strategy would essentially be 
a simulation process. 
Again, we should realize that in default cases of action explanation, the 
pretend situation generated to run one’s simulation on may simply mirror the 
actual situation of the world (at present or in the recent past) according to the 
interpreter’s own assessment. The states attributed upon finding a match could 
be classified as relational states of belief and desire, which upon attribution to 
the target would be conceived as relating the agent to her goals and reasons 
for action. Even if one wishes to hold, as Goldman seems to do, that hypo- 
thesis generation is mediated by theory, we should allow for the possibility 
that the states issued by the theory are (second-order) relational states. So it 
seems that, also on Goldman’s introspectionist Simulation Theory, there is 
room for a relational dimension of third-person mindreading. 
As a last illustration of the feasibility of relational mindreading at the sub-
personal, explanatory level, consider the so-called ‘two-systems approaches’ 
to human social cognition that have recently been proposed in the literature 
(e.g. Carruthers 2006, Goldman 2006, Apperly and Butterfill 2009, Apperly 
2011). Many theorists these days make a distinction between low-level social 
cognition and high-level social cognition. As explained in chapter 2.5, the 
distinction between low- and high-level can be applied to 1) the nature of the 
cognitive process underlying the socio-cognitive activity (fast, efficient, inflex-
ible, involuntary and subconscious versus slow, effortful, flexible, voluntary 
and conscious) and 2) to the nature of the states tracked by that activity (sim-
ple, observable states tracking specific types of behavior versus sophisticated, 
unobservable states with only tenuous, holistic connections to behavioral 
types). The general idea of two-systems approaches is that our socio-cognitive 
abilities are underpinned by two separate cognitive systems: one for low-level 
and one for high-level social cognition. On most proposals, the system that 
operates at a low, i.e. fast, efficient, inflexible, etc. level is also the system dedi-
cated to tracking low-level states. Here we can think of the detection of simple 
goal-directed behavior (e.g. Gergely and Csibra 2003), face-based emotion re-
cognition (e.g. Goldman 2006) or the tracking of non-propositional, belief-like 
states (Apperly and Butterfill 2009). The system that operates at the high, i.e. 
slow, effortful, flexible, etc. level is required for interpretation in terms of high-
level states, paradigmatically the propositional attitudes. This two systems ap-
proach for social cognition is all but ad hoc from the point of view of cognitive 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It has been successfully applied to 
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explain performance in other cognitive domains, e.g. on number cognition 
tasks (see Apperly and Butterfill 2009 for an overview). 
The point of bringing this up is that one may be tempted into thinking 
that, according the abovementioned hypothesis, the Relational model should 
now postulate three systems: one low-level system for tracking low-level states 
and two high-level systems for tracking relational propositional attitudes and 
S-representational attitudes, respectively. This is a rather bold empirical claim 
about the sub-personal implementation basis of human social cognition, a 
claim that certainly deserves to be met with a healthy dose of skepticism. And 
as far as I know, there is no empirical support from other domains of hu-
man cognition for such ‘three systems approach.’ From this perspective, then, 
the Relational Model is empirically unattractive. Better stick to one system for 
high-level social cognition and disregard the conceptual distinction between 
relational and S-representational high-level mindreading as psychologically or 
cognitively invalid. 
This worry about cognitive implementation would be well grounded if the 
Relational Model indeed implied two separate cognitive systems for proposi-
tional attitude attribution. But it does not. As I explained in chapter 4.3, the 
psychological difference between relational and S-representational mindread-
ing lies in the information available for interpreting another person’s world-
directed attitudes. S-representational mindreading takes away the disjunctive 
constraint on relational mindreading and allows information incompatible 
with the interpreter’s own assessment and appraisal of the world to figure in 
the content clauses of the world-directed attitudes attributed to others. The 
switch from relational to S-representational interpretation makes a substantial 
difference from a folk-psychological point of view (see chapter 6). In the present 
context, however, it is worth stressing that as a cognitive difference, it does not 
invite any grand claims about sub-personal architecture. Quite plausibly rela-
tional mindreading and S-representational mindreading use much the same 
cognitive resources, whatever they turn out to be. The only and crucial differ-
ence is that S-representational mindreading additionally requires the capacity 
to inhibit one’s own inferentially articulated assessment of the world from 
interfering with the contents of the world-directed attitudes ascribed to others. 
As we have seen in this section, this additional capacity has been cashed out 
in various ways at the sub-personal level, e.g. in terms of recruitment of Leslie 
et al.’s ‘selection processor’ or Nichols and Stich’s ‘possible world box’. These 
and other sub-personal accounts of high-level mindreading that have surfaced 
in the literature are specifically designed for the task of S-representational min-
dreading. This should come as no surprise, since they are all inspired by the 
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BD-model. The point to take notice of is that the Relational Model claims that 
mindreading often involves less than that. Whatever the nature of cognitive 
processes that subserve the abovementioned capacity for content inhibition, 
the Relational Model predicts that these processes are supplementary to our 
basic capacity for propositional attitude ascription and are often left out of the 
cognitive loop. The Relational Model does not need to postulate anything in 
addition to the sub-personal mechanisms that have been invoked to explain 
belief-desire ascription. Worries about the cognitive implementation of rela-
tional mindreading are ill-founded. 
5.3 Epistemic Holism and Default Knowledge Attribution
In chapter 2.6 I explained in what sense propositional attitudes should be 
considered as ‘unobservable’ states. Propositional attitudes are unobservable 
in the sense that they only have tenuous connections to specific behavioral 
types. This, I indicated, has everything to do with the holistic nature of propo-
sitional attitude ascription. 
Ever since the downfall of logical behaviorism, it has been widely rec-
ognized that no particular piece of behavior can be seen as evidence of the 
presence of any particular (cluster of) propositional attitude(s), and that no 
particular (set of) propositional attitude(s) can be regarded as issuing any par-
ticular kind of behavior, without taking into account an inferentially articu-
lated mental context in which the ascribed attitude(s) make proper sense in 
relation to the behavior in question. As explained in chapter 2.6, the relation 
between propositional states and their behavioral manifestations is one-to-
many and many-to-one. Interpreting John’s walking down the street in terms 
of the reason that he has run out of milk, i.e. as being informed by a state 
with the content that he has run out of milk, only makes sense if we are able 
to place that state in the wider, temporally extended context of John’s mind: 
his further knowledge, intentions, plans, preferences, etc. Awareness of the 
fact that one has run out of milk, devoid of any further mental context, does 
not suggest any particular kind of behavior, and so every kind is a possibility. 
The things that go on in the world on the one hand, and an agent’s behav-
ioral responses to those things on the other, are not reliably correlated with 
individual (sets of) propositional attitudes, only with indefinitely large, whole 
systems of such attitudes. As Davidson (1970/2001a) observes: 
There is no assigning beliefs to a person one by one on the basis 
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of his verbal behaviour, his choices, or other local signs no mat-
ter how plain and evident, for we make sense of particular be-
liefs only as they cohere with other beliefs, with preference, with 
intentions, hopes, fears, expectations and the rest. (p. 221)82
The holistic nature of propositional attitude attribution has often been pre-
sented as an epistemic problem that we have to face in our quotidian discursive 
engagements with one another (Morton 1996, 2003, Bermudez 2003, 2009, 
Zawidzki 2008, Apperly 2011). Zawidzki (2008) states the problem thusly: 
“Holism is a problem because it leads to underdetermination: any finite set 
of behavioral evidence is compatible with an infinite number of distinct sets 
of propositional attitudes. In addition, ascription of any finite set of proposi-
tional attitudes is compatible with an infinite number of distinct behavioral 
predictions.” (p. 196) In other words, since interpretation of other people’s 
actions is always based on finite behavioral evidence, there is no easy way of 
telling which specific set of propositional attitudes best explains the behavior 
in question. And since any ascribed, finite set of propositional attitudes can 
be made compatible with indefinitely many distinct behavioral predictions 
(as long as the appropriate adjustments are made to the agent’s background 
mental states) there is no straightforward way of knowing how the agent will 
behave in the future on the basis of the ascribed set. Mindreading almost starts 
to look impossible (cf. Apperly 2011, pp. 118-119). So how do we manage to 
attribute goals and reasons to each other in daily social life? And how do we 
do this, moreover, in a way that is fast and reliable enough to be of genuine 
practical use? 
The problem is particularly acute for Theory Theory accounts of mind-
reading. Recall that according to TT, providing folk psychological explanations 
and predictions is to subsume observable behavior under general principles 
that spell out how behavior and environmental conditions link and give rise 
to mental states, how mental states relate and give rise to one another, and 
how they cause particular kinds of behavior. The problem is that 
we can only apply these principles if we can identify, among a range of 
possible principles that might apply, the ones that are most salient in 
82 As is well known, Davidson took the epistemic holism of propositional attitude ascription 
to imply the semantic holism of the contents of the attitudes ascribed. Issues regarding semantic 
holism run orthogonal to our present concerns, however. Putting questions regarding the indeter-
minacy of propositional attitudes to one side, I will therefore only speak of the underdetermination 
of propositional attitude ascription. 
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a given situation. We need to identify whether the appropriate back-
ground conditions hold, or whether there are countervailing factors in 
play. We need to think through the implications of the principles one 
does choose to apply in order to extrapolate their explanatory/predic-
tive consequences. The need to do all these things makes folk psy-
chological generalizations rather unwieldy. (Bermudez 2009, p. 194) 
In order to tackle the problem of epistemic holism, our folk psychological 
theory would have to come accompanied with volumes of ceteris paribus 
clauses telling us how the theory should be applied in the particular context 
of interpretation. Successful discursive interaction would furthermore require 
that we sift through all these volumes on the spot. The underdetermination 
of propositional attitudes by behavioral evidence threatens to turn the task of 
accurate propositional attitude ascription into an intractable search problem 
(cf. Zawidzki 2008).
There are actually two worries here. The first concerns computational com-
plexity: it is the worry voiced by Bermudez that applying folk-psychological 
principles to specific situations requires computation over a host of additional 
clauses to determine whether the appropriate background conditions hold 
and whether there are countervailing factors in play. Another closely related 
but deeper worry is that TT here faces a precursor to the frame problem: the 
problem of determining relevance (cf. Heal 1996, Wilkerson 2001). As Spaulding 
(2010, pp. 136) puts it, the problem is “how one determines which general 
principle to apply in a particular case given that the relevant information for 
determining which principle is appropriate is in principle unlimited and could 
come from any domain.”
It is mainly for these reasons that there are no self-acknowledged ‘pure’ 
theory theorists in the debate. Pure or ‘strong’ TT, as Heal (1998) terms it, holds 
that our knowledge about other people’s minds is arrived at independently 
from our knowledge about the world around us. In specific, it claims that 
our ability to determine the contents of the mental states of others functions 
independently from our ability to form thoughts with those same contents 
ourselves. On this account, thinking about some particular subject matter is 
one thing, thinking about other people’s thoughts about that subject matter 
another thing entirely. This strong version of TT is committed to the claim 
that we come equipped with a (tacit) folk theory of content, a theory that 
specifies the contents of other minds in strictly causal terms without drawing 
from our own response mechanisms and reasoning skills. 
Contrast this pure account of TT with Sellars’s version in his Myth of 
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Jones. As explained in chapter 3.5, Jones taught the Ryleans his new theory by 
exploiting their pre-existent linguistic know-how. He did not teach them a the-
ory of meaning. We found no reason to think that the Ryleans’ interpretation 
of each other’s overt verbal behavior itself depended on a functionalist theory 
of meaning, a theory that explicitly states the transition rules that specify the 
functional roles of the expression in their language. As far as the Ryleans were 
concerned, I argued, their functional role semantics was not a theory that 
explained the meaningfulness of their utterances; it was only a device that clas-
sified their already meaningful utterances in a functionalist way, so as to en-
able them to comment upon and criticize each other’s linguistic performances. 
These functional classifications were parasitic on a prior, non-theoretical un-
derstanding of each other’s verbal behavior. It was this classificatory apparatus 
that Jones used to characterize the contents of the theoretical posits of his new 
theory, the inner episodes he calls ‘thoughts’. Once the Ryleans had become 
skilled Jonesian mindreaders, they could determine the contents of the mental 
states they ascribed by exploiting their non-theoretical understanding of the 
meaning of each other’s linguistic utterances. 
Sellars left enough room for his Ryleans to determine the contents of other 
minds by drawing from their own recognition and reasoning skills. And so, it 
seems did TT-ists after Sellars. According to Nichols and Stich (1998), Heal’s 
‘strong’ theory-theorist “is a straw man, a figment of Heal’s imagination.” Heal 
contrasts strong TT with her version of the Simulation Theory in terms of ‘co-
cognition’, which is “just a fancy name for the everyday notion of thinking 
about the same subject matter […] Those who co-cognize exercise the same 
underlying multifaceted ability to deal with some subject matter.” (1998, p. 
483) Heal’s alternative to strong TT is the claim that: 
It is an a prior truth that thinking about others’ thoughts requires 
us, in the usual and central cases, to think about the states of affairs 
which are the subject matter of those thoughts, i.e. to co-cognize 
with the person whose thoughts we seek to grasp. (1998, p. 484)83
83 Regarding the notion of a priori she uses here, Heal states that: “To say that something is 
a priori, as I mean it here, is not to say that it is susceptible of proof in some formal system. The 
idea is rather that the a priori is that which is deeply embedded in our world view […] An a priori 
claim is one we rely on unhesitatingly in making inferences; in cases where it seems threatened 
our automatic assumption is that the threat is illusory and we seek was of explaining it away; if 
challenged we are thoroughly at a loss to describe realistically or in any detail how we would carry 
on intellectually if we could not rely on it. Hence the a priori is not something the testing of which 
could be an object of a realistic scientific project. To say that a judgement is a priori in this sense 
is not to say that it will never be abandoned or replaced; nor is it to say that we know that the 
concepts invoked in it could not mutate into what are recognizably successors in terms of which 
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On the most plausible interpretation, this claim reads that “in thinking about 
others’ thoughts, we typically use co-cognition and if we could not rely on 
it, the ordinary mindreading that we employ in our daily interaction with 
one another would be severely disrupted.” (Nichols and Stich 1998, p. 508) 
Nichols and Stich, however, find this interpretation of the co-cognition thesis 
“so obvious that [they] wonder who is supposed to disagree with it.” (p. 509) 
Heal’s a priori claim about the role of co-cognition in everyday interpretation, 
they conclude, ‘turns out to be a banal truth that no one has ever questioned.” 
(p. 511) 
So if pure TT is not an option, what are the alternatives to counter the 
problem of epistemic holism? The answer that is ‘so obvious’ according to 
Nichols and Stich is that we use our capacity to co-cognize with others to 
determine which goals and reasons most likely figure as the contents of their 
mental states when interpreting their actions. We have already seen several 
proposals as to how this is supposed to be accomplished in the previous sec-
tion. Nichols and Stich hypothesize that we build a model of the interpretative 
target in our ‘possible world box’ (PWB), a general device for hypothetical 
reasoning that exploits the same inference mechanisms that are used for the 
formation of real beliefs. When the PWB is co-opted for mindreading, our own 
beliefs are by default included in the model of the target’s mind. As we have 
seen, this is how they account for ‘default true belief attribution’. Goldman’s 
story is not very different in this respect. He too claims that we tend to let 
the contents of our own mental states enter into the content clauses of the 
pretend-states that represent the interpretative target’s mind, and which are 
subsequently fed into our own practical reasoning mechanisms. 
What is not so obvious, however, is why this solution to the holism prob-
lem should be framed in terms of the BD-Model. If fast and reliable mind-
reading in our daily discursive encounters with one another requires that we 
by default rely on our own understanding of the world around us, then why 
should the contents of the minds of others thusly determined always be pro-
cessed in an S-representational way? Given that we have no other option than 
to rely on our common understanding of the world, why have us explicitly 
mark the contents assigned to each other as giving expression to how the other 
in particular represents the world, a representation which only as a matter of 
contingent fact matches the way we ourselves take the world to be? As long 
the claim is false. But it is to say that at the moment we have no serious idea about how such 
replacement or mutation might go and hence little powerful argumentative work can be done by 
invoking such shadowy and perhaps illusory possibilities.” (Heal 1998, p. 480)
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as the people we interpret in our day-to-day encounters think and act in line 
with the way one is supposed to think and act in their circumstances, adding 
this S-representational dimension is simply unnecessary.
The Relational Model moreover provides a clear alternative characteriza-
tion of the interpretation process. And what is more important: the Relational 
Model implies the solution to the holism problem suggested by the accounts 
mentioned above. At the relational level of discursive understanding, inter-
preters have no other option than to rely on their own inferentially articulated 
appreciation of the world around them in the course of making sense of the 
thoughts and actions of others. We could also say that the Relational Model 
makes the problem of epistemic holism disappear. It effectively dissolves the 
problem by giving a different characterization of the standard situation faced 
by folk psychological interpreters. Epistemic holism of propositional attitude 
attribution only appears as an epistemic problem as long as our discursive 
engagements with one another are portrayed as attempts to gain access to each 
other’s private and potentially discrepant understanding of the world. The 
Relational Model, by contrast, claims that most of our discursive engagements 
with one another take place on common ground, relating each other’s actions 
to salient worldly features that solicit a response, and thinking about each 
other’s thoughts by looking out into the world and letting ourselves be guided 
by the inferences that it licenses. As long as most of our propositional attitudes 
are bound by our common understanding of things, the epistemic holism of 
propositional attitude attribution can be just as (un)problematic as the holism 
of propositional attitude instantiation. Thinking about thinking need not cre-
ate any higher degree of epistemic uncertainty than thinking itself. 
Against this, it might be objected that I overestimate the similarities be-
tween different agents, and thereby overestimate the practical use of relying 
on a shared understanding of the world, i.e. on relational mindreading in eve-
ryday contexts of interpretation. Relational mindreading only works to the 
extent that interpreter and interpretee share their view on the world, have the 
same preferences, make the same priorities, etc. But this is an assumption that 
cannot be taken for granted. Differences in cultural and religious background, 
class, gender, profession, character and personality are profound. Given such 
interpersonal differences, relational mindreading will not get us very far in 
daily social interaction. It will often fail as a means to make sense of other 
people’s actions or to provide accurate predictions of their future behavior. 
It is hard to believe that we rely on a form of mindreading with such severe 
restrictions as our primary strategy for attributing goals and reasons to others 
in daily social life. Or so the argument goes.
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In response to this worry, let me here simply make the observation that it 
is much harder to direct attention to all the things we have in common than 
to focus on our differences. The extent to which relational mindreading is 
deemed insufficient for daily social practice is easily overstated. It is mostly in 
situations in which we do not share a common appreciation and understand-
ing of the world that explicit use of S-representational belief-desire psychology 
is called upon in order to secure successful coordination and cooperation in 
daily social life (see chapter 6). But that should not lure us into thinking that 
this is the default situation we find ourselves in during our discursive interac-
tions with others. The fact that we speak the same language and are able to 
successfully communicate with one another should suffice as an indication of 
the vastness of the common ground we stand on. In Davidson’s words, “To 
understand the speech of another, I must be able to think of the same things 
she does; I must share her world.” (1982/2001c, p. 105) Communication, he 
continues, “depends on each communicator having, and correctly thinking 
that the other has, the concept of a shared world, an intersubjective world.” 
(ibid.) What the above considerations about epistemic holism show, is that 
successfully conversing with one another cannot get off the ground without 
approaching one another as having a shared, inferentially articulated back-
ground view on the way things are or how they should be. There is more to 
say about this objection, in particular about the assumption behind it, but that 
will have to wait until section 5.5.  
There is another problem with the proposed solution of ‘default true belief 
attribution.’ This is what I call the ‘knowledge problem’. In the debate on 
folk psychology, the attribution of knowledge, as opposed to mere true belief, 
has generally been ignored (but see Gordon 1987, Hornsby 2008, Perner and 
Roessler 2010, see also Williamson 2000). Yet simple reflection reveals that 
default action explanations involve more than mere true belief ascription. 
Consider the following example provided by Hornsby (2008). The example 
concerns
Edmund who believes that the ice in the middle of the pond is dan-
gerously thin, having been told so by a normally reliable friend, 
and who accordingly keeps to the edge. But Edmund’s friend didn’t 
want Edmund to skate in the middle of the pond (never mind 
why), so that he had told Edmund that the ice there was thin de-
spite having no view about whether or not it actually was thin. Ed-
mund, then, did not keep to the edge because the ice in the middle 
was thin. Suppose now that, as it happened, the ice in the mid-
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dle of the pond was thin. This makes no difference. Edmund still 
didn’t keep to the edge because the ice was thin. The fact that the 
ice was thin does not explain Edmund’s acting, even though Ed-
mund did believe that it was thin, and even though the fact that it 
was thin actually was a reason for him to stay at the edge. (p. 255)
Hornsby uses this example to show that the ‘factive’ explanations of action we 
provide in our everyday lives (cf. Gordon 2000a, 2001), such as ‘Edmund kept 
to the edge of the pond because the ice in the middle of the pong was thin,’ 
imply the attribution of knowledge, in this example: that Edmund knows that 
the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. As Hornsby goes on to explain, such 
factive, knowledge implying explanation would be infelicitous in the above 
example. Edmund didn’t keep to the edge because the ice in the middle of the 
pond was thin. That could not have been his reason for keeping to the edge; he 
did not have the right sort of epistemic connection to that reason. Edmund is 
a familiar sort of character in epistemology, of the type originally designed by 
Gettier (1963), to show that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. 
Most of our commonsense explanations of action, such as ‘John went to the 
supermarket because his fridge was empty’ or ‘John walked down the road in 
order to buy some milk at the supermarket’ imply more than just justified true 
belief – they imply knowledge: that John knows that his fridge is empty, that 
he knows that the supermarket is somewhere down the road, etc. 
For our purposes, the essence of Gettier cases concerns the interpretative 
act on the basis of which we judge the protagonists to lack knowledge about 
the subject matter their beliefs are about. In order to assess Gettier cases, we 
have to adopt an S-representational interpretative stance. We assess the pro-
tagonist’s belief as being justified from his subjective point of view, whereas 
we judge his belief as being true from our own (subjective) point of view. From 
our point of view, the truth of the belief is a matter of sheer epistemic luck. 
We judge the protagonist to lack the right sort of epistemic contact with that 
which his belief is about in order to be granted a state of genuine knowledge. 
The knowledge problem that confronts the BD-Model is how to explain 
the kind of implicit knowledge attribution that subserves our everyday reason 
explanations in terms of subjective belief ascriptions. The problem is how to 
account for the ‘right sort’ of epistemic contact that knowledge implies, as 
judged from our perspective as interpreters, in terms of the epistemic proper-
ties of the agent, as judged from his subjective perspective. For attribution 
of genuine knowledge, the agent should somehow be able to reach out of 
his private ‘centered possible world’ and make contact with the world as we 
M
aking S
ense in a C
om
m
on W
orld
136
as interpreters experience it. Gettier cases clearly demonstrate the difficulty 
of giving a satisfactory analysis of our implicit folk concept of knowledge in 
terms of subjective belief. But if epistemology has taught us anything over the 
last 50 years, it is that there is no easy way to account for default knowledge 
in terms of some form of subjective belief. And it is seriously doubtful whether 
any such analysis is forthcoming. Yet the BD-Model seems to have no other 
option. What is more, any proposed analysis should also meet certain criteria 
of psychological plausibility. For as far as the BD-Model is concerned, such 
analysis would not just be a philosopher’s sophisticated understanding of the 
concept of knowledge, it would actually have to be applied in the context of 
our quotidian, fast and flexible interactions with one another.  
As with the holism problem, the Relational Model effectively dissolves the 
problem of default knowledge attribution. For it holds that implicit knowledge 
attributions that subserve our commonsense understanding of everyday rea-
son explanations are a form of relational, rather than S-representational mind-
reading. It holds that default ‘factive’ reason attribution involves ascription of 
relational states of ‘belief’, i.e. relational doxastic states with a mind-to-world 
direction of fit (see chapter 2.4). The Relational Model avoids the problem 
presented by Gettier cases because it doesn’t try to analyze implicit knowledge 
in an S-representational way. At the relational level of interpretation, there 
is no question about whether or not other people are in the ‘right sort’ of 
epistemic contact with the world around them. To the extent that others can 
be judged as acting properly in a world-directed fashion, their attitudes are 
already regarded as being in touch with the world. There is only one way in 
which people can be interpreted as making contact with the world so as to 
succeed in making (implicit) doxastic commitments. This one way of making 
epistemic contact with the world is ipso facto the right way. 
The Relational Model implies that the implicit knowledge we attribute to 
others when giving or understanding factive reason explanations, is a form 
of common knowledge: knowledge that expresses a shared perspective on the 
world, the world as we all experience it to be. In the literature on social cogni-
tion, such the implicit assumption of shared perspectives has been character-
ized as a form of ‘projection’ or ‘egocentric bias’ (e.g. Van Boven et al. 2000, 
Van Boven and Loewenstein 2003, Kawada et al. 2004, Goldman 2006). These 
descriptions all seem to presuppose an S-representational understanding of our 
tendency to approach others as sharing our view on the world. The Relational 
Model provides a different understanding of this phenomenon: not as a mat-
ter of projecting our own subjective worldviews onto others, but rather as an 
attempt to relate others to a common world. As concerns knowledge attribu-
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tion, our bias towards a common understanding of things has been termed 
the ‘curse of knowledge’ (Nickerson 1999, 2001; Keysar and Bly 1995; Keysar 
et al. 2003; Birch and Bloom 2003, 2004, 2007). But the implicit assumption of 
common knowledge is not a curse; it is one of the great virtues of human social 
life. Without it, our discursive engagements with one another would soon run 
aground. Of course this assumption may sometimes conceal underlying inter-
personal differences, as the experimental literature cited above reveals. But in 
ordinary folk psychological practice, these differences need not be taken into 
account in advance; they are dealt with where and when the need arises (see 
chapter 6). 
5.4 Developing a Sense for Reasons 
The implicit attribution of common knowledge reveals the world as com-
monly known, the ‘common world’, as I shall call it. The common world is the 
world of the community to which one belongs, as described according to the 
public norms of reason and proper conduct. It is the world, not as it appears 
to anyone in particular (at a certain place and at a certain time), but as it ought 
to appear to everyone (at that place and at that time).84 Accordingly, relational 
mindreading is the act of interpreting another person’s world-directed attitude 
in terms of the way the world ought to appear to the members of one’s com-
munity (no one in particular) from that person’s point of view, of interpreting 
him, in short, in terms of the common world, viewed from that particular 
standpoint. 
The normativity of folk psychology has long been appreciated. The holis-
tic nature of propositional attitude ascription has lead Davidson and Dennett, 
for example, to stress the fact that the attribution of mental states is necessarily 
constrained by considerations of coherence, rationality and consistency. In an 
attempt to make sense of others, as Davidson once put it, “we will try for a 
theory that finds him consistent, a believer of truths, and a lover of the good 
(all by our own lights, it goes without saying).” (1970/2001a, p. 222) Likewise, 
Dennett has argued that in treating others as intentional agents, we have to 
start from the assumption that they generally tend to believe and desire what 
they ought to and that their actions are such as would be rational for an agent 
with those beliefs and desires to perform (cf. Dennett 1987, p. 49). The general 
idea is that our understanding of what others have done or will do is heavily 
84 See section 5.5 for a more nuanced understanding of this idea. 
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influenced by norm-governed judgments about what they ought (not) to have 
done or ought (not) to do, what it made or makes proper sense to do, given the 
circumstances. Needless to say, there are plenty of situations in which others 
defy our norm-governed expectations. But on the whole they tend to listen to 
our normative concerns, i.e. they tend think and act as we think they ought to.
More recently, several authors have taken these considerations one step 
further. McGeer (2007, see also 2001), for example, directs attention to two 
important questions that arise once this normative dimension of folk psychol-
ogy has been laid bare: (i) How do we acquire our views about what others 
ought to think and how they ought to act? (ii) How does it happen that others 
tend to comply with our normative standards, so as to make these standards 
a reliable tool for everyday interpretation of each other’s thoughts and ac-
tions? She answers both questions with reference to the regulative function of 
folk psychology in human social practice. Through a process of enculturation, 
folk psychological explications teach us how we ought to think and act under 
certain circumstances, while simultaneously showing us what we can expect 
from others under similar circumstances (cf. Hutto 2008a, p. 37). According to 
this line of thought, folk psychology is not merely a tool for mindreading, but 
also for mindshaping (Zawidzki 2008, forthcoming). It is because our minds are 
shaped in much the same way through participation in a folk psychological 
practice, that using our folk psychology in the interpretation of each other’s 
behavior is often successful.
There are two points I want to extract from these considerations. The first 
is that the normative constraints for fast and reliable folk psychological ascrip-
tions cannot merely be formal, in the sense that the attitudes attributed simply 
be mutually coherent and consistent, irrespective of their content. In order to 
see this, consider a scenario along the lines of Davidson’s (e.g. 1973/2001b) 
‘radical’ interpretation, a scenario in which an interpreter is confronted with 
the task of making sense of people from an alien culture, speaking a language, 
having customs, performing rituals, etc., that are unknown to the interpreter 
and vice versa. The interpreter is faced with an interpretative problem. Failing 
to make any sense of their actions, the only thing he can do is step up and ask 
them for their goals and reasons. But he doesn’t speak their language and they 
don’t speak his. In order to understand what they are saying he needs to know 
what their thoughts and actions are directed at, but in order to know that, he 
needs to be able to understand what they are saying. The only way for him to 
proceed, as Davidson pointed out, is to make certain charitable assumptions 
about the worldview of his interlocutors and the degree of rationality of their 
thoughts and actions and to interpret their utterances on the basis of these 
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assumptions, continuously adjusting or discarding these assumptions and 
adding new ones as he proceeds in the light of new behavioral evidence, until 
he reaches sufficient levels of interpretative success (measured by his ability 
to adequately explain and anticipate their actions, successfully coordinate his 
actions with theirs, etc.). 
The protagonist of our story is faced with a genuine, practical problem 
of epistemic holism: in an attempt to make sense of his interlocutors, he has 
to start with substantial assumptions about their worldview, assumptions 
which are severely underdetermined by the behavioral evidence and which 
furthermore are in constant need of revision as they fail to provide accurate 
predictions of further accumulating evidence. What this shows is that, in the 
absence of any positive idea about what the minds of others are directed at, as-
sumptions about the mere formal coherence and consistency of their thoughts, 
utterances and actions get us close to nowhere in the process of interpretation. 
The standards of rationality that guide ordinary folk psychological interpreta-
tion need to be of a material nature, essentially pertaining to the contents of 
the attitudes ascribed, telling us what counts as a proper reason for adopting 
which goals and performing which actions under what circumstances.85 In 
this respect, the normativity of folk psychology is perhaps better character-
ized in terms of canonicality (Bruner 1990, p. 37). Characterizing folk psycho-
logy as a canon of social practice brings out the fact that folk psychology is a 
substantial corpus, shaping our understanding of and our responding to the 
world. According to Bruner, the canonical status of folk psychology lies in the 
fact that “it summarizes not simply how things are but (often implicitly) how 
they should be.” (ibid. p. 39-40) The (substantial, contentful) descriptions of 
the world that folk psychological explications provide, in other words, imply 
prescriptions as to how to think and act under particular circumstances. 
Fast and reliable folk psychological interpretation requires a good sense of 
the material adequacy of the thoughts and actions of others. The first point I 
wish to highlight here, is that the Relational Model actually predicts this. At 
the relational level of interpretation, stating how things are implies a commit-
ment as to how things should be stated. There is no way of prying apart the 
descriptive and prescriptive elements of other people’s sayings about the world 
or their responses to it; the idea of mere formal coherence and consistency, in 
abstraction from material adequacy, is not intelligible from this interpretative 
85 See De Bruin and Strijbos (2010) and Strijbos and De Bruin (2012) for a model of folk psy-
chological interpretation according to which reason discourse is a process of endorsing, construct-
ing or rejecting material inferences (cf. Sellars 1953, Brandom 1994) that feature the suggested 
reasons for action in the antecedent and the actions to be explained in the consequens.  
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point of view. For the relational mindreader, the canonicality of folk psycho-
logy reflects the fact that folk psychological interpretation is constrained by 
our common and only appreciation of the world. Accordingly, the norms of 
folk psychology mirror the nature of the common world, the perceptual re-
ports that it solicits and the inferences and ensuing actions that it licenses 
– the world as it ought to be perceived, conceived of and responded to. 
The second point I want to extract from the above considerations regards 
the ontogenetic development of our capacity for goal-reason attribution. 
Children do not come equipped with an acute sense of material (in)adequacy 
of thought and action. Not even the staunchest nativist would dare to claim 
that children have an innate module that informs them about folk psycho-
logical norms of reason and proper conduct. What is considered proper acting 
or thinking is heavily dependent on socio-cultural factors. The ontogenetic 
question, then, is how children learn the material rules of the game of giving and 
asking for reasons.
Traditional TT and ST accounts have paid surprisingly little attention to 
this question. TT claims that folk psychological interpretation is guided by 
lawlike psychological generalizations of the kind “if A wants P and believes 
that doing q will bring about p, then ceteris paribus, A will q.” (Borg 2007, p.6; 
see chapter 2.3) But such ‘central action principles’ get us nowhere without 
any positive idea about the contents of P, q and p, respectively. As we have 
seen, this has been considered one of the major drawbacks of TT compared to 
ST. Heal (e.g. 1998) took it to be an a priori truth that we identify the contents 
of other people’s mind by means of co-cognition (see section 5.3). Gordon 
(e.g. 1996) and Goldman  (e.g. 2006) proposed further empirical hypotheses 
as to how this is supposed to be accomplished: by imaginatively identifying 
with them through performing an ‘egocentric shift’, and by introspecting on 
pretend states about their situation, respectively (cf. chapter 4.2 and 5.2). Yet 
such stories are simply insufficient to explain the ontogeny of mindreading. 
For the nascent child does not yet have any substantial, inferentially articulated 
worldview to draw from for the purpose of co-cognition, imaginative iden-
tification or introspection. The question that needs to be answered is how 
children acquire a proper sense of when to do what and why.  
To this end, consider Hutto’s (2008a, 2008b, 2009) ‘Narrative Practice 
Hypothesis (NPH). As indicated in chapter 2.3, Hutto characterizes adult folk 
psychology as a narrative practice, a primarily second-person practice of telling 
and listening to the stories behind people’s actions. He terms these stories ‘folk 
psychological narratives’: stories about people (or other intentional agents) 
acting with goals and for reasons. According to the NPH children learn to 
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wield our folk psychological concepts of belief, desire and other psychological 
attitudes through participation in such narrative practices. Here one can think 
of fictional stories as found in children books, but also of non-fictional sto-
ries about actual agents. The narratives themselves, as socio-cultural objects, 
exemplify the core structure of our folk psychology, in the form of explica-
tions, explanations and predictions of the protagonist’s actions (e.g. “Little 
Red Riding Hood entered her grandmother’s house because she thought that 
the wolf was her granny and she wanted to bring her granny a basket of goods 
because she was ill…”). The idea is that through attentive listening and active 
participation (e.g. asking questions), children gain familiarity with the way 
psychological attitudes interrelate and lead to action. The folk psychological 
narratives children are exposed to can serve as exemplars for constructing sto-
ries of their own as to why someone acted in a certain way. These narratives 
can then again function as objects of joint attention with caregivers, who can 
correct and further specify them so as to meet the proper standards of folk 
psychology. As a result, children get bootstrapped into the folk psychological 
practice of telling stories about people’s actions, their goals and their reasons. 
What I want to suggest here, is that the NPH can function as a promising 
account of how children acquire a sense of the material adequacy of goals and 
reasons for action. Accordingly, it is through continuous practice and train-
ing in telling folk psychological narratives that they get familiarized with the 
specific norms of proper thinking and conduct that characterize their folk psy-
chological community. Constant interaction with their caregivers ensures that 
they are slowly but surely being pulled up into the space of reasons and learn 
the rules of discursive engagement, of what (not) to think, say or do under 
which circumstances and why. The substantive worldview of their caregivers, 
specifying how things are or ought to be done, provides the proper ‘deontic 
scaffolding’ (Strijbos and De Bruin 2012) that enables children to bootstrap 
themselves into a proper discursive understanding of human social life. 
Hutto, however, targets a different explanandum. His aim is to provide an 
ontogenetic account of our competence in belief-desire psychology. Thus, he 
explains:  
the stories in question serve as exemplars and teaching tools: in 
their guided encounters with such stories children come to see 
the relations that hold between the various psychological atti-
tudes – crucially, but not exclusively, the focus is on beliefs and 
desires […] the way beliefs and desires conspire to motivate action 
– which, in abstracto, we might think of as the core folk psychologi-
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cal schema, is a constant feature of these narratives. (2008a, p. 29)
But it seems the NPH could remain largely intact if we were to add a relational 
stratum of goal-reason psychology in the developmental timeline. The idea 
that children need to learn how propositional attitudes interrelate to motivate 
action applies just as much at the relational level. Recall Ratcliffe’s point that 
“Just as one can say ‘if B believes p and desires q, all things being equal, B 
ought to do r’, one can say ‘if p is the case and q is the case, all things being 
equal, B ought to do r’.” (2007, p. 97; see section 4.1) It is certainly possible that 
children first learn the complex relation between actions, goals and reasons by 
getting a hold on the relational attitudes of the protagonists of FP-narratives, 
relational attitudes of (pretend) knowledge that link the agent to her reasons 
(in the counterfactual story) and relational attitudes of (pretend) desire and 
intention that link her to her goals. Accordingly, children’s first grasp of goals 
and reasons would reflect the public norms of action: when one ought (not) 
to do what and why. 
This is not only possible, but also very plausible when compared to the 
alternative offered by the BD-Model. In order to see this, it should again be 
realized that when children are first being invited to participate in discursive 
practice by their caregivers, they are still in the process of learning the material 
constraints of folk psychology. They do not yet have a substantial, proposition-
ally articulated view of the world at this point in their interpretative careers; 
they still lack the capacity to assess the propriety of the inferential connections 
between thoughts, words, and actions. With this in mind, consider how need-
lessly confusing it would be for children at this ontogenetic stage to gauge the 
minds of others in a fundamentally S-representational way, to provide each 
and every example of proper reasoning or conduct set by their caregivers with 
a silent comment on the fact that this merely reflects their view on things, not 
necessarily the correct view. Such S-representational understanding would be 
superfluous; it could have no effect on their initial learning curve. The reason 
is simple: there is nothing they can contrast the set examples with, no properly 
worked out alternative to present or pursue in its stead. This points towards a 
more fundamental worry. For it could be argued that for the same reason, such 
S-representational thoughts could not even make sense to children at this stage 
in their social development. If there is no contrast class of possible alterna-
tives to the goals and reasons explicated or exemplified by their caregivers, it 
seems the S-representational distinction between a subjective and an objective 
understanding of the world simply could not apply to their assessment of the 
situation.  
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The Relational Model can avoid these difficulties. At the relational level 
of understanding, there can be no question about the normative force of the 
rules of common discursive practice; the goals and reasons revealed by others 
can only appear as part of a given reality.86 Children’s first encounters with 
discursive practice are guided attempts at relating to the common world as 
it is pointed out to them by their caregivers.87 Here, the activity of ‘point-
ing out’ can be taken quite literally as pointing, with words, to certain sali-
ent features in the common world.88 The capacity to initiate and understand 
pointing gestures as a means for engaging in cycles of joint attention starts 
to emerge around infants’ first birthday and is robustly present at the age of 
15 months, as it begins to manifest itself in the learning and use of words 
(Tomasello et al. 2005). Once children begin to actively participate in conver-
sation, roughly from 2 years of age onwards, objects of joint attention, which 
they have already explored in numerous non-discursive, affective, perceptual 
and action-oriented ways, can slowly but surely start to appear as proposi-
tionally articulated events, facts and states of affairs: the stuff that goals and 
reasons are made of. 
86 A ‘given’ in the innocuous sense of the term, shaped by a linguistic practice, not a mythi-
cal, pre-conceptual ‘Given’ that is supposed to justify our conceptual norms (see chapter 3.2).   
87 The experimental findings of Rakoczy et al. (2008; see also Rakoczy et al. 2009) appear to 
be a case in point. On of their experiments involved a newly invented game called ‘daxing.’ In the 
first phase of the experiment, one of the experimenters brought out some building blocks and she 
and the child performed some usual actions with them. In the second phase, the experimenter 
announced that she was going to show the child a new game involving the building blocks, called 
‘daxing’, and explained the rules. The experimenter and the child then played the game, taking 
turns for a while. In the third stage, a puppet called Max appeared who had previously been 
introduced to the child. In the experimental condition Max announced to play the game, whereas 
in the control condition he announced not to play the game but rather to build. The 3-year-olds 
intensely monitored Max’s moves and displayed distinctively normative interventions when he 
did not play by the rules of ‘daxing (e.g. ‘No it does not go like this!’ or ‘No, don’t do it that way!’), 
and they did so only in the experimental condition. The 3-year-olds thus appeared to have a clear 
awareness of the normativity created in simple conventional rule games. For our purposes, what 
is interesting is that they absorbed the rules as explained by the experimenter without question or 
argument and afterwards tried to ensure that the puppet played in strict accordance with them. 
This active focus on conventional norms laid out by adults makes much sense on the ontogenetic 
picture sketched here.  
88 Cf. Heal (2005): “Words are […] an immensely delicate and useful way of pointing. 
Pointing itself is an elaborated way of focusing shared gaze. And what in turn grounds the whole 
enterprise is the sense of living together with another, a sense which perhaps shows itself already in 
the infant in those very early episodes when infant and carer smile at each other.” (p. 39)
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5.5 The Limits of Relational Mindreading 
In section 3 I dismissed a worry regarding the inaccuracy of relational mind-
reading. The worry was that lack of agential similarity between different 
members of society, even of the same socio-cultural group, makes relational 
mindreading too unreliable as our dominant interpretation technique in daily 
social life. Differences in background, status, occupational role, character, etc. 
are profound. Due to these differences, the interpretation of others on the 
basis of one’s own understanding of the world would often miss its mark. 
Against this, I held that there must be a vast shared background underneath 
all these differences, if discursive engagement with one another is ever to get 
off the ground. The case of Davidsonian ‘radical’ interpretation in section 4 
further exemplified this point: A common language is non-negotiable for folk 
psychological interpretation.   
This section serves to show that the limits of relational mindreading need 
not be set by the strict requirement of agential similarity. I discuss two ways in 
which the relational mindreader can relate to another person without relying 
solely on his or her own understanding of the situation: by means of assessing 
the situation relative the other person’s (i) spatio-temporal point of view and 
(ii) socio-cultural characteristics.
As to (i): Consider the capacity of so-called ‘level 2 visual perspective tak-
ing’ (e.g. Flavell 1974). Children are said to have acquired the competence 
for level 1 perspective taking when they are able to understand that different 
people with different lines of sight may see different things (e.g. person A 
can see a box in front of a wall, while another person, standing on the other 
side of the wall, cannot see the box). Level 2 perspective taking furthermore 
requires that one understands that different people with different lines of sight 
might see one and the same thing in different ways (e.g. person A sees the 
box in front of the ball, while person B sees the box behind the ball). Level 2 
perspective taking constitutes what Perner and colleagues (Perner et al. 2002, 
Perner et al. 2003, Perner et al. 2005) term a ‘perspective problem’. Roughly, 
a social situation constitutes a perspective problem iff there are at least two 
intentional states involved the content of which cannot be joined by simple 
conjunction to yield a consistent representation. The content of person A’s 
state ‘the box is in front of the ball’ cannot simply be conjoined with the 
content of person B’s state ‘the box is behind the ball’, for that would result in 
the inconsistent proposition that the box is both in front and behind the ball. 
Proper understanding of the situation requires that one conjoins the contents 
of the intentional states of persons A and B by making reference to their different 
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perspectives: the box is behind the ball from A’s point of view and the box is 
behind the ball from B’s point of view. Level 2 perspective taking requires that 
one grasp the possibility of different people being intentionally directed at the 
same thing under a different ‘mode of presentation’ (cf. chapter 4.4). 
Now, does relational mindreading allow for level 2 perspective taking? 
There seems to be no reason why it could not. Level 2 perspective taking only 
requires that one can assess the public world from different spatial coordi-
nates; it does not involve the capacity to assess the public world as privately 
conceived from different spatial coordinates. Perner et al. (2002) make a distinc-
tion between ‘truth compatible’ and ‘truth incompatible’ perspective prob-
lems. Level 2 perspective taking is a truth compatible perspective problem, 
because the truth of the conjoined contents of the respective mental states 
can be preserved with reference merely to spatial coordinates of their bearers. 
They consider the standard ‘false belief task’ to constitute a truth incompatible 
perspective problem. In one classical experimental setup, the task involves a 
character (a puppet), who places an object (chocolate) in a particular loca-
tion (a box) and then leaves the room. In his absence the chocolate is moved 
to another location (a cupboard). The subject, who has watched the scene 
unfold, is then asked where the puppet will look for the chocolate when it 
returns. In order to succeed in this task (i.e. predict that the puppet will look 
for the chocolate in the box) the subject must understand that the puppet still 
thinks that the chocolate is in the box, and therefore, it is often argued, that 
the puppet has a false belief about the location of the chocolate (cf. Wimmer 
and Perner 1983). Succeeding in standard false belief tasks constitutes a truth 
incompatible perspective problem, according to Perner et al., because the con-
tents of the relevant intentional states (‘the chocolate is in the cupboard’, ‘the 
chocolate is in the box’) cannot be conjoined to yield a consistent representa-
tion of the scenario, not even with reference to the different points of view of 
the test subjects and the puppet. The proposition ‘the chocolate is in the cup-
board from my point of view and the chocolate is in the box from the puppet’s 
point of view’ seems inconsistent.89 In general, the defining criterion of a truth 
incompatible perspective problem is that the contents of the relevant states 
cannot be consistently conjoined within one and the same ‘possible world’ or 
logical universe (cf. Perner et al. 2002, p. 1465) Consistently conjoining the 
contents of the relevant mental states demands that we make reference, not 
merely to points of view in one and the same world, but to points of view in 
89 It is questionable, however, whether this is the best way to approach children’s under-
standing of the standard false belief task (see appendix).   
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different possible worlds. 
Perner et al.’s distinction between truth compatible and truth incompat-
ible perspective problems provides us with a useful tool in drawing the limits 
of relational mindreading.  In truth compatible perspective problems, the 
contents of different perspectives can be made compatible within one ‘pos-
sible world’. For the relational mindreader, there is only one possible world 
that can apply to the actual world, only one frame of reference for assessing 
the world-directed attitudes of others: the common world of public assess-
ment.90 Relational mindreading can tackle perspective problems insofar as 
solving them only requires ‘walking around’ in the common world, assessing 
the modes in which it presents itself from different spatio-temporal points of 
view. In order to solve truth incompatible perspective problems, one needs to 
understand that agential perspectives that depict counterfactual scenarios can 
inform agents’ world-directed attitudes. One needs to be sensitive to possibility 
that people’s subjective worldviews may misrepresent the common world, that 
their private understanding of the world may be incompatible with the public 
rules of proper thought and action. This goes beyond the grasp of relational 
mindreading. It requires S-representational mindreading. 
The distinction between compatible and incompatible perspectives not 
only applies to informational states with a mind-to-world direction of fit 
(cf. section 2.4). It can also be used to characterize the limits of relational 
mindreading in making sense of other people’s motivational states, states 
with a world-to-mind direction of fit. The watershed between relational and 
S-representational mindreading is drawn by the ‘satisfaction (in)compat-
ibility’, i.e. the (un)feasibility, (in)appropriateness or (un)acceptability of the 
motivational states attributed. As long as the desires and intentions of others 
do not come into conflict with our commonsense assessment of proper con-
duct, relational mindreading should in principle suffice.91 In general, both the 
informational and motivational attitudes ascribed must be in line with our 
common practice of knowing, intending and acting.92   
90 This constraint on relational mindreading is what I termed the ‘disjunctive constraint’ in 
chapter 4.4. 
91 Arguably, attribution of informational states is more tightly constrained than attribution 
of motivational states. Even the most neutral knowledge claim seems to imply a public commit-
ment regarding its truth, for example, whereas the performance of an insignificant action might 
only imply its compatibility with the public commitments of proper conduct. 
92 Let it be noted in passing that the distinction between informational and motivational 
states has limited application at the level of relational mindreading. There are situations in which 
the specific circumstances of an agent dictate that he perform one and only one particular kind of 
action. Consider the following case. A child is drowning in the middle of a lake and there is only 
one person nearby who can rescue her, a man, say, fishing in a boat. For a bystander, the situation 
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As concerns (ii): Relational mindreading also allows for an assessment of 
other people’s actions relative to prevalent stereotypes, relating to socio-eco-
nomic class, professional role, social status, etc.  Not everybody is treated alike 
in social practice. Immigrants, doctors, pop stars, children, scientists, prime 
ministers, etc., all occupy specific socio-economic positions and/or have spe-
cific social roles to play, and with each position and role come different rights 
and responsibilities. Scientific experts are granted knowledge of things that 
other people do not understand; doctors are entitled to perform procedures 
no other person is allowed to; children are granted much higher degrees of 
naivety and irresponsibility than adults, etc. These signatures of entitlements 
and commitments are carved into human social life, forming an integral part 
of our discursive practices. What counts as a proper goal or reason for action 
depends not only on the circumstances one is in, but also on the position or 
status one has and the role one is supposed to play under those circumstances. 
But this need not pose any problems for the relational mindreader. The world 
other people are interpreted as being related to, is not a projection of one’s 
own private preferences and concerns, it is a common world, the world as char-
acterized by public standards of reason. 
This is an important point. One of the most frequently voiced objections 
to the Simulation Theory is that it cannot account for interpretation in cases of 
agential dissimilarity (e.g. Churchland 1991, Nichols and Stich 2003, Weiskopf 
2005, Zawidzki 2008). To the extent in which the other person’s mind is dis-
similar from one’s own, using one’s own mind as a model for interpreting the 
other is deemed unreliable. But why would the resources for mindreading have 
at that particular moment may very well allow one and only one proper course of action for this 
man: e.g. to paddle his boat towards the child in order to rescue her. A mere relational mindreader 
would be able to interpret this person as intentionally directed at the situation at hand only insofar 
as he acts in line with the way he ought to; any behavior not conducive to his paddling towards the 
child would be regarded as a failed action. In this case, the informational/motivational distinction 
is futile. There is no intelligible way for the relational mindreader to separate the informational 
aspects of the action (that the child is drowning and that he can rescue her by paddling towards her 
and getting her out of the water) from the motivational aspects (that he ought to paddle towards 
her). The person at the scene is interpreted, if at all, in terms of a relational ‘besire’ (Altham 1986, 
cf. McDowell 1978/1998), a state with both directions of fit with respect to different aspects of the 
world: knowledge-like with respect the fact that the child is drowning, etc., desire/intention-like 
with respect to his rescuing her by paddling his boat towards her. Prying these two aspects apart 
would require S-representational mindreading. It would require that the interpreter take into ac-
count “that it is at least possible for agents who are in some particular belief-like state not to be 
in some particular desire-like state; that the two can always be pulled apart, at least modally.” 
(Smith 1994, p. 119) For it to be intelligible that the person in our example could intentionally 
respond to the child’s drowning by, say, paddling away or casting a line, the bystander would have 
to assess the action from an essentially subjective point of view. A principled distinction between 
informational and motivational states can only be drawn from the perspective of someone who 
sees the relation between agents and the world as being mediated by their subjective representa-
tions of the world.
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to be restricted to one’s own model of the world? Why couldn’t interpreters use 
the common mind as a model for making sense of others? Relational mindread-
ing is a form of ‘understanding others from the inside’ (Heal 2000). The crucial 
question, however, is how we should interpret this phrase. From inside of 
what? Not, I suggest, from inside our own minds, as on Goldman’s (e.g. 2006) 
introspectionist version of the Simulation Theory, nor from inside the minds 
of others, as on Gordon’s (e.g. 1996) ‘radical’ version, but rather from inside 
the community of human beings to which one belongs (cf. McGeer 2007).93 
The common world is not the mere overlap between projected egocentric 
points of view; it is the world of a community of people, shaped by culture, 
crafted by narratives, informed by theories. Starting from our ability to co-
cognize, in Heal’s (1998, p. 483) sense of exercising “the same underlying mul-
tifaceted ability to deal with some subject matter” (see section 4.3), relational 
mindreading can draw from a rich tradition of folk psychological knowledge 
that specifies goals and reasons relative to socio-cultural characteristics.94 
There doesn’t seem to be an a priori constraint on the extent to which 
the public rules of thought and action can be tailored to fit the socio-cultural 
characteristics of specific (groups of) individuals. Strongly put, there is no dis-
similarity between two individual human agents that could not in principle be 
incorporated into public life so as to render relational mindreading sufficient 
for making sense of each other’s differences. When it comes to the limits of 
relational mindreading, the question is not so much where but how to draw the 
line. At the relational level of understanding, marking goals and reasons for 
specific individuals proceeds by zooming in on their socio-economic position, 
professional role, etc. from the public point of view. Whenever they act in defi-
ance of the public norms, the relational mindreader hits the rock bottom of 
common ground and can dig no deeper. The line is drawn where making sense 
of the minds of others requires approaching them from their private perspec-
tive on the world, the world as represented by them in particular, irrespective 
of their socio-cultural characteristics, and not necessarily by anyone else. 
93 Or from inside communities within the community. It is certainly possible that relational 
mindreading draws from different public frames of mind, depending on the social group or subcul-
ture in which our discursive engagements take place.    
94 Cf. Hutto (2008a): “Stories […] help to shape our common cultural expectations, making 
us familiar with the norms governing actions in “ordinary” situations. […] Through them we learn, 
for example, about the social roles that pervade our everyday environments [...].” (p. 37) Heal 
(1995) also acknowledges a role for ‘information rich’ folk psychological knowledge found theories 
and narratives in addition to simulation as co-cognition. Thus se states that: “it is obvious that we 
do derive from experience, literature, political treatises, books on psychology, etc. a great deal of 
explicit and implicit knowledge about human nature, people’s psychological states, how they arise 
and interact and so forth.” (p. 46)
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter targeted the first part of second challenge set for the Relational 
Model: to show why relational mindreading is not just a conceptually coher-
ent idea, but also a robust psychological phenomenon in human discursive 
practice. Section 2 revealed that the psychological plausibility of relational 
mindreading is not threatened by dominant explanatory theories found in the 
current literature. Although clearly inspired by the BD-Model, all these sub-
personal accounts of mindreading allow for a relational interpretation of the 
explanandum. Section 3 provided two powerful considerations why such in-
terpretation is to be preferred. As argued there, the BD-Model faces significant 
problems in accounting for epistemic holism and implicit knowledge attribu-
tion. I showed how the Relational Model dissolves these problems by taking 
a different perspective on the human discursive understanding. In section 4, 
acknowledgement of the holistic nature of goal-reason attribution urged us 
to regard folk psychology as an essentially normative practice, not only in 
a strictly formal sense, but also, and more importantly, in a material sense. 
Acquiring a proper understanding of the material (in)adequacies of thought 
and action is not something that children can achieve all by themselves. They 
need substantial input from others, people who have already mastered a sub-
tle appreciation of the material (im)proprieties of discursive engagement and 
thereby have already gained a differentiated, inferentially articulated view of 
the world. Section 4 showed that the Relational Model either implies or gives 
a plausible rendering of these considerations, much more plausible, in fact, 
than the BD-Model. Finally, section 5 explored the limits of relational mind-
reading. We found that these limits need not be drawn by the boundaries of 
our individual preferences and concerns. Beyond agential similarity, relational 
mindreading can proceed as far as common sense goes.  
The next chapter will approach our interpersonal differences from anoth-
er direction, not by homing on stereotypical characteristics from within the 
public sphere, but by exploring perspectives from within the private domains 
of other minds. This is not as mysterious as it sounds; it is the province of 
good-old belief-desire psychology.
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Appendix: Do False Belief Tasks Test False Belief Understanding?  
In section 4 I suggested that children start their discursive careers as relational 
mindreaders, from around 2 years of age onwards, when they begin to actively 
participate in conversation and learn the rules of the game of giving and ask-
ing for reasons. This may seem at odds with recent empirical findings from 
developmental psychology. This appendix provides a brief survey of these 
findings and argues that they do not undermine the Relational Model. 
Section 5 briefly discussed the standard false belief task (SFBT). Until 
recently, the SFBT was considered a reliable indicator of the fact that chil-
dren acquire an understanding of false belief no earlier than 4 years of age 
(e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, Wellman et al. 
2001). This would fit in nicely with the developmental timeline I suggested. 
Accordingly, children start to discursively engage with others by means of re-
lational mindreading roughly from their second birthday onwards. When they 
reach the age of 4, their relational interpretation techniques are supplemented 
with S-representational mindreading skills, tailored to fit specific social situa-
tions, such as mimicked in the SFBT.   
The SFBT relies on the subject’s explicit verbal response to the experiment-
er’s question as to where the subject will look for the object of interest. This 
makes it impossible to test infant’s understanding of the situation before they 
have acquired sufficient linguistic competence to understand and answer the 
experimenter’s questions. Recently, therefore, studies were conducted based 
on violation-of-expectation and anticipatory looking paradigms. These stud-
ies, it has been argued, show that false belief understanding emerges at a con-
siderably earlier age: in 25-month-olds (Southgate et al., 2007), 15-month-olds 
(Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005), and even 13-month-olds (Surian et al., 2007).
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), for example, conducted an experiment in 
which 15-month-old infants were familiarized with a protagonist hiding a toy 
in one of two locations. The protagonist left, and the toy was moved without 
her knowledge. Then the infants were shown scenes of the protagonist search-
ing for the hidden toy either where she falsely believed it to be, or where it 
was actually located. Onishi and Baillargeon found that 15-month-old infants 
reliably looked longer at those scenes in which the protagonist searched at 
the correct location despite their false belief about where the toy was hidden, 
and thus expected the protagonist to search for the toy where she believed 
it was located. Onishi and Baillargeon concluded that this measure of action 
expectancy or anticipation in fact demonstrated an early understanding of 
false belief.
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Follow-up experiments have attempted to support this conclusion. 
Southgate et al. (2007), for example, tested anticipatory looking in infants of 
25 months old by means of a task that was quite similar to the one used by 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). Infants observed a protagonist who witnessed 
a puppet bear hiding a ball in one of two boxes. Then the protagonist became 
distracted and turned away from the scene. Meanwhile, the bear removed the 
ball from its original hiding location. Southgate et al. (2007) found that, on 
the protagonist’s return, most 25-month-olds correctly anticipated her behav-
ior and looked at the location where she falsely believed the ball to be hidden. 
Again, the conclusion was that this demonstrated an early understanding of 
false belief.
The first thing to say here is that even if these experimental findings indi-
cate proper mastery of the concept of subjective belief, this could not by itself 
undermine the position defended here. It is one thing to argue that infants can 
ascribe S-representational propositional attitudes to others in certain highly 
artificial experimental settings, quite another to say that it comprises their de-
fault interpretation strategy in daily social situations. Normal adults are surely 
able to ascribe S-representational beliefs, but that does not imply that they do 
so all the time. The same would apply to the story of infants and children. 
Secondly, however, it is seriously doubtful whether the NVFBT can actually 
test for propositional attitude ascription. 
To start with, it is not at all clear whether the explanatory models put 
forward to explain infants’ performance on NVFBT are committed to an inter-
pretation of their performance in terms of full-blown propositional attitude 
ascription. Baillargeon et al. (2010), for example, recently proposed a modu-
lar Theory Theory account according to which infants come equipped with 
an innate psychological-reasoning system that consists of two sub-systems: 
sub-system 1 and sub-system 2. Sub-system 1 (SS1) enables infants to register 
both motivational states and ‘reality-congruent informational states’ to other 
agents, and is well in place by the end of the 1st year. Reality-congruent in-
formational states, they explain, specify what accurate information the agent 
possesses about the scene. Motivational states, by contrast, are defined as states 
that specify the agent’s motivation in the scene and include goals and dis-
positions. Sub-system 2 (SS2) goes beyond SS1 in that it also enables infants 
to attribute ‘reality-incongruent informational states’ to another agent, and 
becomes operational in the second year of life (cf. Scott & Baillargeon 2009). 
Baillargeon et al. argue that the findings discussed above are indeed indicative 
for implicit false belief understanding, and they explain this in terms of SS2. 
At the same time, however, they merely characterize this understanding as the 
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ability to attribute ‘reality in-congruent informational states’.
This obviously falls short of the much more advanced capacity to attribute 
propositional states to others. As Apperly and Butterfill (2009, p. 957) point out, 
‘in terms of content [...] no study has yet suggested that infants track beliefs 
involving both the features and location of an object (e.g., ‘The red ball is in 
the cupboard’) or that they track beliefs whose contents can be represented 
only using quantifiers (e.g., ‘there is no red ball in the cupboard’); or that, in 
tracking beliefs, they are sensitive to modes of presentation.’ On the basis of 
these observations, Apperly and Butterfill conclude that ‘whatever [infants] 
represent, it is not a state with propositional content.’ (ibid.)
Zawidzki (2011) provides a stronger and more principled argument against 
interpretation of infants’ performance as manifesting genuine false belief un-
derstanding. He argues that, due to its experimental design, the NVFBT cannot 
test for mastery of the concept of belief. As argued in section 3, the proposi-
tional nature of beliefs is closely tied to the holistic nature of their attribution. 
Beliefs and other propositional attitudes only show tenuous, holistically medi-
ated connections to behavior and external circumstances. Ascribing a belief on 
the basis of which someone is judged to respond to a specific environmental 
stimulus only makes sense if that belief can be placed against an inferentially 
articulated background of indefinitely many other propositional attitudes. 
Now how could the NVFBT test for this? A clear manifestation of full mastery 
of the propositional attitudes concepts would require a fair deal of linguistic 
comment on the observed scenario. There seems to be no other way to make 
sure that the subject’s understanding of the behavior of the protagonist is 
based on an appreciation of the latter’s propositionally articulated, holistically 
structured assessment of the situation.  
Thus, the very methods of investigation of the NVFBT resist interpreta-
tion of the experimental subjects’ social understanding in terms of full-blown 
propositional attitude ascription. Plenty of other interpretations have been 
provided to account for the experimental findings, moreover.95 The SFBT fares 
much better, it would seem, for it relies on subjects’ explicit verbal responses. 
Yet here too, there are alternative interpretations possible. Let it be granted, 
95 Perner and Ruffman (2005) and Ruffman and Perner (2005), for example, suggest that in-
fants might solve the NVFBT by application of behavioral rules or by drawing associations between 
object, protagonist and location. Apperly and Butterfill (2009) model infants’ performance in terms 
of ‘registering’ rather than full-blown belief  (see below). De Bruin, Strijbos and Slors (2011) offer 
an enactive account of the infants’ understanding of the situation, according to which infants’ 
anticipation of the protagonist’s behavior is a form of tracking affordances for others. Interestingly, 
the concept of affordance (Gibson 1979) can be understood as implying neither a world-to-mind 
direction of fit, nor a mind-to-world direction of fit (cf. section 2.4).  
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for the sake of the argument, that when confronted with the SFBT children 
explicitly reason about the protagonist’s (A) future behavior. We could then 
reconstruct their reasoning as follows: “A saw that the object was at location 
L1 but did not see the change of location of the object to L2; A intends to 
retrieve the object and will base his action on what he has seen, so he will look 
for the object at L1.” All italicized intentional attitude terms can be interpreted 
as referring to relational, rather than S-representational states. So there is no 
reason why this reconstruction could not in principle be understood from a 
relational mindreader’s point of view. 
In this context it is interesting to consider Apperly & Butterfill’s (2009) 
alternative interpretation of infants’ performance on the NVFBT. On their in-
terpretation, infants are sensitive to the agent’s belief only insofar as it registers 
the object. The notion of registering, they suggest, builds on the more primi-
tive notion of encountering. Encountering is defined as ‘a relation between an 
individual, an object and a location, such that the relation obtains when the 
object is in the individual’s field’ (p. 962). A field is defined, simply, as a certain 
region of space around the individual. Registering is then defined as a slightly 
more complex psychological relation between an individual, an object and 
a location. An individual is said to register an object at a location when (a) 
she encounters the object at the location and (b) has not since encountered 
it somewhere else. A registering is off target when the object registered is not 
located where it is registered to be. The importance of the concept lies in the 
connections to actions: ‘One can understand registration as an enabling con-
dition for action, so that registering an object and location enables one to act 
on it later […] Further, registration also can be understood as determining 
which location an individual will direct their actions to when attempting to 
act on that object’ (962). 
If we apply the notion of registering to the above reconstruction of the 
SFBT, we would get: “A registered that the object was at location L1; A intends to 
retrieve the object and will base his action on what he has registered, so he will 
look for the object at L1.” The point I want to make is that tracking an agent’s 
registering of something does not require an understanding of her mental 
states as subjectively representing what they are directed at. Registerings too 
are relational states. 
So what would demonstrate children’s understanding of false belief? The 
mere presence explicit verbal response is not enough (cf. Q: “Where will A look 
for the object?” A: “There!” – pointing to the location). Not even all explana-
tions of the prediction of the protagonist’s behavior would suffice (cf. Q: “Why 
do you think A will look at location L1?” A: “Because that’s where he last saw 
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it.”) Only explicit comments on the protagonist’s truth incompatible commit-
ments would seem to be sufficient (e.g. “Because he mistakenly thought that 
the object was still at L1.”).
These considerations also bear on experiments designed to test infants’ 
and young children’s understanding of subjective preferences and desires. 
Consider Repacholi and Gopnik’s (1997) experiment, in which 18-month-olds 
were shown two bowls, one of yummy goldfish crackers and one contain-
ing yucky broccoli (most infants confirmed to this characterization). In the 
discrepant preference condition the experimenter tasted the broccoli and said 
‘Mmm, that’s good!’ When tasting crackers, she made a disgusting face and ex-
claimed ‘Yuck, that’s awful.’ After this demonstration, the experimenter held 
out her hand and asked, ‘Can you give me some?’ The 18-month-olds succeed 
in giving the experimenter the one that she had shown a preference for, i.e. 
the broccoli, even though it clearly did not match with their own choice. 
Successful performance on this task does not show sensitivity to the ho-
listic inferential connections between the relevant preference and other back-
ground mental states, no more than does the NVFBT. There are alternative 
explanations, moreover. On Perner et al.’s proposal (Perner et al. 2005, see also 
Perner and Roessler 2010), for example, infants understand the situation in 
terms of what they term ‘objective desirability’ relative to specific situations. 
Accordingly, ‘broccoli in a grown up’s month’ could be judged good while 
‘broccoli in my mouth’ considered bad. This proposal can be regarded as a 
specific instance of what I described in section 5.5 as interpretation relative to 
people’s social class, role or status. And this, I argued, lies within the limits of 
relational mindreading. 
True understanding of the concept of subjective desire, Perner et al. argue, 
requires that one is able to ascribe conflicting desires, i.e. desires with contents 
incompatible with the contents of one’s own desires. Participation in com-
petitive games has generally been considered a good case in point. In simple 
competitive games involving two competitors, the desired outcomes of both 
competitors are mutually incompatible. Asking the child about the other com-
petitor’s desire would seem a good test for the capacity to ascribe conflicting 
desires. Test results show correct answers near ceiling level at ages ranging from 
3 (Rakoczy et al. 2007, Rakoczy 2010) to 5 years (Moore et al. 1995), depending 
on the specific experimental settings. Their mutual incompatibility notwith-
standing, however, one could argue that ascription of each competitor’s desire 
to win does not necessarily require an S-representational understanding of the 
situation. After all, it is one of the basic rules of game playing that, in general, 
each competitor who participates in a game ought to have the desire to win. From 
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the point of view of common sense, therefore, neither one of the competitor’s 
desires is incompatible with the public rules of proper conduct. 
A better test for understanding of incompatible desires would involve 
the ascription of desires considered unacceptable by most children. Yuill et al. 
(1996) designed a ‘wicked’ desire task, in which children had to predict the 
emotional state (happy or sad) of a protagonist, depending on whether or not 
his goal of hitting someone on the head was satisfied. 5-year-olds performed 
fairly accurately, but 3-year-olds generally failed to provide the correct answer. 
Of course, even wicked desires could be interpreted in terms of objective desir-
ability relative to social class, role or status. This possibility cannot be ruled 
out in advance. As in the case of testing false belief understanding, it seems 
that the only way to demonstrate genuine S-representational understanding 
of preference and desire is to invite subjects to make explicit judgments on 
the incompatibility between the protagonist’s desires on the one hand and the 
common desirability characteristics of the situation on the other.
Simple non-verbal tasks such as the NVFBT or Repacholi and Gopnik’s 
discrepant preference task cannot test for propositional attitude ascription. 
As far as the experimental findings on these non-verbal tasks are concerned, 
there is nothing that can undermine the developmental story suggested in 
section 4. Nor does successful performance on verbal tasks like the SFBT and 
mentioned conflicting desire tasks unequivocally indicate mastery of the con-
cepts of belief and desire. This does not mean, of course, that 4 to 5-year-olds 
are still blind to the private dimension of other minds. What it does suggest, 
however, is that tracking objects for others or predicting happiness or sadness 
in relatively simple, constrained scenarios, is not the best way to test mastery 
of the concepts of belief and desire. We should start looking elsewhere for the 
proper application of our S-representational propositional attitude concepts.
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The Social Functions of 
Belief-Desire Psychology
6.1 Introduction
According to the Belief-Desire Model of folk psychology, our commonsense 
understanding of each other as rational agents is essentially mediated by our 
mature, S-representational concepts of belief and desire. Interpreting someone 
as adopting goals in the light of reasons is an act of ascribing desires represent-
ing these goals and beliefs representing these reasons. On this picture, com-
petent use of belief-desire psychology is an absolute requirement for engaging 
in discursive practice; without it we would not be able to regard each other as 
rational agents. The social function of belief-desire psychology, so it appears, is 
simply to enable us to discursively interact with one another. 
The Relational Model gives a more nuanced understanding of the concep-
tual structure of our folk psychology. Accordingly, our folk psychology reveals 
the minds of rational, discursive beings first and foremost as public minds, 
minds intentionally directed at the world as characterized by established 
socio-cultural norms of reason. Folk psychological interpretation starts from 
the assumption that people think and act in line with the norms of common 
practice; it proceeds by relating them to the goals and reasons out in the com-
mon world that present themselves as particularly salient in the situation at 
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hand – goals and reasons that they ought to have, given the circumstances. On 
the Relational Model, therefore, mastery of the concepts of belief and desire is 
not an absolute requirement for proper engagement in the practice of giving 
and asking for reasons. This does not mean that belief-desire psychology is of 
no or only of limited practical significance for human social interaction. It is 
to say, however, that its role in folk psychological interpretation is essentially 
complementary. 
The previous chapter revealed the importance of relational mindreading 
in folk psychological understanding. This chapter focuses on the many com-
plementary functions of S-representational mindreading in human social prac-
tice. Together, this should suffice to successfully address the second challenge 
for the Relational Model laid down in chapter 1 and to establish the empirical 
validity of the distinction between a relational and an S-representational con-
ception of the discursive mind. 
Section 2 starts from the observation made in the previous chapters that 
S-representational mindreading allows us to interpret the actions of others 
even when their attitudes fail to align with the common world. The question 
is why the attribution of such discrepant propositional attitudes is of practical 
value for social interaction. I first consider the role of belief-desire psychology 
in providing third-person predictions and explanations of behavior and argue 
that it is of limited use when deployed for this purpose. Section 3 then focuses 
on the use of belief-desire psychology in second-person contexts. When people 
act out of the ordinary, coordination of our actions may become problematic 
and the success of joint projects may be at risk. Under such conditions it is 
very important that we ensure ourselves of their status as rational agents and 
that we are able to prevent such displays of abnormality from happening in 
the future. I show how subjective belief-desire psychology greatly enhances 
the capacity to rehabilitate rational status in the face of apparent irrational 
conduct and how it enables us to effectively and efficiently identify the source 
of other people’s mistakes and to regulate their future behavior. 
In section 4 I direct attention to the critical function of belief-desire 
psychology. Besides managing our discursive engagements within common 
practice, S-representational mindreading also allows us to discursively relate to 
that practice itself, from a somewhat more detached, evaluative stance. Once 
we start conceiving of our relation to the world in S-representational terms, 
common practice seizes to be our only frame of reference in judging the cor-
rectness of our world-directed attitudes. This creates new possibilities for the 
regulation of social practice. I briefly discuss how S-representational mindread-
ing enables us to challenge established norms of thinking and acting and to 
The S
ocial Functions of B
elief-D
esire P
sychology
158
pursue rivaling ideas and ideals. 
In the previous chapter I argued that belief-desire psychology is not our 
dominant way of making sense of each other. This chapter reveals why, in 
certain fairly complex social situations, it should nevertheless be considered 
our best option. Belief-desire psychology is not the conceptual basis of our 
discursive engagements with one another. Yet if the observations made in this 
chapter are correct, it does play a crucial complementary role in regulating our 
socially complex ways of life. 
6.2 Beyond Prediction and Explanation
Relational mindreading, so I have argued, forms the psychological basis of our 
discursive social practice. It is the primary way through which we interpret 
each other’s world-directedness in propositionally articulated ways. At the 
same time, however, relational mindreading has significant practical limita-
tions. As explained in the previous chapters, interpretation of each other’s 
propositional attitudes through relational mindreading is essentially confined 
to what is publically accessible. Contents incompatible with what one ought to 
say or do according to the rules of common practice cannot be regarded as the 
contents of world-directed attitudes – merely as the contents of suppositional 
attitudes. Interpreting other people’s goals by means of relational mindreading 
only succeeds insofar as their goals are realistic and acceptable. When an agent 
adopts an unrealistic or unacceptable goal, the relational mindreader will soon 
run out of options. The relevant intention cannot be interpreted as such, for 
its content is incompatible with the interpreter’s assessment of the ways the 
world could or should be changed as a result of the action. Chances are high 
that she will not be able to find anything in the common world to relate the 
agent to so as to make the action even remotely intelligible. Similar consid-
erations apply to the attribution of reasons. Relational interpretation of other 
people’s reasons only works to the extent that their reasons are constituted by 
worldly offerings that make their actions appear as acceptable, appropriate or 
required. From a relational point of view, the idea of conflicting views about 
proper reasons for action is not intelligible. False beliefs about the situation 
responded to or the appropriate means to achieve a goal may moreover render 
the action unjustifiable. When agents are misinformed in this way, it may 
simply be impossible to reconstruct the action as a proper response to the 
common world.   
It has been suggested many times in the previous chapters that the virtue 
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of S-representational mindreading lies in the fact that it enables us to over-
come these limitations. The most straightforward way to understand this is 
that it allows us to conceive of people’s goals as the objects of their desires, 
and of their reasons as the objects of their beliefs. Subjective propositional 
attitudes are not constrained by the dictates of public evaluation. Desires may 
be unacceptable or unrealistic, beliefs false or otherwise inappropriate, and as 
such may inform people’s world-directed behavior. According to this line of 
thought, belief-desire psychology is simply the subjective counterpart of rela-
tional goal-reason psychology. As competent belief-desire psychologists we are 
able to make sense of other people’s actions even when their goals and reasons 
defy the rules of common practice. This greatly enhances our skills in making 
sense of others when their actions seem strange or out of line. What concerns 
us here is the practical significance of this fact. Belief-desire competence in-
creases our ability to rationalize apparently counter-normative behavior. But 
why is this a good thing? How does it facilitate human social interaction? 
The first option I want to consider is that belief-desire psychology serves 
third-person prediction and explanation of behavior. As indicated in chapter 
1, Prediction and explanation is often considered to be the primary business of 
folk psychology by standard Theory Theory and Simulation Theory accounts. 
Davies and Stone (1995b) explicitly link the activity of generating folk psycho-
logical explanations and predictions to the rationalization of behavior. In an 
introduction to the TT/ST debate, they argue that
one impressive fact about human beings is that […] they develop the 
capacity to deploy psychological concepts such as belief and desire in 
the predictions and explanations of the actions and mental states of 
other members of the species. These predictions and explanations are 
said to rationalize the subjects actions or mental states; they present 
the subject’s beliefs and desires as providing him or her with reasons 
for acting and thinking in certain ways. (p.2, emphasis in original)96
In the present context, the idea would be something like this. When people act 
out of the ordinary, we cannot rely on our normal expectations about their fu-
ture behavior. In order to keep coordinating our actions successfully, we need 
96 In the current literature, this is still considered to be the consensus view shared by TT and 
ST proponents: “Though Theory Theorists and Simulation Theorists disagree over the process of 
mindreading, they agree that how we understand and interact with others in social environments 
is by explaining and predicting their behavior on the basis of mental state attributions.” (Spaulding 
2010, pp. 121-122, emphasis in original) 
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to understand why they behaved abnormally so that we can figure out what 
to expect next. Rationalization of the anomalous behavior of other people 
enables us to generate explanations that serve to make accurate predictions 
about their future conduct. There is certainly some truth to this, but I think 
that the value of belief-desire predictions and explanations for quotidian use 
is easily overestimated.
When an agent acts in defiance with the public norms of action, the pre-
dictive and explanatory powers of the relational mindreader soon give out. 
When the agent acts on a false belief, for example, the relational mindreader 
will likely interpret it as a mere failed attempt to perform a world-directed 
action. This gives him some room to speculate about the agent’s future be-
havior: he may predict that the agent will suffer from the same malfunction 
in similar situations in the future. Appeal to the relevant malfunction also has 
some explanatory potential: at a minimum it contrasts failed world-directed 
actions with mere as-if actions (see chapter 4). But this is about as far as it 
goes. The relational mindreader’s predictions and explanations are restricted 
to the particular type of behavior exhibited. The problem is that she cannot 
interpret the agent’s malperformance as informed by a propositional state.  She 
will not be able to speculate about the agent’s thoughts and actions based on 
his false belief. Suppose John takes out the garbage on Tuesday, believing it is 
Wednesday. His Jonesian neighbor will regard this as a failed action of taking 
out the garbage on Wednesday. Solely on the basis of this malperformance, 
she will not be able to appreciate the possibility that today (i.e. Tuesday) John 
is likely to engage in other activities that he is used to on Wednesdays. The 
only way for his Jonesian neighbor to predict that, say, John will not go to 
work today (because Wednesday is his day off), is by association based on prior 
clustering of failed actions of these kinds on Tuesdays in the past. Since she 
doesn’t understand John’s action as resulting from a false belief, she is unable 
to judge which sayings and doings John is entitled and committed to, relative 
to that false belief. She is unable to predict that, ceteris paribus, John will do 
what he ought to do and will not do what he ought not to do, relative to his 
false belief that it is Wednesday today. The same goes for explanation: different 
types of abnormal behavior can be explained with reference to the false belief 
attributed in virtue of the inferential connections with other beliefs, desires 
and intentions. On the assumption that John is by and large a rational agent, 
it can be inferred that his not going to work today is probably also informed 
by his false belief that it is Wednesday today. For the attributer of false belief, 
there may be a rational pattern in John’s abnormal behavior. 
S-representational mindreading thus greatly expands our capacity to 
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speculate about other people’s reasons when their actions are informed by 
false or differing beliefs. A similar story can be told about actions informed by 
inappropriate or unrealistic desires. Yet are the explanations and predictions 
we are able to generate through S-representational mindreading generally ac-
curate enough to serve as the basis for successful interaction? 
Recall the holism problem from chapter 5.3. As explained there, epistemic 
holism is a potential problem because it can lead to underdetermination. The 
interpreter cannot decide on the correct explanation of the agent’s action 
because it is compatible with a wide range of equally (im)plausible interpreta-
tions. Furthermore, each interpretation allows for many equally (im)plausible 
predictions about the agent’s future actions. It is a problem that becomes ur-
gent in situations of Davidsonian ‘radical’ interpretation, when the interpreter 
cannot determine the contents of other minds with reference to the common 
world. In cases of radical interpretation, S-representational mindreading would 
be our only way to make sense of others, yet at the same time, it would be a 
very poor way. Rampant underdetermination would make efficient and effec-
tive social interaction practically impossible. The point of introducing the case 
of radical interpretation was to make clear that we are in no such predicament 
in our day-to-day social affairs. It is because we have a practice in common 
that we may interpret each other’s thoughts and actions according to the do’s 
and don’ts of that practice. Holism is not a problem as long as the minds of 
others are constrained by the common world. 
We started from the observation that a subjective shift towards 
S-representational mindreading may help us to rationalize other people’s ac-
tions when relational mindreading in terms of the common world runs out 
of resources. S-representational mindreading becomes practically relevant pre-
cisely in those situations in which the thoughts and actions of others fail to 
meet our normative expectations. Under these circumstances, however, the 
holism problem looms again. Perplexed by the behavior of others, we may 
find ourselves simply unable to come up with any rationalizing explanation, 
let alone to predict their next move. In less bizarre cases, the abnormal actions 
of others will often generate too many candidate explanations, which will 
make us feel hesitant to rely on any one of them in particular. John takes out 
his garbage on Tuesday, but it will not be taken away until Wednesday. Does 
John believe that it is Wednesday today? Does he intend to go away for a few 
days? Perhaps he wants to clean out his shed?  Or is he just trying to annoy 
his neighbor? 
One may wonder how urgent the problem of underdetermination is in the 
case described. Why should his neighbor care why John takes his garbage out a 
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day early?  We often shrug our shoulders at the display of abnormal behavior 
by others. And even if we take interest in interpreting others when they act in 
strange or inappropriate ways, we are often more concerned with the impres-
sion they make than with providing accurate explanations and predictions. 
In such cases, underdetermination may actually suit our purposes rather well 
(see section 3). There is bound to be an interpretation of someone’s eccentric 
or unusual behavior that confirms our prior determined evaluations (consider 
gossip, for example). Yet we often feel reluctant to rely on such evaluations 
when predicting their behavior is practically important. The moral is that when 
underdetermination is not deemed problematic, it’s probably not explanation 
and prediction we are primarily concerned with. 
This being said, there are plenty of situations in which we do feel it is im-
portant that we find out about the reasons and goals that explain the anoma-
lous behavior of others. Under such circumstances, underdetermination is an 
urgent problem. As an example, consider the following case: 
As I was preparing for a long visit to St. Louis, I asked my wife to ar-
range for my car to be serviced and kept in my local garage while I 
was abroad. I supplied her with its telephone number and she kindly 
made the booking for me. On the morning of my flight, she agreed to 
drive me to Heathrow after I dropped my car in at the garage. We set 
off, each in our own car with her in the lead, her boot laden with my 
luggage. As we came up to the turning for the garage, she stopped at 
a set of red traffic lights but unusually failed to signal. This surprised 
me because my wife is a stickler for such things. But then something 
even odder happened. To my amazement when the lights changed 
she did not turn, but began driving toward the town centre, straight 
past the garage at which she herself had made the booking! As time 
was against us, this alarmed me. I raced to make sense of her action, 
assuming that, very uncharacteristically her mind must have been 
elsewhere. At first, I flashed my lights with my signal light blinking, 
expecting her to realise that I was no longer following and hoping 
that she would notice her mistake. Things went from bad to worse 
when I saw her cast a glance in her rear view mirror without stopping. 
At this point, I was faced with a rather tricky interpretative problem. 
Given that my wife is very competent and reliable, lacking any ma-
licious streak or any reason to act so, I was at an utter loss to make 
sense of her actions. Although a number of possible explanations 
sprang to mind, knowing my wife, none of these looked plausible. 
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I was unable to make any sense of her actions. (Hutto 2004, p. 569)
What this example shows is that when shrugging our shoulders at the abnor-
mal behavior of others is not an option, we tend to be very much concerned 
with getting our explanations exactly right. Typically there is something at 
stake; giving the wrong explanation will have important consequences. Under 
such circumstances, even the slightest degree of underdetermination may pose 
a significant obstacle for successful interpersonal coordination. The problem is 
that precisely in those cases in which third-person explanation and prediction 
of behavior in terms of subjective representational states is most needed for 
successful interaction, i.e. when people act in apparently counter-normative 
or otherwise puzzling ways, it is bound to be least effective. As Hutto observes: 
“given that proper reason explanations require us to designate the reason for 
acting – as opposed to simply offering a possible reason for acting – […] third-
personal approaches are of limited use.” (ibid., p. 570)97 
As competent belief-desire psychologists we are able to rationalize the 
anomalous behavior of others in ways that are systematically precluded from 
the mere relational mindreader. But that doesn’t help us much when all we 
can do is speculate about it from a third-person stance. The holism problem 
often makes explaining and predicting the behavior of others in terms of dis-
crepant beliefs and desires too unreliable for practical purposes. 
6.3 Managing Discursive Engagements 
Our ability to make sense of the anomalous behavior of other people is largely 
dependent upon the information they or others in their vicinity can provide. 
A generally efficient and reliable method for coming to grips with the unusual, 
strange or inappropriate behavior of others is to let them make themselves un-
derstood in conversation. Rather than trying to explain or predict their actions 
for them, we can ask them to explain or ‘predict’ their actions for us.98 It goes 
without saying that this is not always possible, appropriate or even desirable. 
And sometimes the answers we get ‘from the horse’s mouth’ are uninforma-
97 Here is the denouement of Hutto’s story: “Luckily, this is what explained the otherwise 
disturbing behaviour of my wife on the way to the airport. After the incident, she explained that 
although it was true that she had phoned the garage to make the appointment herself, and she had 
used the number I had given her, she believed it was the number for our old garage, in the next 
village.” (2004, p. 570). 
98 In chapter 2, footnote 15, I indicate the sense in first-person avowals of intention can be 
regarded as cases of prediction of future behavior.  
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tive, nonsensical, evasive or (deliberately) misleading. Yet there may be other 
people around who can provide some of the information we need, people 
who know them well, perhaps better than they think they know themselves, 
people who may actually have spoken to them about the particular course 
of action that we are trying to understand. In second-person contexts, we do 
not have to speculate about the reasons and goals of others. When we don’t 
understand or won’t accept the answers given in response to our questions, 
we can ask for further clarification or suggest a different interpretation of what 
happened. This will normally evoke further responses by the other party, an-
swers we may accept or again challenge, in which case additional information 
may be required, etc.99 There is no guarantee that such conversations will have 
a satisfactory result. And sometimes we keep suspicious of the true motives of 
others despite the answers provided. Still, this poses no threat to the claim that 
in general, engaging in the game of giving and asking for reasons is by far the 
most efficient and reliable means of getting the information we want about 
others when we are unable to make sense of them.100
The previous section started from the observation that belief-desire com-
petence increases our ability to rationalize anomalous behavior. The question 
was how this might actually benefit the interaction between people. Consider 
Bruner’s (1990) claim that 
when you encounter an exception to the ordinary, and ask somebody 
what is happening, the person you ask will virtually always tell a story 
that contains reasons […] All such stories seem to be designed to give 
the exceptional behavior meaning in a manner that implicates both 
an intentional state in the protagonist (a belief or desire) and some 
canonical element in the culture […] The function of the story is to find 
an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a devia-
tion from a canonical cultural pattern. (pp. 49-50, emphasis in original)
99 See De Bruin and Strijbos (2010) for an account that models everyday reason discourse as a 
process of what Brandom (1994, 2000) terms ‘deontic scorekeeping’: of assessing the correctness of 
material inferences expressed in answers to questions why against the background of the utterer’s 
commitments and entitlements.  
100 Of course, once we have been informed about the goals and reasons of others, we can 
use this information in order to generate further third-person explanations and predictions. Yet 
the information provided may not suffice for our explanations and predictions to reach the level 
of accuracy we feel is necessary for our interactive purposes, and so second-person adjustment may 
still be called for. The point is that our ability to generate accurate explanations and predictions 
of anomalous behavior depends heavily on information provided in conversation. Furthermore, 
the explanations and predictions we come up with are defeasible and readily revised in light of 
information gained in conversation.
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Following Bruner on this point, Hutto (2008a) argues that “folk psychological 
narratives can function as ‘normalizing’ explanations, allowing us to cope with 
‘unusual’ or ‘eccentric’ actions, by putting them into contexts that make them 
intelligible, where possible.” (p. 7) In second-person contexts, explanation of 
action in terms of the agent’s goals and reasons serves to provide a context in 
which the action can start to appear as a rational response. We ask the agent 
to reconstruct his action so as to make it appear ‘normal’ again, i.e. as falling 
within the scope of the norms of reason. In this way, folk psychology can serve 
as a kind of social glue. By creating a situation in which someone can make 
himself understood, we offer ourselves the opportunity to ‘level’ with him 
again, as one rational agent towards another. The practice of giving and asking 
for reasons thereby serves as a tool for re-establishing rational engagement. 
It helps us to create, maintain, restore, and even intensify our interpersonal 
relations (cf. Andrews 2007, McGeer 2007). 
It often occurs that people explain their seemingly abnormal behavior by 
drawing attention to some feature that is easily accessible through relational 
mindreading. The interpreter may for example be unaware of the reason the 
agent responded to. An answer to a question why may explain the action sim-
ply by relating it to certain features of the common world that constitute a 
proper reason for performing the action under consideration. John puts on his 
coat, grabs his umbrella and walks towards the door. His roommate is surprised. 
Last time she looked out the window, 10 minutes ago, the sun was shining. She 
asks him why he’s taking his umbrella. He replies that it is raining. She looks 
over her shoulder and sees it’s raining now. In this scenario, the roommate can 
make sense of John’s action of taking his umbrella by relating him to a reason 
in the common world: that it is raining now. Relational mindreading suffices. 
Problems arise as soon as the actions of others are informed by attitudes that 
fail to align with the common world. Answers given to questions why give ex-
pression to these attitudes and cannot be interpret as world-directed responses 
by the mere relational mindreader. The answers the agent provides only make 
him appear more out of touch with reality. In an attempt to make sense of the 
agent’s action the relational mindreader gets more inexplicable behavior in 
return.
Competent use of belief-desire psychology enables us to accept a wider 
range of ‘normalizing’ explanations provided in response to each other’s ques-
tions why and thereby greatly increases our options when trying to re-establish 
a common ground for future interaction. As S-representational mindreaders, 
we can ascribe propositional attitudes that vary considerably from the dictates 
of common practice. Yet, due to holistic nature of interpretation, this may ac-
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tually serve to bring people closer within range of the normal again. Ascription 
of a small set of discrepant attitudes can minimize the overall deviation from 
the norms if the abnormal behavior is interpreted in a context adjusted to that 
set. In second-person contexts, we moreover do not have to speculate about 
the relevant attitudes: typically, they are expressed in the agent’s answers to 
our questions.
In complex societies, most actions require interpersonal coordination. In 
order to successfully go about our business, there is a lot we need to know 
and a lot that needs to be done that we simply cannot find out or do all by 
ourselves. We heavily rely on others as extended pairs of eyes, ears and hands. 
In the daily pursuit of our goals, we have no other option than to act on 
the general assumption that others will behave according to the rules, speak 
the truth, keep their promises and meet their obligations (cf. Morton 2003, 
McGeer 2007). When others act in strange or seemingly inappropriate ways, 
coordination of our actions may become problematic and the success of joint 
projects may be at risk. Under such conditions it is often crucial that we re-
ensure ourselves of their normative status as rational, reliable and generally 
cooperative agents, and that we are able to prevent such displays of abnormal-
ity from happening in the future. Finding a rational pattern in the seemingly 
counter-normative behavior of others may be crucial in order to rehabilitate 
their status as rule-abiding participants and to restore the cooperative spirit 
necessary to maintain our complex ways of life. 
Rationalization moreover plays an important role in determining whether 
or which sanctions are appropriate for compensation and rehabilitation. 
Seemingly inappropriate behavior is normally assumed sanctionable, unless 
excusing or extenuating circumstances can be presented. If the agent’s story 
convinces the audience, sanctions may be attenuated or avoided. Such inter-
pretations are contestable and negotiable, however. They moreover generate 
new expectations. Failure to meet these expectations in the future will again 
damage one’s status as bona fide conversation or cooperation partner (cf. 
Zawidzki forthcoming, ch. 7). In general, each move in the game of giving and 
asking for reasons is assessed against the background of commitments already 
undertaken or explicitly acknowledged. The rationalizations provided are sub-
ject to the public rules of proper discursive conduct and this narrows down the 
range of acceptable answers considerably. Still, competent use of belief-desire 
psychology greatly improves the options available for both parties to reach a 
satisfactory result in the give-and-take of reason discourse. In a Jonesian so-
ciety of mere relational mindreaders, the inability to accept counterfactual 
stories as justificatory or exculpatory for apparent counter-normative behavior 
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reduces the chances of restoring the social balance. Sanctions will often be dis-
proportionate and ineffective and full rehabilitation may remain out of reach. 
The sanctioning of abnormal behavior takes place against the back-
ground of the important regulative role of folk psychology (see chapter 5.2). 
Throughout our lives, we correct and are corrected by others so as to think and 
act in conformity with public standards. From this perspective, ‘normaliza-
tion’ does not only serve to make the abnormal behavior of others appear as 
normal, but also to make it normal and to prevent such displays of abnormal-
ity from happening in the future. S-representational mindreading can also 
play an important role in educative practices.
 Consider the following case. A teacher is perplexed by the poor perfor-
mance of one of her students on last week’s exam. She asks him to explain 
to her how he reached his answer to one of the exam questions. In response 
to her question, he expresses a false belief that makes his approach appear 
even more puzzling. Being a skilled S-representational mindreader, however, 
the teacher is able to interpret his utterance as giving expression to a yet inex-
plicable belief. And this motivates her to ask further questions (‘Why do you 
think so?’ ‘Please explain to me how you came to this conclusion.’) Persistent 
as she is, the teacher soon finds the underlying beliefs that rationalize his 
malperformance and manages to teach the student how to solve the problem. 
Now consider the predicaments of a Jonesian teacher. Since she cannot un-
derstand the student’s answer as giving expression to a false belief, the whole 
point of asking for further clarification of his answer escapes her. Faced with 
the apparent abnormality of the student’s answer, she can only try to correct 
him by showing him how it is properly done (‘No, that’s not right! You ought 
to do it this way!’). But the student will not understand her intervention; it 
doesn’t make sense from his perspective. She may succeed in teaching him a 
new rule for giving the correct answer, but the rule will only apply in the con-
text of the specific exam question under discussion. Below the surface of the 
conversation, the core attitudes responsible for his malperformance remain 
unchallenged. They will keep influencing his way of thinking and cause him 
to give incorrect answers when the question is framed differently. His teacher 
may again try to correct him, but each time the effect will be limited to the 
specific conditions set by the exam questions. Malperformances and their cor-
rections multiply without any hope of actually teaching the student anything. 
For the S-representational mindreader, dialogue is an efficient and ef-
fective means of getting at the source of other people’s abnormal conduct. 
Sometimes the identification of a discrepant attitude expressed in the agent’s 
response suffices for effective intervention. We can point out the error to the 
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agent and thereby re-establish a shared context for successful interaction in 
the future. But it may be necessary to ask further questions. Perhaps the at-
titude expressed in the agent’s response is based on other discrepant attitudes, 
attitudes that would have remained unchallenged if we hadn’t asked further 
questions and which might have resulted in other, seemingly unrelated forms 
of abnormal behavior in the future. In this way, S-representational mindread-
ing enables us to prevent a whole array of abnormal actions through a single 
round of discourse. 
In the preceding paragraphs I focused on situations in which the norms 
against which to assess aberrant behavior are relatively clear in advance. In 
error cases, for example, the agent normalizes his behavior by revealing his 
error and by showing that, relative to his error, he actually endorses the pre-
established public norms. In educative contexts, students are expected to grant 
the teacher the authority to establish the criteria for successful performance. 
Here too, there is normally no disagreement about which norms are relevant 
in the particular context and how to apply them. Sometimes, however, re-
establishing rational engagement demands “that we extend the range of what 
we think as falling within the scope of the ‘normal’.” (Hutto 2004, p. 560) 
Consider cases of dispute about how things are or what ought to be done. In 
such cases, it may not be obvious who is to be ‘normalized’ according to what 
norms. Any or each interlocutor may be mistaken and there is often no agree-
ment about how this can be settled. 
On a mere relational conception of mind, interpersonal conflict can 
only be interpreted as a matter of disobedience of one (some) of the par-
ties involved. Disobedience calls for proper sanctions, not for discussion. As 
S-representational mindreaders, however, we are able to compare and contrast 
the perspectives of different individuals. When drawn into an argument, we 
can interpret the situation as a clash between conflicting subjective points of 
view. This helps to appreciate the possibility that both (all) parties may have to 
give in on certain points and it motives us to reach consensus, e.g. by articulat-
ing new interpretations of the norms under discussion or by restricting their 
applicability. 
In this process of negotiating between conflicting perspectives, practical 
considerations largely determine whether and to what extent reaching con-
sensus is appropriate or required. Perhaps agreement on a particular issue is 
necessary to guarantee the success of our cooperative efforts or to avoid certain 
dangers. If the issue is of no real importance, however, continuing the discus-
sion may not be worth the trouble. And sometimes it seems better to tolerate 
divergence of different subjective views; insistence on convergence may lead 
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to awkward, hostile or even violent situations. Belief-desire psychology greatly 
enhances our conflict management skills. To the extent that it is deemed ap-
propriate or required that we resolve our differences, S-representational min-
dreading increases our options in seeking to convince or persuade each other, 
by approaching matters from another direction, making further inquiries, do-
ing further research, seeking advice from experts, etc. When it is undesirable or 
inappropriate to start or continue a discussion, or when the costs of reaching 
agreement are too high, ascription of subjective propositional attitudes ena-
bles us to explicitly mark our cognitive or conative differences so as to avoid 
further confrontation and to prevent misunderstanding in the future. In this 
way, the ascription of subjective propositional attitudes allows us to draw and 
redraw the delicate line between each other’s public discursive responsibilities 
on the one hand, and our right to privately believe and desire on the other. 
Let me also draw attention to the role of belief-desire psychology in what 
Malle et al. (2007) call ‘impression management’, i.e. “attempts to influence an 
audience’s impression of either oneself or another person.” (p. 495) Sometimes 
our interpretative efforts are not primarily directed at genuinely finding out 
what others really intended to do and why. The explanations we provide of 
other people’s behavior may rather serve to confirm our prejudices and prior 
determined evaluations. Finding support for the stories we have told about 
others, for example, may be important to avoid losing face in front of our 
peers and to maintain our position in the social hierarchy. When people act 
in seemingly counter-normative ways, their behavior moreover tends to evoke 
all kinds of emotions, reactions and responses from us: ‘reactive attitudes’, as 
Strawson (1962) called them, of anger, resentment, disapprobation, but also of 
gratitude, admiration, commendation, etc. Sometimes our reactive attitudes 
seem out of order, to the person to whom they are directed, or to some third 
observing party. When this is the case, it is not only the other person’s behavior 
that requires an explanation, but also the behavior we displayed in response. 
Explanations of the other person’s behavior may then function as a justifica-
tion of the ways in which we reacted to that behavior. Our status may be at 
stake, as a person of good will, a forgiving friend, a figure of authority, etc. 
S-representational mindreading can be drawn upon whenever we feel in-
clined to display people in a more or less favorable light.101 In all such cases, as 
101 There is evidence from social psychology which suggests that spontaneously generated 
behavior explanations in terms of propositional attitudes are influenced by such normative con-
siderations. Malle et al. (2007) found that adult observers are more likely to rationalize behavior 
in terms of propositional attitudes (rather than providing ‘causal history explanations’ that cite 
factors that did not figure in the actor’s decision making) when they are motivated to portray 
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Zawidzki (forthcoming, ch. 7) observes, underdetermination due to holism is 
feature rather than a bug. Competent use of belief-desire psychology increases 
our options when trying to justify our prejudices and spontaneous reactions 
towards the behavior of others, by reconstructing it in ways that make our 
judgments and reactions seem more acceptable. It gives us more wiggle room 
to excuse the apparent misconduct of the ones we like or to condemn the 
seemingly innocent behavior of the ones we don’t. At the extreme, belief-
desire psychology can be exploited to intentionally damage the reputation of 
others when it is deemed conducive to reaching our goals. 
A focus on second-person contexts of interpretation reveals that the 
epistemic task of finding out about each other’s goals and reasons always 
takes place in a social setting in which established ways of interaction are 
potentially at stake. In this section I have explored some of the ways in which 
S-representational mindreading enhances our ability to successfully manage 
our dealings with one another in discursive practice. Folk psychological expla-
nation often takes the form of mitigation, justification, exculpation, accusa-
tion, approbation, etc.102 Competent use of belief-desire psychology gives us 
more leeway to find the explanation that best suits our social needs.
6.4 Evaluating Common Practice
The previous section showed how competent use of S-representational belief-
desire psychology increases our options for adjusting, restoring or regulating 
our discursive engagements with one another when our thoughts and actions 
appear to go against the norms of common practice. But it seems that we can 
also engage in S-representational mindreading from a more detached, critical 
perspective: not so much in the course of managing our discursive engage-
ments within common practice, but rather in an attempt to discursively relate 
to that practice itself. 
It is only a short step from interpreting each other as subjectively repre-
the actor in a favorable light. Importantly, this effect persisted independently of the observer’s 
knowledge about the actor. Consider also the so-called the ‘Knobe effect’ (e.g. Knobe 2003, 2006). 
In this case, the attribution of intentions seems to be influenced by negative normative judgments. 
Based on these and other findings, Pettit and Knobe (2009) argue that the impact of normative 
considerations on folk psychological attributions is pervasive. 
102 Cf. Malle et al. (2007, p. 504): “behavior explanations serve more than an epistemic 
function: they are a social activity to manage ongoing interactions [...] Explanations can be used to 
clarify, justify, defend, attack, or flatter; they serve as tools to guide and influence one’s audience’s 
impressions, reactions, and actions.” 
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senting the common world, to interpreting the common world, or at least cer-
tain parts of it, as the contents of our shared subjective representations. When 
we adopt a relatively disengaged, evaluative stance towards our everyday lives 
and start conceiving of common practice as being informed and maintained 
by our subjective attitudes, the question presents itself as to whether our com-
mon views and ways of doing things are (still) justified or whether they are in 
need of revision. From this perspective, common practice starts loosing its ap-
peal as a given103, as providing the unquestionable and incorrigible standards 
of truth and proper conduct. Claims with the impact of common knowledge 
may start to appear as expressions of shared subjective beliefs, rules with the 
power of moral imperatives as articulations of shared subjective values and 
desires. As such, questions can be raised regarding their accuracy and appro-
priateness. S-representational mindreading enables us to make a distinction 
between the public reality of common practice and its private appearance to 
individuals. But with this distinction also comes the contrast between public 
appearance and objective reality.
At the relational level of interpretation, public appearance is objective re-
ality, or rather, objective reality has only one appearance: that of the common 
world. Intersubjectivity is conceived as having what Brandom (1994) calls an 
asymmetric I-we structure. On this conception, inquiry into how things are 
objectively presupposes “the existence of a privileged perspective – that of the 
‘we’, or community. The objective correctness of claims and of the application 
of concepts is identified with what is endorsed by that privileged point of 
view.” (p. 599) At the relational level of understanding, there is only one le-
gitimate perspective when it comes to the objective correctness of conceptual, 
epistemic and practical norms, a perspective which is therefore automatically 
privileged. Accordingly, there is no “room for the possibility of error regarding 
that privileged perspective; what the community takes to be correct is correct.” 
(ibid.) Answers to questions how things are objectively are prescribed by the 
dictates of the community to which one belongs; there is no way of going 
beyond this orthodoxy. The perspectives of individual members ought to be 
compatible with this perspective, on pain of not being recognized as claims 
to objectivity at all. For the relational mindreader, there is no conception of 
objectivity that goes beyond the confines of the common world, no under-
standing of objective truth that exceeds the intersubjective truth of common 
knowledge.104
103 A given, not a Given; see chapter 5.4, footnote 86. 
104 In this context, recall Davidson’s claim, quoted in chapter 5.3, that “Communication 
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Once we draw the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity at the 
level of the group or community as a whole, however, the identification of 
objective correctness with the norms of common practice can no longer be 
maintained. The subjective nature of the public view implies the possibility 
and legitimacy of competing views. The common world is revealed as one par-
ticular, and possibly mistaken, conception of how things really are. From an 
S-representational perspective, intersubjectivity can be perceived as having a 
symmetric I-Thou structure (Brandom 1994, p. 599). On this conception, each 
perspective is at most locally privileged as to how things really are or ought to 
be done. The ‘we’ of common practice starts to appear as another ‘you’, whose 
views are disputable in principle. From this critical stance, any global claim to 
objectivity looses credibility. The symmetry of the I-Thou distinction
ensures that no one perspective is privileged in advance over 
any other. Sorting out who should be counted as correct, whose 
claims and applications of concepts should be treated as authori-
tative, is a messy retail business of assessing comparative author-
ity of competing evidential and inferential claims. Such author-
ity as precipitates out of this process derives from what various 
interlocutors say rather than from who says it; no perspective is 
authoritative as such. There is only the actual practice of sorting 
out who has the better reason in particular cases. (ibid., p. 601)105
depends on each communicator having, and correctly thinking that the other has, the concept 
of a shared world, an intersubjective world.” (1982/2001c, p. 105). Davidson fails to draw the 
distinction between this concept of an intersubjective or common world and the concept of objec-
tive reality, however. For the text continues: “But the concept of an intersubjective world is the 
concept of an objective world, a world about which each communicator can have beliefs.” (ibid.) 
Elsewhere Davidson states that “Thought, propositional thought, is objective in the sense that 
it has a content which is true or false independent (with rare exceptions) of the existence of the 
thought or the thinker.” (1997/2001c, p. 129) This statement can be read in two ways. On the first 
reading, it says that thought is objective insofar as its content is true or false independent of any 
particular instance of thinking. This amounts to the idea that thought has objective purport in the 
sense of being directed at or about something in the external world. On the second reading, it says 
that thought is objective in the sense that it has a content which is true or false independent of 
the community of thinkers to which the thinker of the thought belongs. The first reading is implied 
by the concept of the common world, the second, however, is not. The common world implies the 
existence of a community of rational agents who inhabit it. The idea of the common view being 
false, of the world objectively being a certain way without anyone in one’s community thinking or 
being disposed to think about it in that way, is not intelligible from a relational point of view. This 
notion of objective reality can only be grasped from an S-representational stance. 
105 Brandom proposes to construe objectivity “as consisting in a kind of perspectival form, 
rather than in a nonperspectival or cross-perspectival content. What is shared by all discursive 
perspectives is that there is a difference between what is objectively correct in the way of concept 
application and what is merely taken to be so, not what it is – the structure, not the content.” 
(ibid. p. 600) Notice that this formal understanding of objectivity is only intelligible from an 
S-representational point of view. At the relational level of interpretation, objectivity must have 
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If the Relational Model is correct, this thoroughly S-representational concep-
tion of intersubjectivity does not form the interpretative basis of human social 
practice. In most of our day-to-day interactions, the common world suffices 
as the referent of and standard for our thoughts and actions. Adopting an 
S-representational I-Thou stance towards our rational engagements with one 
another requires considerable training and effort. It is something we can do 
only some of time and each time only with regard to certain aspects of our 
lives. Yet it plays a crucial role at the more advanced levels of the game of giv-
ing and asking for reasons. A critical attitude towards the epistemic norms of 
common practice is what drives scientific inquiry, for example. And question-
ing the presumed unfeasibility or inappropriateness of certain aspirations can 
mark the beginning of technological development or of social and political 
reform. Closer to home, critical assessment of inherited values may be neces-
sary to resolve personal conflicts or to make suitable changes in lifestyle. And 
overcoming interpersonal differences often demands that we re-evaluate the 
norms that we implicitly endorse. In these and numerous other ways, com-
petent use of belief-desire psychology enables us to go beyond the practice of 
commonsense and adopt a critical attitude towards the relation between mind 
and world. 
6.5 Conclusion
According to standard accounts of folk psychology, belief-desire psycho- 
logy is the bread and butter of human discursive practice. Without it, no one 
could treat any other as adopting goals and doing things for reasons. On the 
Relational Model presented here, belief-desire psychology is more like a preci-
sion instrument in our folk psychological toolkit. It is not used for our mun-
dane dealings with one another, not even when these interactions take place 
at the discursive level of giving and asking for goals and reasons. Our mature, 
S-representational concepts of belief, desire and other propositional attitudes 
play an essentially complementary role in commonsense social understand-
ing; they are specifically designed to deal with non-standard, unexpected, dif-
ficult or otherwise problematic social situations.
In this chapter I explored some of the ways in which human interac-
tion can benefit from the subjective shift towards belief-desire psycho- 
substantial content: the world is given objectively as it is publically conceived.
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logy. S-representational mindreading increases our capacity to make sense of 
seemingly irrational, counter-normative behavior. By ascribing a limited set 
of discrepant attitudes, the behavior displayed can be made to fit a rational 
pattern so that the overall deviation from the norms of common practice is 
reduced. I argued that this is of limited use for strictly third-person predic-
tion and explanation. In second-person contexts of interpretation, however, 
it greatly facilitates the management of our discursive engagements with one 
another. It increases our capacity to ask, give and understand ‘normalizing’ 
explanations that seek to maintain or rehabilitate people’s normative status 
or to determine proper sanctions for norm violation. It plays a crucial role in 
the efficient and effective correction of mistakes and the regulation of future 
behavior in educative contexts. Competent use of belief-desire psychology 
also serves our conflict and impression management skills. Approaching dis-
pute from an S-representational point of view greatly increases the chances 
of finding a compromise that is acceptable for all parties involved. And the 
ascription of discrepant attitudes gives us more interpretative options when 
reconstructing behavior so as to fit with the impression others make on us or 
to alter the impression we make on others. Finally, I showed how a subjec-
tive conception of mind influences our thinking about objectivity. From an 
S-representational point of view, the givenness of common sense may start to 
appear as the mere public appearance of an objective reality it is supposed to 
be about. S-representational mindreading thereby enables us to adopt a critical 
stance toward common practice and to evaluate, challenge and even change 
the conceptual, epistemic and practical norms that shape our ordinary ways 
of life. 
In the next and final chapter, I will show how these considerations help to 
explain the reflective fallacy introduced in chapter 1: the fallacy of projecting 
certain philosophical analyses of intentional action in terms of beliefs and 
desires onto our spontaneous, commonsense understanding of each other as 
intentional agents who perform goal-directed actions for reasons. 
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Conclusion
7.1 Summary
Folk psychology is, at its core, goal-reason psychology: an understanding of 
people in terms of the goals they adopt and the reasons they have for adopt-
ing these goals and for performing goal-directed actions. It is the consensus 
view that commonsense goal-reason psychology is belief-desire psychology. 
According to this BD-Model of folk psychology, our understanding of one an-
other as adopting goals in the light of reasons hinges on the concepts of belief 
and desire. Essential for proper mastery of the concepts of belief and desire, 
however, is the capacity to distinguish between the way the world appears to 
the believer or desirer on the one hand, and the way the world is on the other. 
Ascription of belief and desire as such must go accompanied by an acknowl-
edgement of the possibility that the ascribed beliefs and desires are or turn out 
to be false or otherwise inappropriate. Modeling our folk psychological under-
standing of each other exclusively on these concepts, the BD-Model in effect 
gives a thoroughly individualist or subjectivist picture of our commonsense 
conception of the mind. On this picture, the minds of others are essentially 
private minds, whose subjective, perhaps peculiar and possibly mistaken per-
spectives on the world are always marked as such and thus distinguished from 
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the world as we ourselves believe it to be or to become.   
This is a distorted picture folk psychology, so I have argued in this book. 
In its place, I presented the Relational Model of folk psychology. It takes the 
‘commonsense’ in commonsense psychology quite literally, not only in the 
sense that we rely on a shared sense of discursive understanding of the world 
in order to engage with one another, but also in the sense that in doing so, 
we tend to conceive of each other’s minds as essentially intersubjective, public 
phenomena. On this picture, making sense of others is first and foremost an 
attempt to relate them to a common world, a world shaped by public norms 
of reason and proper conduct. In this process, we treat their mental states as 
public states, states consisting in the relation between an individual person 
and the common world. 
On the Relational Model of folk psychology, our basic understanding of 
other people as rational agents relies on the capacity to draw relations between 
them and the things in the common world that constitute their goals and 
reasons. This is what I termed ‘relational mindreading’ in chapter 2. The kind 
of social understanding that results from relational mindreading has generally 
been neglected in the debate on social cognition. The conception of an agent 
as being genuinely intentionally directed at the world in propositionally ar-
ticulated ways, without, however, subjectively representing the world in those 
ways, appears to have been overlooked entirely in the philosophical treatment 
of folk psychology. With this in mind, the first thing to do was to provide a 
conceptually coherent story of relational propositional attitudes and their at-
tribution. This was the first challenge I set for the Relational Model in chapter 
1 and it was addressed in chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 3 lead us through Sellars’s ingeniously designed Myth of Jones. 
Jones bootstrapped the Ryleans into a genuine functionalist understanding 
of mind, of each other’s mental states about goals and reasons in particular. 
But that didn’t suffice to introduce them to the idea that people represent 
their goals and reasons to themselves in ways that may defy public evalua-
tion. Jones taught the Ryleans how to conceive of each other’s mental states 
as FR-representations of the things they intended to achieve and the things 
that make these ends and their means worth accomplishing. But he didn’t 
show them how to treat such states as subjective representations of their goals 
and reasons, i.e. as full-blown desires and beliefs, respectively. Rylean inter-
pretation was still disjunctively split: An agent acting on beliefs and desires 
incompatible with public evaluation could not be regarded as behaving in 
a world-directed way, he either failed in doing so or merely pretended to act 
in such manner. Exploiting Sellars’s verbal behaviorist strategy for our own 
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expository ends, we thus discovered that the functionalist conception of mind 
that Sellars introduced in 1956 and that served as the basis for the philosophi-
cal treatment of folk psychology in subsequent years, was in fact a relational 
conception. 
Chapter 4 showed that the basic idea of relational mindreading does not 
depend on any particular conception of the propositional attitudes attributed. 
The distinction between first-order and second-order mental states enabled 
us to conceive of relational mindreading outside of the functionalist frame-
work of Sellars’s Myth. Relational states may be construed as second-order 
FR-representational states, but they can also be conceived as first-order states 
that lack specification in terms of functional or causal role. The differentiation 
into an intersubjective/public and a subjective/private treatment of mental 
representation furthermore revealed that no concept of mental representation, 
functionalist or otherwise, by itself entails the subjective element of our ma-
ture understanding of belief and desire. Taken together, these considerations 
sufficed to demonstrate the conceptual coherence of the notion of relational 
propositional attitudes and relational mindreading, and thus to establish the 
conceptual validity of the distinction between (the attribution of) relational 
and S-representational propositional attitudes.
But is this distinction also empirically robust, does it actually structure 
our day-to-day discursive engagements with one another? This was the sec-
ond challenge for the Relational Model and it set the agenda for chapters 5 
and 6. Chapter 5 first revealed that the psychological plausibility of relational 
mindreading is not threatened by dominant explanatory theories found in 
the current literature, accounts explicitly targeting the cognitive processes of 
mindreading at the subpersonal level of description. Although clearly inspired 
by the BD-Model, all these explanatory theories of mindreading turned out 
to be compatible with a relational interpretation of the explanandum. Two 
powerful considerations were then presented why such interpretation is actu-
ally to be preferred. The BD-Model faces significant problems in accounting 
for the holistic nature of propositional attitude ascription and the implicit at-
tributions of knowledge that pervade our folk psychological explanations. By 
taking a different perspective on the explanandum of human discursive under-
standing, the Relational Model effectively dissolved both problems. These con-
siderations served as input for a discussion of the ontogeny of mindreading. 
Acquiring a proper understanding of the material (im)proprieties of thought 
and action in childhood requires the presence of deontic scaffoldings, in the 
form of caregivers who point out what counts as a proper reason for adopting 
which goals and performing what kind of actions under which circumstances. 
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Again, we saw that these considerations were in line with the Relational Model 
but failed to make proper sense on the BD-Model. 
The final hurdle was to account for the complementary roles of belief-desire 
psychology in discursive practice. This was the focus of chapter 6. Competent 
use of belief-desire psychology increases our capacity to make sense of seem-
ingly irrational, counter-normative behavior. This facilitates the management 
of our discursive engagements with one another in a variety of ways. It gives 
us more interpretative options when seeking to maintain or rehabilitate peo-
ple’s normative status or determining proper sanctions for norm violation. It 
plays a crucial role in the efficient and effective correction of mistakes and the 
regulation of future behavior in educative contexts. It moreover enhances our 
capacity to find compromises in situations of dispute, to protect our own im-
age or to destroy that of others. Finally, S-representational mindreading allows 
us to develop new standards of objectivity and to critically evaluate, challenge 
or change the norms that shape common practice. 
Together, chapter 5 and 6 completed the second challenge laid out for the 
Relational Model and established the practical importance of the distinction 
between relational and S-representational mindreading. Relational mindread-
ing is the central engine of our discursive engagements with one another. It 
forms the psychological basis on which many of our social practices are built. 
S-representational mindreading has an essentially complementary function in 
human interaction. It finds its proper application in relatively complex so-
cial situations, situations in which relational mindreading could only lead to 
misunderstanding. 
7.2 The Fallacy Revealed
Why has a relational conception of the propositional attitudes received so lit-
tle attention in the debate on folk psychology? One of problems I encountered 
in thinking about folk psychology is that we do not have a distinctive termi-
nology for relational propositional attitudes. In folk psychological practice, 
factive explanations often suffice to specify the relational attitudes ascribed. 
John goes to the supermarket in order to buy some milk because he’s run out 
of milk. His relational attitude of desire is conveyed by the description of a 
future state of affairs as his goal, i.e. to buy some milk at the supermarket; his 
relational attitude of knowledge is presupposed by the description of a fact as 
his reason, i.e. that he has run out of milk. We tend to switch to explicit propo-
sitional attitude ascription only when factive explanations no longer suffice, 
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when there is doubt about the agent’s epistemic or motivational state or when 
generating such explanations would come into conflict with our own com-
mitments as to what counts as an appropriate goal or a reason-constituting 
fact given the circumstances. Our explicit propositional attitude terminology 
has a strong S-representational connotation. Using it from a theoretical point 
of view in the debate on folk psychology can easily make one blind toward 
the possibility that there might actually be a relational understanding of 
propositional attitudes underlying our more sophisticated, S-representational 
concepts.  
In chapter 1 I suggested that the BD-Model is the expression of a reflective 
fallacy: the fallacy of projecting certain philosophical analyses of intentional 
action in terms of beliefs and desires onto our spontaneous, commonsense 
understanding of each other in terms of goals and reasons. I also suggested 
(see chapter 2) that the incentive for the BD-Model comes from a certain un-
derstanding of the truth of the following conditional: 
C:  Whenever an action is explained in terms of a goal at which      
      it is directed and a reason for which it is performed, there is an  
        explanation of that action in terms of, inter alia, a Humean belief-
       desire pair. 
Proponents of the BD-Model want to explain the truth of C either in terms 
of conceptual entailment or in terms of presupposition of the consequent by the 
antecedent. According to the first option, our folk conception of intentional 
action is such that having a goal and having a reason entails having a desire 
about that goal and having a belief about that reason. According to the sec-
ond option, attribution of goals and reasons presupposes not only the truth, 
existence or expected occurrence of the facts, states of affairs or events that 
constitute those goals and reasons, but also the presence in the agent of beliefs 
and desires representing those goals and reasons. In the debate on folk psy-
chology, this second interpretation of conditional C seeps through in the idea 
that attribution of goals and reasons psychologically requires the ascriptions 
of goal-representing desires and reason-representing beliefs. 
Having met the first challenge outlined above, we can now see that the 
first option is not available: chapter 3 and 4 showed that there is a concep-
tual distinction to be drawn between being directed at/representing goals and 
reasons simpliciter on the one hand and subjectively representing goals and 
reasons by instantiating desires and beliefs on the other. Thus, having goals 
and reasons does not entail having subjective desires and beliefs about these 
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goals and reasons. Having met the second challenge, it also becomes clear 
why the second option is no longer attractive. Chapter 5 made a strong case 
for the psychological role of relational mindreading in our everyday discur-
sive understanding of one another. Accordingly, the attribution of goals and 
reasons in folk psychological practice often need not require the ascription of 
desires and beliefs subjectively representing those goals and reasons; relational 
mindreading suffices. 
In chapter 2.5 I proposed to explain the truth of conditional C not con-
ceptually or psychologically, but socially in terms of the rationale of the subjec-
tive shift to belief-desire psychology in human discursive practice. The idea 
was that we can explain the truth of C with reference to a rule in the game 
of giving and asking for reasons that entitles participants to make the shift 
towards S-representational mindreading at any stage in the game. Conditional 
C would then simply be a restatement of that rule: whenever an action can be 
explained in terms of goals and reasons, one is entitled to explain that action in 
terms of subjective desires and beliefs about those goals and reasons. 
After having explored the social functions of belief-desire psychology in 
chapter 6, we can now explain why there is such a rule. I do not think it is a 
rule that applies in ordinary folk psychological practice. Explicit reference to 
subjective beliefs and desires often gives rise to unwanted and inappropriate 
implicatures. In philosophical practice, however, the rule does seem to apply. 
In chapter 6.4 I argued that belief-desire psychology enables participants in 
discursive practice to adopt a reflective, critical stance towards common prac-
tice. Well, philosophers are most critical folk. They have made it their specialty 
to adopt a critical attitude toward the relation between mind and world. The 
truth of C can be explained by pointing out that within the discursive practice of 
philosophy, one is always entitled to make an S-representational shift towards 
the phenomena under investigation and to study the mind-world relation 
from a relatively detached, objective point of view. 
Conditional C gives expression to a rule in a philosophical language game, 
a game concerned with providing conceptual clarity to our commonsense un-
derstanding of mind and action. But the clarity one aspires should not be 
measured by the rules that regulate the philosophical practice one is engaged 
in. The reflective fallacy lies in an attempt to treat a rule of a philosophical 
game as a logical principle that defines our commonsense concepts, or as a 
psychological principle that guides our practice of wielding them in quotidian 
social contexts. It is fed by the intuition that philosophical explanations in 
terms of beliefs and desires are in some sense more fundamental than explana-
tions merely in terms of goals and reasons. But they are not more fundamen-
C
on
cl
us
io
n
181 
tal. The philosophical study of mind and action is conceptually and psycho-
logically more sophisticated than our mundane ways of thinking about such 
things, in the sense that it requires more practice and training and might give 
us better insight. But for all that, it is conceptually and psychologically less 
fundamental. It only appears to be more fundamental if one mistakes doing 
philosophy for the real thing. 
C
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Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch)
‘Folk psychology’ is de psychologie die we in de alledaagse sociale praktijk 
gebruiken om elkaar en onszelf te begrijpen. Het omvat een rijke verzameling 
van begrippen die allemaal te maken hebben met onze psyche, geest of ‘mind’, 
begrippen die we nodig hebben om te begrijpen waarom iemand iets denkt, 
voelt, zegt, doet of juist nalaat. Dit proefschrift spitst zich toe op de psycholo-
gie die we doorgaans gebruiken om elkaars gedrag te begrijpen als intentionele 
handelingen, d.w.z. als gedrag met doelen en redenen. 
Stel je ziet je partner ’s ochtends na het ontbijt op een doordeweekse dag 
haastig zijn jaszakken doorzoeken. Je interpreteert dit gedrag als een handeling 
die hij uitvoert met het doel zijn autosleutels te vinden. Je partner doet dit 
natuurlijk niet zomaar. Hij zoekt zijn autosleutels omdat het nu echt tijd is 
om naar zijn werk te gaan (zijn reden om naar zijn autosleutels te zoeken). Het 
interpreteren van elkaars gedrag in termen van doelen en redenen voor han-
delen is iets wat we voortdurend doen, meestal zonder erbij na te denken. Het 
is een sociaal-cognitief vermogen dat vaak zo vanzelfsprekend is, dat je bijna 
zou vergeten hoe belangrijk het is voor het dagelijkse intermenselijke verkeer. 
Zonder folk psychology zou je niet in staat zijn het simpele scenario hierboven 
te begrijpen. Je zou geen idee hebben in welke context je de graaiende hand-
bewegingen van je partner moest plaatsen. Folk psychology ligt ten grondslag 
aan alle complexe sociale relaties en omgangsvormen die onze maatschappij 
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typeren. Het is een begrippenkader dat elk zich normaal ontwikkeld kind zich 
toe-eigent en dat het nodig heeft om volwaardig deel te kunnen nemen aan 
onze samenleving. 
Folk psychology, in engere zin, heeft dus betrekking op onze sociale vaar-
digheid elkaars gedrag te interpreteren in termen van doelen en redenen voor 
handelen. Kort gezegd: op ons vermogen te snappen wat iemand doet en waar-
om. In dit proefschrift beschrijf ik dit vermogen als een typisch rationele, dis-
cursieve vorm van sociale cognitie. Door gebruik te maken van folk psychology 
plaatsen we gedrag in een redelijke context. Dit stelt ons in staat om met elkaar 
in gesprek te komen over wat we hebben gedaan of willen gaan doen, om 
extra uitleg te geven over het hoe en waarom of verdere afwegingen te maken 
over wat het meest wenselijk of praktisch is, gegeven de omstandigheden. In 
de filosofische en wetenschappelijke literatuur wordt ook wel gesproken over 
‘mentaliseren’ of ‘mindreading’ wanneer men het heeft over deze discursieve 
vorm van sociale cognitie. Het betreft de vaardigheid andermans gedrag te 
interpreteren in de context van zijn of haar mentale leefwereld, om iemands 
‘mind’ te kunnen ‘lezen’ in het gedrag dat hij of zij vertoont in een bepaalde 
situatie.   
In de filosofische en wetenschappelijke literatuur over folk psychology 
houdt men zich met name bezig met de vraag hoe deze vorm van sociale 
cognitie psychologisch of neurobiologisch verklaard moet worden. Is folk 
psychology bijvoorbeeld een theorie met behulp waarvan we interne causaal 
effectieve toestanden postuleren achter het gedrag dat we proberen te begri-
jpen, analoog aan de manier waarop wetenschappers (cognitief psychologen, 
neurowetenschappers) gedragsfenomenen proberen te verklaren? Of is men-
taliseren veeleer een vorm van simulatie die ons in staat stelt ons te verplaatsen 
in het perspectief van de ander om zodoende te ervaren wat hij of zij van plan 
is en waarom?  
De discussie tussen aanhangers van deze twee stromingen (de zogenaamde 
‘theorie theorie’ en ‘simulatie theorie’) heeft het filosofische en wetenschap-
pelijke debat over folk psychology de afgelopen decennia sterk bepaald.  Met 
een focus op het vinden van een psychologische of neurobiologische verkla-
ring van ons vermogen tot mentaliseren is een behoorlijke discussie over een 
adequate karakterisering ervan echter achterwege gebleven. Aanhangers van 
zowel de theorie theorie als de simulatie theorie veronderstellen veelal een 
begrip van mentaliseren dat, zo beweer ik in dit proefschrift, ongenuanceerd 
en onvolledig is en daarom geen goede afspiegeling kan vormen van het feno-
meen dat ze proberen te verklaren. Door de exclusieve focus op verklarende 
theorieën is een belangrijk explanandum (wat verklaard moet worden) van dis-
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cursieve sociale cognitie over het hoofd gezien. Het doel van dit proefschrift 
is om deze vorm van doel-redeninterpretatie voor het voetlicht te brengen en 
te laten zien welke cruciale rol het speelt in onze dagelijkse sociale praktijk. 
Een ander voorbeeld. Stel een vriendin belt je op om af te zeggen voor 
vanavond. Haar moeder is plotseling ernstig ziek geworden en ze zit nu in de 
auto op weg naar haar moeder om haar bij te staan. De uitleg van je vriendin 
kan als volgt worden weergegeven. 
U1:  V is op weg naar haar moeder… 
 - om haar bij te staan 
 - omdat zij plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden. 
Het eerste gedeelte van de uitleg geeft V’s doel weer: ze is op weg naar haar 
moeder met als doel haar bij te staan. Het tweede gedeelte laat zien waarom 
V dit doel heeft: V wil haar moeder bij staan met als reden dat haar moeder 
plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden. Zo op het eerste gezicht geeft U1 een prima 
verklaring van V’s gedrag. En in principe heb je ook geen extra informatie 
nodig om te snappen wat ze aan het doen is en waarom. Merk echter op dat 
U1 geen expliciete mentaliserende terminologie bevat. V verklaart haar gedrag 
met verwijzing naar haar doel (haar moeder bijstaan) en haar reden daarvoor 
(haar moeder is plotseling ernstig ziek geworden). Het doel van haar handeling 
wordt hier verwoord als een toekomstige gebeurtenis (haar moeder bijstaan) 
de reden als een feit of stand van zaken (haar moeder is plotseling ernstig 
ziek geworden). V verklaart haar gedrag door te verwijzen naar gebeurtenissen, 
feiten of standen van zaken in de buitenwereld, niet door expliciet te refereren 
aan haar eigen mentale toestanden.  
 Hoe moeten we dit nu begrijpen? Is V’s uitleg bij nader inzien dan toch 
geen vorm van mentaliseren, maar slechts een soort van reductionistische 
stimulus-responsverklaring van gedrag in termen van ‘input’ vanuit de buiten-
wereld? Een dergelijk radicaal behaviorisme is niet erg plausibel. Immers, V’s 
uitleg laat duidelijk zien dat haar gedrag een intentionele handeling is met 
doelen en redenen. En een intentionele handeling veronderstelt een mind die 
gedachten heeft, plannen maakt en intenties vormt: mentale activiteit die niet 
tot gedrag is te reduceren. Wat maakt V’s uitleg dan tot een mentaliserende 
interpretatie? In het debat over folk psychology luidt het standaard antwoord 
op deze vraag als volgt: je interpreteert V’s uitleg in termen van doelen en 
redenen omdat je haar bewust of onbewust mentale toestanden toeschrijft die 
haar doelen en redenen representeren. Discursieve sociale cognitie, zo luidt de 
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consensus, vindt haar essentie dus in het toeschrijven van representationele 
mentale toestanden.  
Ik denk dat dit een verkeerde manier is om ons alledaags begrip van uit-
spraken als U1 te karakteriseren. De stelling van dit proefschrift is dat discur-
sieve sociale cognitie doorgaans niet representationeel is, maar relationeel. Dit 
betekent grofweg dat we de minds van anderen, door hun gedrag te relateren 
aan de buitenwereld, begrijpen in termen van de buitenwereld. Maar dit maakt 
het gedrag van anderen niet ‘mindless’, zoals in een radicaal-behavioristische 
verklaring, het maakt de buitenwereld juist ‘mindful’.
Volgens het standaard model van folk psychology maken wij in ons 
alledaags begrip van uitspraken als U1 noodzakelijkerwijs gebruik van de 
concepten van ‘belief’ en ‘desire’ (enigszins krom vertaald als ‘overtuiging’ of 
‘geloof’ en ‘verlangen’). Het zogenaamde ‘Belief-Desire Model’ (BD-Model) van 
folk psychology stelt dat U1 per definitie onvolledig is en slechts een verkorte 
versie is van de werkelijke verklaring: 
U2:  V is op weg naar haar moeder… 
 - met het verlangen haar bij te staan 
 - omdat ze gelooft dat zij plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden.
Het BD-Model zegt hiermee dat het toeschrijven van doelen en redenen voor 
handelen de begrippen van ‘belief’ en ‘desire’ impliciet veronderstelt: verlan-
gens (desires) naar de toegeschreven doelen en overtuigingen (beliefs) over de 
toegeschreven redenen. Beliefs en desires worden in de filosofische traditie als 
prototypes beschouwd van representationele, subjectieve mentale toestanden. Ze 
geven uitdrukking aan de manier waarop degene aan wie ze toegeschreven 
worden, de wereld representeert, hoe deze persoon de wereld subjectief ervaart. 
Dit komt het meest duidelijk naar voren wanneer je iemand een onjuiste over-
tuiging toeschrijft: je begrijpt deze persoon dan als iemand die de wereld mis-
representeert, iemand die een subjectief oordeel heeft over de wereld dat niet 
strookt met de werkelijkheid. Iets dergelijks doet zich ook voor wanneer je 
iemands gedrag interpreteert in termen van een onrealistisch of ongepast verlan-
gen. De persoon die zich een doel stelt vanuit een onrealistische verlangen is 
iemand wiens subjectieve verwachting ten aanzien van de toekomst niet reëel 
is, iemand die de toekomst dus op een bepaalde manier mis-representeert. En 
een ongepast verlangen representeert een doel dat iemand niet zou moeten 
hebben in de specifieke situatie waarin hij of zij verkeert: het is een mis-rep-
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resentatie van de praktische normen die gelden in de betreffende situatie.106 
Een goed verstaan van de begrippen ‘belief’ en ‘desire’ vereist dus dat we 
een onderscheid maken tussen de wereld zoals hij is (zoals hij ons toeschijnt) 
en de wijze waarop degene aan wie beliefs en desires wordt toegeschreven de 
wereld subjectief representeert. Volgens het BD-Model ontleent elke uitleg van 
andermans handelen in termen van gebeurtenissen en feiten of standen van 
zaken in de buitenwereld, zijn verklarende kracht aan een onderliggende repre-
sentationele verklaring in termen van beliefs en desires. Het BD-Model schetst 
een exclusief subjectivistisch beeld van de discursieve mind. Het veronderstelt 
daarmee een vorm van mind-wereld dualisme dat mijns inziens ons spontane 
begrip van elkaar als gesituationeerde, rationele actoren wezensvreemd is.
Het alternatief dat ik in dit proefschrift hiertegenover plaats, begint bij de 
simpele observatie dat in de meeste alledaagse situaties een representationeel 
begrip van elkaars handelen helemaal niet nodig is. In verreweg de meeste 
gevallen delen we onze overtuigingen en verlangens ten aanzien van redenen 
en doelen voor handelen in een bepaalde praktische situatie. Als je met je auto 
naar werk moet, ga je de autosleutels zoeken. Bijvoorbeeld in de zakken van je 
jas. En wanneer je hoort dat je moeder plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden, ga 
je naar haar toe om haar bij te staan. Natuurlijk geldt dit niet voor iedereen in 
elke situatie, maar dit zijn de uitzonderingen die de regel bevestigen. 
Over het algemeen handelen we zoals we behoren te handelen, met de 
doelen en redenen die we behoren te hebben, gegeven de specifieke omstan-
digheden. En dit is maar goed ook. Mensen die in hun gedrag te veel afwij-
ken van geldende socio-culturele normen, worden onvoorspelbaar. En met 
onvoorspelbare mensen kun je niet samenwerken, laat staan samenleven. Folk 
psychology is bruikbaar omdat en voor zover we handelen overeenkomstig 
106  In de ontwikkelingspsychologie wordt het begrip van beliefs en desires bij jonge kin-
deren getest met behulp van zgn. ‘false belief tests’ en ‘discongruent desire tests’. Bij de klassieke 
false belief test kijkt een kind naar een scenario met twee poppen, waarna het een voorspelling 
moet doen van het gedrag van een van de poppen. Om de juiste voorspelling te geven, zo is de 
redenering, moet het kind een false belief aan de betreffende pop toeschrijven. Het scenario is 
bijvoorbeeld als volgt. Pop A stopt een voorwerp X in een mand en plaatst vervolgens het deksel 
weer op de mand, zodat het voorwerp niet meer te zien is. Naast de mand staat een kast met een 
deur. Na voorwerp X in de mand te hebben gestopt verlaat pop A de ruimte. Vervolgens komt pop 
B binnen, haalt X uit de mand, plaatst het deksel weer op de mand, stopt X in de kast, en sluit de 
kastdeur, zodat ook nu het voorwerp niet te zien is. Hierna verlaat pop B de ruimte. Wanneer pop 
A weer terugkomt, wordt aan het kind de vraag gesteld waar A zal gaan kijken om X te pakken: in 
de mand of in de kast? Als het kind het goede antwoord geeft (de mand), zou het snappen dat A 
een subjectieve mis-representatie heeft van voorwerp X als zijnde in de mand, terwijl X in de kast 
ligt. Bij dergelijke klassieke false belief tests geven kinderen pas vanaf ongeveer 4-jarige leeftijd het 
goede antwoord.  Jongere kinderen  wijzen stelselmatig naar de kast wanneer hen de vraag gesteld 
wordt. De verschillende false belief tests en discongruent desire tests worden besproken in de ap-
pendix bij hoofdstuk 5.  
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de normen die folk psychology veronderstelt. Een goede opvoeding en gede-
gen onderwijs zorgt er in de meeste gevallen voor dat we ons aan de normen 
houden en een praktische situatie inschatten zoals we dat behoren te doen, 
door de juiste doelen te stellen op basis van de juiste redenen, gegeven die 
situatie. Dit normatieve aspect van folk psychology wordt nogal eens over het 
hoofd gezien. We maken gebruik van folk psychology om anderen te kunnen 
mentaliseren. Maar mentaliseren of mindreading zou praktisch onmogelijk 
zijn zonder een pedagogisch proces van mindshaping, waarin onze mindset 
gevormd wordt door de gedragsnormen de impliciet gesteld worden door folk 
psychology.  
Zolang anderen handelen in overeenstemming met hoe het hoort, is een 
representationeel begrip van hun mind niet nodig. Als je niet precies begrijpt 
wat ze aan het doen zijn, volstaat informatie over de gebeurtenissen, feiten 
of standen van zaken in de buitenwereld die hun doelen en redenen vormen. 
Het heeft dan geen praktisch toegevoegde waarde om stil te staan, bewust 
of onbewust, bij hun subjectieve representatie van deze gebeurtenissen, feiten 
of standen van zaken. Een representationeel begrip van rationeel handelen 
wordt van belang wanneer anderen praktische of epistemische normen lijken 
te schenden, wanneer er onduidelijkheid is over deze normen of wanneer we 
het van belang achten ze te evalueren of te veranderen. 
Het alternatief dat ik tegenover het BD-Model plaats, noem ik in hoofdstuk 
2 het ‘Relationele Model’ van folk psychology. Het Relationele Model onder-
scheidt twee vormen van discursieve sociale cognitie: ‘relational mindreading’ 
en ‘representational mindreading’. Representational mindreading is belief-de-
sire psychologie, zoals beschreven door het BD-Model. Het Relationele Model 
stelt echter dat representational mindreading een typisch reflectieve manier is 
van interpretatie, een uitzonderlijke vorm die we nodig hebben in problema-
tische sociale situaties, zoals hierboven beschreven: wanneer we normen lijken 
te schenden, etc. 
De cognitieve basis van onze dagelijkse discursieve interactie bestaat ech-
ter uit relational mindreading. Relational mindreading is onze spontane manier 
van discursieve sociale cognitie. Het is een echte vorm van mentaliseren, maar 
zonder de ander te conceptualiseren als iemand die de wereld subjectief repre- 
senteert. In de act van relational mindreading relateer je de ander aan de 
doelen en redenen in de buitenwereld die zijn of haar handeling begrijpelijk 
maken. Dit betekent dat je op dat moment geen rekening houdt met de mo-
gelijkheid dat de doelen en redenen van de ander inadequaat (onhaalbaar, 
ongepast, niet gebaseerd op feiten, etc.) zijn. Je gaat ervan uit dat de ander 
handelt zoals hij zou moeten handelen in zijn situatie. De technische term 
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‘relationeel’ is gekozen omdat het veronderstelt dat beide zgn. ‘relata’ (wat aan 
elkaar gerelateerd wordt) in de wereld aanwezig zijn (waren of zullen zijn). Je 
interpreteert de ander dus als iemand die in zijn doen en laten betrokken is op 
de wereld zoals jij die zelf ook ervaart en inschat. 
Bekijk nogmaals bovenstaand voorbeeld: Je vriendin is op weg naar haar 
moeder om haar bij te staan omdat zij plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden. 
Deze verklaring veronderstelt dat het waar is dat de moeder van je vriendin 
plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden. Het klinkt absurd als je zou zeggen: “V is op 
weg naar haar moeder omdat haar moeder plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden. 
Maar haar moeder is niet ziek.” De verklaring van V’s gedrag in het voorbeeld 
is ‘factief’; door de verklaring te accepteren committeer je je er zelf aan dat het 
een feit is dat de moeder van V plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden.  Contrasteer 
dit met een verklaring in termen van belief: V is op weg naar haar moeder 
omdat ze denkt dat haar moeder plotseling ernstig ziek is geworden. Maar haar 
moeder is niet ziek.” Een dergelijke uitspraak is allesbehalve absurd. En dat 
komt doordat je hier expliciet onderscheid maakt tussen V’s subjectieve repre-
sentatie van de gezondheidstoestand van haar moeder en de haar werkelijke 
(als werkelijk veronderstelde) gezondheidstoestand. 
Representational mindreading projecteert een subjectieve representatie 
van de wereld op de wereld zoals je hem zelf ervaart, een soort privé leefwereld 
van de ander die onderscheiden wordt van de wereld waarin je zijn gedrag 
plaatst. Relational mindreading daarentegen veronderstelt een gedeelde, pub-
lieke leefwereld waarin de ander wordt gerelateerd aan de doelen en redenen 
die oplichten in zijn praktische situatie. Het Relationele Model stelt dat deze 
relationele, publieke conceptie van mind aan de basis ligt van folk psycho- 
logy. Verklaringen van andermans gedrag in termen van gebeurtenissen, feiten 
of standen van zaken in de buitenwereld zijn mentaliserend, niet doordat ze 
mentale representaties van een ‘mindless’ buitenwereld veronderstellen, maar 
doordat deze gebeurtenissen, feiten en standen van zaken impliciet als ‘mind-
ful’ worden beschouwd, d.w.z. als wezenlijke onderdelen van de intentionele 
relaties van andermans handelen. Een paar pagina’s terug omschreef ik men-
taliseren als het vermogen om iemands gedrag te interpreteren in de context 
van zijn of haar mentale leefwereld. Het Relationele Model laat zien dat deze 
mentale leefwereld niets meer en niets minder hoeft te zijn dan de wereld 
waarin we leven.  
De conceptuele uitdaging voor dit proefschrift is om deze relationele con-
ceptie van mind hard te maken. Dit heeft echter alleen kans van slagen als we 
ons bevrijden van het mind-wereld dualisme dat inherent is aan het BD-Model. 
Hiertoe bespreek ik in hoofdstuk 3 een beroemd gedachte-experiment van de 
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filosoof Wilfrid Sellars uit 1956, dat aan de basis stond van het filosofische de-
bat over folk psychology. Sellars’ gedachte-experiment wordt vaak beschouwd 
als een vorm van conceptuele analyse van ons representationele begrip van 
mind. Ik laat zien waarom dit niet klopt en waarom het juist een perfecte 
manier is om een relationele conceptie van discursieve interactie te introduc-
eren. In hoofdstuk 4 worden de relationele tegenhangers van beliefs en desires 
verder uitgewerkt tegen de achtergrond van dominante verklarende theorieën 
in het debat: de verschillende versies van de theorie theorie en de simulatie 
theorie.  Ik laat zien dat al deze verklarende theorieën in wezen compatibel 
zijn met een relationele conceptie van het explanandum van discursieve sociale 
cognitie. 
Hoofdstuk 5 laat vervolgens zien waarom het Relationele Model inderdaad 
een vruchtbaarder karakterisering geeft van doel-redeninterpretatie dan het 
BD-Model. Het Relationele Model kan uitleggen hoe we in staat zijn elkaar 
vliegensvlug te begrijpen in alledaagse situaties, het maakt inzichtelijk hoe we 
anderen kennis kunnen toeschrijven (i.p.v. slechts overtuigingen) en het geeft 
antwoord op de vraag hoe kinderen op jonge leeftijd geïntroduceerd worden 
in de wereld van folk psychology. Op al deze punten scoort het BD-Model 
aanzienlijk slechter. Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op de additionele functie van repre-
sentational mindreading. De praktische waarde van belief-desire ascriptie ligt 
in de mogelijkheden die het schept om om te gaan met anderen wanneer ze 
de normen lijken te schenden, om verschillen van mening uit te praten, om 
consensus te creëren, of om kritisch te reflecteren op onze normatieve prak-
tijken zelf, bijvoorbeeld wanneer we vinden dat ze verbeterd kunnen worden. 
Hoofdstukken 1 en 7 vormen samen het sluitstuk van dit proefschrift. 
Ze fungeren niet alleen als introductie op, resp. samenvatting van de andere 
hoofdstukken, maar geven tegelijkertijd antwoord op een achterliggende 
vraag: hoe komt het dat de relationele vorm van discursieve sociale cogni-
tie nagenoeg onopgemerkt is gebleven in de filosofische discussies over folk 
psychology? Het antwoord dat in hoofdstuk 1 geponeerd en in hoofdstuk 7 
beargumenteerd wordt, is dat we als filosofen vatbaar zijn voor een reflectieve 
denkfout. Wanneer filosofen reflecteren op alledaagse sociale cognitie, zijn ze 
geneigd hun eigen kritische, reflectieve interpretatie van de sociale situatie te 
projecteren op ons alledaagse begrip ervan. Filosofische reflectie is bij uitstek 
een cognitieve exercitie waarbij belief-desire psychologie goed van pas komt, 
zelfs onontbeerlijk is. Vanuit een filosofische houding lijkt het alsof de begrip-
pen van doelen en redenen voor handelen, de begrippen van desire en belief 
veronderstellen. Als het Relationele Model klopt, is dit echter slechts kritische 
schijn. De filosofische praktijk is een uitzonderlijke sociale praktijk. Het kan 
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alleen maar vertekenend werken als we de psychologie van alledaagse sociale 
interactie modelleren naar de reflectieve houding van iemand die deze interac-
tie slechts van een afstand aanschouwt. 
S
am
en
va
tt
in
g 
(S
um
m
ar
y 
in
 D
ut
ch
)
Curriculum Vitae
Derek Willem Strijbos was born in Nijmegen on August 24th, 1979. He attended 
high school (Gymnasium) at Bernardinuscollege in Heerlen, where he gradu-
ated cum laude in 1997. He returned to Nijmegen to study medicine, which 
he combined with philosophy from 2002 onwards. After earning his MD in 
2004, he worked at an addiction treatment center for 3 years, completing 
his MA-thesis in philosophy cum laude in 2006. He joined the department of 
philosophy of the Radboud University Nijmegen as a junior researcher (PhD-
student) in 2007, where he worked on his PhD-thesis under supervision of 
prof. dr. Slors, published papers on social cognition and folk psychology, and 
taught several courses on the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psy-
chology. In the fall of 2011, Derek started his residency training in psychiatry 
at Dimence in Zwolle under supervision of prof. dr. Glas. He has a part-time 
research position at the Radboud University, currently focusing his research on 
the philosophy of psychiatry. Derek is married to Ayse Baltacı. Together they 
have two sons, Süleyman and Isaak. 
Alvarez, M. 11n, 36(n), 38, 39 
Apperly, I.A. 30, 32, 126-127, 129, 152(n), 153
Baillargeon, R. 30, 150, 151
Baker, L. 15
Baron-Cohen, S. 18, 150
Bermúdez, J.L. 30, 31n, 129-130
Birch, S. 137
Bloom, P. 137
Brandom, R.B. 23n, 25, 75, 106n, 108n, 164n, 
171-172(n)
Bruner, J. 139, 164-165
Butterfill, S. 126-127, 152(n), 153
Carruthers, P. 126
Churchland, P.M. 14, 15, 71, 147
Csibra, G. 30, 126
Dancy, J. 11n, 36(n), 37, 38, 39(n), 40(n), 93n
Davidson, D. 11n, 12-13(n), 17, 31n, 86, 128-
129(n), 134, 137, 138, 144, 171n
Davies, M. 16, 18, 159
Dennett, D.C. 14, 15(n), 17, 119n, 137
DeVries, W. 48n, 73-74, 75, 81, 101n 
Dretske, F. 14, 55, 57n, 68n
Flavell, J.H. 90n, 144
Fodor, J. 14, 15, 18, 67n, 71, 99, 103n
Gallagher, S. 17, 30, 76, 99
Gergely, G. 30, 126
Gettier, E. 135, 136
Goldie, P. 35
Goldman, A.I. 16(n), 18, 30n, 31n, 124-126, 
132, 136, 140, 148
Gopnik, A. 19(n), 71, 120, 154, 155
Gordon, R.M. 16, 20n, 37n, 39n, 91-94(n), 
100n, 112-115(n), 135, 140, 148
Heal, J. 16, 31n, 73n, 130, 131-132(n), 140, 
143n, 148(n)
Herschbach, M. 76
Hornsby, J. 134-135
Hutto, D.D. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21n, 30, 69n, 71, 99, 
138, 140-142, 148n, 162-163, 165, 168
Jackson, F. 14, 69n, 101n
Kim, J. 70n
Leslie, A.M. 18, 67n, 120-122, 124
Lewis, D. 14, 72, 119
Malle, B.F. 35, 169(n), 170n
McDowell, J. 84-86, 147n
McGeer, V. 17, 138, 148, 165, 166
Meltzoff, A.N. 19(n), 71, 120
Millikan, R.G. 55, 56, 101n
Morton, A. 16, 17, 31n, 69n, 129, 166
Nichols, S. 18, 31n, 32, 121, 122-124, 127, 131-
132, 147
O’ Shea, J.R. 48n, 68n, 79, 81, 101n
Perner, J. 20n, 29, 67n, 90-91, 94, 99n, 103-
105(n), 144-146, 150, 152n, 154
Pettit, P. 14, 69n
Rakoczy, H. 143n, 154
Ratcliffe, M. 20n, 30, 35, 89-90, 142
Rosenberg, J.F. 48n, 68n, 94n, 101n
Ryle, G. 44n, 46n
Schueler, G.F. 35, 36, 37, 69n
Searle, J. 20, 21
Sellars, W. 25, 43-86, 94-100, 105(n), 139n, 
176-177
Smith, M. 11n, 12-13, 24, 27, 34n, 36, 37n, 
59n, 147n
Southgate, V. 150, 151
Spaulding, S. 76(n), 130, 159n
Stich, S. 14, 18, 31n, 32, 121, 122-124, 127, 
131-132, 147
Stone, T. 16, 18, 159
Stoutland, F. 11n, 36(n), 37(n)
Tomasello, M. 30, 143
Wellman, H.M. 19, 71, 120, 150
Williams, B.A.O 39
Wilkes, K. 15
Woodward, A.L. 30
Woodward, J. 99n
Zahavi, D. 30, 76
Zawidzki, T.W. 17, 30, 31n, 129, 130, 138, 147, 
152, 166
Author Index






THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS 
OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
IN A PUBLIC STATE 
OF MIND
Derek Strijbos
IN A PUBLIC STATE OF MIND
Derek Strijbos
Op 8 november 2012, 
om 15.30 uur precies, zal ik 
mijn proefschrift getiteld
in het openbaar verdedigen 
in de Aula van de Radboud 
Universiteit, 
Comeniuslaan 2 te Nijmegen. 
UITNODIGING
IN A PUBLIC STATE OF MIND
THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
PARANIMFEN
Cyril Moers
Roel Schutgens
Jules van Binsbergen
U bent van harte 
uitgenodigd deze 
plechtigheid bij te 
wonen. 
Aansluitend is er 
een receptie in 
hetzelfde gebouw. 
Derek Strijbos
Understanding people in terms of their goals and reasons lies at the heart of 
our socio-cognitive abilities. It reveals the human mind as a discursive mind, a 
mind capable of reasoning about what to do and why. Established wisdom in 
many corners of philosophy and psychology has it that discursive social practice 
hinges on the ascription of representational mental states, prototypically beliefs 
and desires. On this so-called belief-desire model, we interpret the discursive 
minds of others essentially and exclusively as representational minds. This dis-
sertation departs from this consensus view and argues that our quotidian, spon-
taneous understanding of one another in terms of goals and reasons is a form 
of relational sense-making. Accordingly, folk psychological practice is based on 
the ascription of relational mental states, states that relate the individuals we 
interact with to their goals and reasons out in the public world of common 
understanding. On this account, representational belief-desire psychology is not 
the conceptual core of folk psychology, nor the driving psychological force be-
hind our discursive engagements with one another. Rather, it is an essentially 
complementary form of social cognition, designed for reflection on and man-
agement of such discursive engagements when our default, relational modus of 
understanding runs aground. 
ISBN/EAN: 9789090271194
kaft2.indd   1 16-09-12   21:23
T E C CEPT L SIS 
F F L  PSYC L Y
r  trij s
IN A PUBLIC STATE OF MIND
Derek Strijbos
p 8 nove ber 2012, 
o  15.30 uur precies, zal ik 
ijn proefschrift getiteld
in het openbaar verdedigen 
in de ula van de adboud 
niversiteit, 
o eniuslaan 2 te ij egen. 
I I I
I   LI  ST TE F I
THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
PARANI FEN
Cyril oers
Roel Schutgens
Jules van Binsbergen
 bent van harte 
uitgenodigd deze 
plechtigheid bij te 
onen. 
ansluitend is er 
een receptie in 
hetzelfde gebou . 
erek trijbos
Understanding people in ter s of their goals and reasons lies at the heart of 
our socio-cognitive abilities. It reveals the hu an ind as a discursive ind, a 
ind capable of reasoning about what to do and why. Established wisdo  in 
any corners of philosophy and psychology has it that discursive social practice 
hinges on the ascription of representational ental states, prototypical y beliefs 
and desires. On this so-cal ed belief-desire odel, we interpret the discursive 
inds of others essential y and exclusively as representational inds. This dis-
sertation departs fro  this consensus view and argues that our quotidian, spon-
taneous understanding of one another in ter s of goals and reasons is a for  
of relational sense- aking. Accordingly, folk psychological practice is based on 
the ascription of relational ental states, states that relate the individuals we 
interact with to their goals and reasons out in the public world of co on 
understanding. On this account, representational belief-desire psychology is not 
the conceptual core of folk psychology, nor the driving psychological force be-
hind our discursive engage ents with one another. Rather, it is an essential y 
co ple entary for  of social cognition, designed for reflection on and an-
age ent of such discursive engage ents when our default, relational odus of 
understanding runs aground. 
ISBN/EAN: 9789090271194
kaft2.indd 1 16-09-12 21:23
